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INTRODUCTION
Copyright law worldwide

is

facing a

new

challenge - the Internet.

Although new

technologies have often caused reason for concern in the field before,^ rarely since the

by Gutenberg

invention of the printing press

The

strength

of the

the

Internet,

unprecedented speed and ease,

is

ability

in

to

1440 has the challenge been
distribute

this great.

information worldwide with

the cause for a multitude of legal problems especially in

the field of copyright. Facilitated distribution of information

means

facilitated copyright

infringement as well.^ Lately, the attention has been drawn to music and sound recording
copyrights in particular, due to the highly publicized cases involving

The problems addressed

Napster, Inc."

German

scientist at the

MP3^.

filters

It

file size.^

in those cases

Frauenhofer Institute invented a

sounds not perceptible to the human

While a

5

and

ear,

MP3.com and

in this thesis arose after a

new

digital

audio

file

format:

thereby dramatically decreasing

minute song would have taken up 50

MB

of

memory

before the

See generally, Timothy L. Skelton, Internet Copyright Infringement and Service Providers: The Case for
a Negotiated Rulemaking Alternative, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 219 (1998) (describing the Internet and its
function); see also Michael Neuber, Urheberrecht im Internet, (2000) (describing the spread of the Internet
'

in

Germany)

New technologies

have had an impact on copyright law whenever invented. One

printing press but also of phonorecords,

CDs and computer programs

Merges, Peter S Menell, Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property
citing Paul Goldstein, Copyright's

Highway (1995) and

in the

for

may

think not only of the

example. See generally Robert

New Technological

P.

Age, 347 (2000),

Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation

and

Technological Change, 68 Or.L.Rev. 265 (1989)
See generally Timothy L. Skelton, Internet Copyright Infringement and Service Providers: The Case for a
Negotiated Rulemaking Alternative, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 219 (1998)
"*

*

A&M Records, Inc.

rem

'd.

v.

Napster, Inc.,

239 F.3d 1004 (9*

Cir. 2001),

1

14 F.Supp.2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev

UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F.

'd in part,

and

Supp.2d 349

(S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also Timothy L. Skelton, Internet Copyright Infringement and Service Providers: The
Case for a Negotiated Rulemaking Alternative, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 219, 219-220 and footnote 8 (1998)
^

*

MP3
MP3

stands for

Motion Picture Experts Group

1

Layer 3

reduces the original sound data by a factor of twelve. See Timothy L. Skelton, Internet Copyright

Infringement and Service Providers: The Case for a Negotiated Rulemaking Alternative, 35 San Diego L.
Rev. 219, 220-242(1998)

)

advent of MP3, the same song can

tremendous decrease
faster; especially in

in file-size

now be

makes

stored using only 5

broadband technologies and ever increasing
is

obvious that

It is

the transfer of such files over the Internet

conjunction with faster connections via

Moreover, the sound quality of MP3

MB.

memory and

better than that

DSL,

modem

cable

RAM

much

or other

of home PCs.

size

of older formats;

this

it

produces near-

perfect digital copies. '° Peer-to-peer (P2P) filesharing networks like Napster, or Gnutella

have further

facilitated the transfer

of audio

files:

They

are based

the case of Napster a catalogue and search engine service),

to

browse the

services' other users' hard-drives

on

free software (and in

which enables

and ultimately

lets

Internet users

them copy

files

directly fi-om that location." Internet access providers (lAPs), Internet service providers

(ISPs) and Online service providers (OSPs)'^ enable the individual user to access the

and thereby are a prerequisite

Internet

infiingement.'^

to

Whether they can be held

any activity of the users

that could constitute

liable for online infiingements is

an important

question in the context because the result has tremendous implications for the

growth and structure of the Internet and

Using .wav.,

'

Blues.

'

aix, .wmf.,

Computers Today,

.pcm or

modem

aiff file formats.

communications technology

See Praveen

S.

Thampi,

MP3

fiirther

in general.

Digital Format:

Funk and

86, Jan.31, 1999

RAM stands for Random Access Memory, see http://www.webopedia.com
See generally <http://Intemet.bestbuy.com; http://Intemet.fastaccess.com/consumer/blsc_howfast.jsp>

(last visited

6/1/2001); With a regular

56K modem the

transfer of a five

minute song would

still

take up to

thirty minutes.

A&M

"^

See generally
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 1 14 F.Supp.2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part,
rev 'd in part, and rem 'd. 239 F.3d 1004 (9* Cir. 2001
" For a detailed description of P2P technology and Napster Inc.'s service in particular, see
Records,

A&M

Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
1

004 (9

Cir.

1

and rem 'd. 239 F.3d
Copyright Infringement and Service

14 F.Supp.2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part,

2001 ); see generally Timothy

L. Skelton, Internet

Providers: The Case for a Negotiated Rulemaking Alternative, 35 San Diego L.Rev. 219, 224-241 (1998);
for a description of decentralized P2P systems like Gnutella, see generally Frederike Hanel, Napster und

Gnutella

-

Prohleme bei der Obertragung von MPi-Dateien nach deutschem Urheberrecht, JurPC Web-

Dok. 245/2000, Abs. 28 (2000), <http://www.jurpc.de/aufsatz/20000245.htm> (last visited 6/5/2001)
'^
These types of services differ in that they offer different levels of service to their subscribers. In this

however all be referred to as OSPs.
See Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright Infringement,
Enterprise Liability, And the First Amendment, 88 Geo. L. J. 1833, 1836 (2000)
thesis they will
''

for writing about liability for copyright infringement with special regard to

The reasons

music on the Internet are

fairly

obvious in

light

of these recent and ongoing

and the introduction of legislation addressing the problems of
infringements

like

the

for online

liability

Millenium Copyright Act (hereinafter:

Digital

litigations

DMCA)

or

European Directive 2000/3 1/EC.'^
It

may be

and comfortable

useful to explain

why

a comparative approach

own

caught up in one's

to get

legal

often difficult enough to understand and apply ones

a foreign legal system

may seem

the familiar

legal

is fatal to

rare in the field of law

from another
progress

is

Europe.

it

illustrated

is

As
the

work organized and

'"*

'^
'^

is

borrowing

would be without

familiar,

a steady flow of accessible

by examples as old as the reception of Roman law

of

many

may

pose

useful. In order to

keep

like the Internet, are global

and

few remarks

may be

systematic, the relevant law and

for the legal

its

application to the issue will

systems of Germany and the United

Furthermore the historical and philosophical background of copyright law

in the

80 et. seq.
Alan Watson, Roman Law and Comparative Law, Preface, 97 et. seq. (1991)
See generally, Allan Watson: Roman Law and Comparative Law (1991) (giving an overview of the
Infra, p.

impact of Roman law)

in

legal systems.

this thesis, a

be presented and discussed separately
States.

is

important to conduct this study comparatively, especially

difficulties for

to the structure

It

laws accurately and the study of

one does not stray beyond the boundaries of the

because the problems concerning the topic,

much of the same

own

easy

an effort too great. Yet, this reluctance to look beyond

inhibited just as learning

Therefore,

system and not look abroad

and the main source of change and new approaches

may be

It is

development and improvement since entirely new ideas are

legal system.'^ If

information. This

was chosen.

respective legal systems

is

included but kept as short as possible, so as to address the real

issue in appropriate length.

philosophical topics to

some

It

is

however, necessary to elaborate on historical and

extent, since both are vital to the understanding

law, the problems arising in conjunction with the Internet and even

insightful

more

so to an

comparison of the laws discussed.

The

final part

of

this thesis, after presentation, analysis

laws and the respective problems and solutions
will

of copyright

to the

and comparison of the

problems concerning the

be a conclusion including the author's opinions and suggestions

Internet,

CHAPTER
A. Copyright protection in
In

Germany,

is

COPYRIGHT LAW IN GERMANY

Germany - General Overview

like in the

United States, there

Article 14 Grundgesetz

in the constitution.

since copyright

I:

is

(GG)

only indirect mention of copyright

guarantees the right to property, and

considered property, this article protects

at least the

economic

rights

the copyright holder. Article 73 Nr. 9 Grundgesetz (GG)'^ assigns the legislative

concerning copyright to the federal legislative bodies. The legislative used

1965 to reform copyright law, formerly regulated by the
music) of 1901^^ and the

Germany

is

KUG (concerning art

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und

clause", U.S. Const,
'*

power

power

in

(concerning literature and

and photography) of 1907^'. Copyright

in

almost exclusively regulated by the Copyright Statute enacted on 9/9 1965,

the Urheberrechtsgestez (hereinafter UrhG).^^

'^

LUG

this

of

art.

1

Article 14 Grundgesetz

express purpose

is

the protection of the

Urhebervertragsrecht, 37 (1997); For the U.S. "copyright and patent

§ 8, cl. 8., see infra, p.

[GG]

Its

88 (quoting from

[Constitution]: "(1)

§ 8, cl. 8)

Das Eigentum und das Erbrecht werden
"

und Schranken des Eigentums werden durch die Gesetze bestimmt.
(2) Eigentum verpflichtet. Sein Gebrauch soil zugleich dem Wohle der AUgemeinheit dienen.
(3) Eine Enteignung ist nur zum Wohle der AUgemeinheit zulaessig. Sie darfnur durch Gesetz oder auf
Grund eines Gesetzes erfolgen, das Art und Ausmass der Entschaedigung regelt. Die Entschaedigung ist
unter gerechter Abwaegung der Interessen der AUgemeinheit und der Beteiligten zu bestimmen. Wegen der
"
Hoehe der Entschaedigung steht im Streitfalle der Rechtsweg vor den ordentlichen Gerichten ojfen.
Translation provided by author: "( 1 ) Property and succession are guaranteed. The laws define content and

gewaehrleistet. Inhalt

limitations of property.
(2) Property is

an obligation.

(3) Expropriation

contains the
interests

is

Its

use serve the public good at the same time.

only permissible for the public good.

It

may

manner and scope of compensation. Compensation

only take place by law or under a law that
is

to

be defined by justly weighing the

of the public and the interests of the parties involved. Concerning the amount of compensation

recourse to the courts

is

guaranteed."

GG: "Die Gesetzgebung des Bundes

hat die ausschliessliche Gesetzgebung ueber:
"
gewerblichen Rechtsschutz, das Urheberrecht und das Verlagsrecht...
Translation provided by author: "The federal legislative has the exclusive legislation regarding:
Article 73

regulations, copyright and publishing law..."
''^

^'

^^

See Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 53 (1997)
See id., 53-54
Schoenfelder, Deutsche Gesetze, Stand Juni 2001 Nr. 65,

<http://www.netlaw.de/gesetz/urhg.htm>

(last visited

full text

6/5/2001)

also available at

...9.

den

...9.

trade

author's economical and moral interests in her work,

it

regulates the relation between the

author and his successors and the work.

Other laws relevant for copyright protection
international

in

Germany

European law^^, the Informations- und Telekommunikations-

treaties^"*,

dienstegesetz (luKDG),^^ and the Buergerliches Gesetzbuch

Germany

(BOB), the

civil

code of

.

The philosophical and

1,

are to be found in

The

earliest signs

historical

background - "Natural law theory"

of concern regarding authors and their rights arose when Eike

von Repgow published his Sachsenspiegel, a book of laws for Saxony,

in

1230.

He

expressed worries that others might copy his work and alter the contents, which would
then be attributed to him.^^ At this time no copyright law existed in

only "remedy"

known

to authors

was

to curse those

who

Germany and

the

copied or altered their work

unauthorized in the foreword to their works.^^

With

the

invention of the printing press, copyright began to evolve. First,

privileges, closer to a

the

^^

^*

16**^

century the

modem

first

day patent than

author's privilege

to a copyright,

was

were granted

to printers, hi

granted, affording the rights to certain

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht (1997)
Germany is a member to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and

July 24, 1971; the

World

Intellectual Property Organization

Artistic Works, Paris
[WIPO], Convention establishing the World

Intellectual Property Organization, July 14 1967, entered in to force April 26, 1970, for the

United States

Aug. 25, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 1749 and the 1996 WIPO treaties: WIPO Copyright Treaty [WCT], 36 I.L.M. 65
(1997) and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty [WPPT], 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997) not in force, see
infra, p. 78
" Especially Council Directive 2000/3 1/EC which will be addressed in detail later; see infra, p. 78-79
^^
Also available at <http://www.netlaw.de/gesetz/IuKDG.htm> (last visited 6/5/2001)
^^
Provisions on intent/negligence (§ 276) are found in the Buergerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code]
^^
Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 45 (1997); see also Georg Mueller: Eike von Repgow
als Urheber, Archiv fiier Urheberrecht 1937, 383-422, 417
^'
Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 45 (1997)

to their creator rather than to the pubHsher.^°

works

preparation of copies of the

work and were Hmited

the author's privileges have httle in

common

to a

These privileges prohibited the
term of three

to ten years.

While

with today's copyright, they are an early

expression of the author's moral rights.^'

The change
18'*"

in

paradigm from privilege

to intellectual

property

century. Johann Stephan Puetter (1725-1807), intrigued

came about

in the

by John Locke's (1632-

1704) idea that the justification for private property was to be found in labor^", wrote that
creative

works

are "unstreitig ein

wahres Eigentum ihres Verfassers, so wie Jeder

was seiner Geschicklichkeit und seinem
Eigentum ansehen kann.

"^^

Fleiss sein Dasein zu

danken

hat.

das,

als sein

This approach was refined by the distinction between the

property in the work and property in the expressed ideas of the author; the former being

considered no different from any other property right in tangibles, the
as an inalienable natural

right.'''*

Long before

the author's personality- related rights in the

first fairly

modem

^^

being defined

the codification of copyright in the

work were recognized

codification of copyright in the parts of

become Germany was

latter

Europe

Germany.^^ The

in

that

would eventually

the Prussian copyright statute of 1837, followed

47-48; a privilege system

UrhG,

by

a statute for

is often regarded as primitive because it does not recognize authors' natural
Bundesgenchtshof m Zivilsachen [BGHZ] [Supreme Court] 17, 266, 270-277
^
See Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 49 (1997); This approach is common in
continental Europe. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books.
Photocopies and Computer Programs, 84 Harv.L.Rev. 281, 284 (1970), quotmg Marion: "...as the heavens
and earth belong to god, because they are the works of his word. so the author of a book is its complete
master, and as such can dispose of it as he chooses."
Translation provided by author: "Intellectual works are indisputably property, just as anyone may claim
as his property that which owes its existence to his skillfiilness and labor.", Johann Stephan Puetter, Der
Buechermarkt nach aechten Grundsaetzen des Rechts geprueft (1774, republished 1981)
^*
Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 49 (1997), quoting Immanuel Kant, Von der
Unrechtmaessigkeit des Buechemachdrucks (1785) or Immanuel Kant, Of the Injustice of Counterfeiting
Books,
Essays and Treatises on Moral, Political and Various Philosophical Subjects 225, 229-230

Id.,

rights in their creations, see

.

1

(Richardson Ed. 1798)

.

northern Germany, which

amended

A revision

in 1876.

which

statute,

was kept

work and

period

when

law for the Reich of 1871 and

of copyright in 1901 resulted in the

LUG,

a

new

copyright

finally led to the present copyright statute."'^ Interestingly, during the

Nazis' reign of terror, copyright

the

as the copyright

was declared

ideas were labeled as

copyright

to

be a fiduciary right of the author, while

"common good of the

was not perceived

Copyright in Germany today

is

as a proprietary

again (or

more

people". This remains the only

nght

m Germany.

accurately:

perception that the author has a natural right to his creation.

still)

based on the

Internationally

it

has been

recognized in Art. 6bis Berne Convention.

2.

The Urheberrechtsgesetz (Copyright

The UrhG

Statute)

consists of five parts.

The

first

part concerns the nature

of copyright, while the second deals with similar or related
special provisions for

moving

rights.

The

and existence

third part contains

pictures; the fourth contains provisions applied to both

copyright and related rights, such as infiingement actions and procedural rules. Finally,
the fifth part regulates the scope of the statute and contains rules of temporal conflicts.^^

^^

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 145 (1997), quoting Reichsgericht
[RGZ] [Supreme Court before 1949] 79, 397.
^^
See Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 52-55 (1997)

" See

id.,

in Zivilsachen

54

BGHZ

Heading and at 278: "Die Herrschaft des Urhebers ueber sein Werk, auf
Lohnfuer eine Verwertung seiner Leistung durch Dritte gruendet.
wird hiemach nicht erst durch den Gesetzgeber verliehen, sondern folgt aus der Natur der Sache, naemlich
aus seinem geistigen Eigentum, das durch die positive Gesetzgebung nur seine Anerkennung und
Id.,

49; see also

17, 266,

die sich sein Anspruch auf gerechten

Ausgestaltung findet.

"

Translation provided by author: "The author's

compensation

for the use

of his work

is

power over

founded,

is

because of the author's intellectual property, which

his work,

not created
is

by

his claim for just

merely recognized and put into legal form by the

law."
^'

on which

the legislature but exists naturally,

See Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 55 (1997)

The

first

and fourth parts are

be examined closely in

to

this thesis.

\n the

following, the requirements and scope of protection will be presented in general and with

regard to musical works and sound recordings in particular. "Musical works" are

understood as "a succession of sounds intended to create an acoustic experience for the

listener".'"^

common

This definition serves to draw the line between composed musical works and

or

random sounds.

are created as the result of

does not matter

It

some human

act

how

the sounds are created as long as they

of creation, which controls the compositional

media

that

allow the playback of the musical work with the aid of a playback device such as a

CD

process.'*'

"Sound Recordings"

are manufactured fixations of musical

works

in

player or a tape deck.

Requirements for protection:

a.

Today, the requirements for copyright protection in Germany are contained

UrhG. Typical
music, fine

protectible subject matter are

arts,

Id. at

literature including speech"*

computer programs'*^, pantomimic and choreographic works,

design, architecture, photographies and

*"

works of

moving

in the

pictures.'*'* In

industrial

the context of this thesis.

91

91 Accordingly, "music" created by "random" are not protectible; neither would John Cage's
"4.33" be protectible in which a pianist sits at a piano quietly for four minutes and thirty three seconds as a
Id. at

;

is no compositional creativity involved. It may or may not be protected as a
performance or other work of art.
"
See Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 87-88 (1997) (stating that while a single word
rarely protectible, the length of the work is unimportant and that the scope of protection and whether

musical work. There

protection should be granted for certain works in this category such as telephone

heated discussion and courts have decided
*^

These are

now

literature. See,

See,

many

in

different

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und

book design

is

commonly considered works of

Urhebervertragsrecht, 88-89 (1997),

BGHZ 94,

276, 282

Urhebervertragsrecht, 87-102 (1997) (giving an overview of the

various kinds of works and definition thereof

is

subject to

ways)

expressly mentioned. Before, computer programs were

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und

,

10

the focus will be

problems and

on musical works and the related sound recordings/^ Therefore the

difficulties arising

with regard to some of the other kinds of works will not

be elaborated upon.
§

and

1

art".

UrhG"*^ clarifies that the law protects authors of "works of literature, science

The

central element

is

the

work

itself

Defining the term "work" causes
47

considerable problems.

It

is

often claimed that the term defies definition altogether.

Especially since the forms of protectible works mentioned in the law are merely

examples, not a

however,

*^

"list

of protected works".

UrhC*^ describes a "work"

§ 2

Since

some form of

definition

is

necessary,

as a "personal intellectual creation" of the

Although many of the problems and solutions discussed here

will equally

apply to other protected subject

matter.
*^

§

1

Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG] [Copyright Statute]: "Die Urheber von Werken der Literatur,

Wissenschaft unci Kunst geniessen fuer ihre Werke Schutz nach Massgabe dieses Gesetzes.

"

Translation provided by author: "Authors of works of literature, science and art enjoy protection of their

works according
See,
*^

"'

See,

to the

measures

set out in this law."

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 78 (1997)
id. at 78 and compare §2(1) UrhG

2 UrhG:

§

Zu den geschuetzten Werken der Literatur, Wissenschaft und Kunst gehoeren insbesondere:
Sprachwerke, wie Schriftwerke, Reden, und Computerprogramme;

"(1)
1.

Werke der Musik;
pantomimische Werke einschliesslich Werke der Tanzkunst;
4. Werke der bildenden Kuenste einschliesslich der Werke der Baukunst und der angewandten Kunst und
Entwuerfe solcher Werke;
5. Lichtbildwerke einschliesslich der Werke, die aehnlich wie Lichtbildwerke geschaffen werden;
6. Filmwerke einschliesslich der Werke, die aehnlich wie Filmwerke geschaffen werden:
7. Darstellungen wissnschaftlicher oder technischer Art. wie Zeichnungen, Plaene, Karten, Skizzen,
2.
3.

Tabellen und plastische Darstellungen.
"

Werke im Sinne dieses Gesetzes sind nur persoenliche geistige Schoepfungen.
Translation provided by author:
"(1) Protected works especially include works of literature, science and art of the following kind:
1. works of speech like writings, speeches and computer programs;
(2)

2.

musical works;

3.

pantomimic works including works of choreography;
works of art including architectural works, functional art and drafts of such works;
photographies and works created in a similar way as photographies;
moving pictures including works created in a similar way as moving pictures;
depictions of the scientific or technical kind like drawings, plans, maps, drafts, tables and

4.
5.
6.
7.

depictions.
(2)

Works

in the

terminology used here are only personal creations of the author."

plastic

11

Even though

author.

this definition is

anything but accurate or concrete,

it

reveals

some

necessary elements for a work to be protectible under the law:

The work must be

(1)

a personal creation of the author. ^°

objects trouves, objects that were not prepared

works.

also

It

everyday

bars

objects

What

means

this

by a human being, cannot be

(so-called

ready-mades)

from

is that

protectible

protection.

Accordingly an author cannot achieve protection for his "art" by simply proclaiming an

everyday object to be
because

by

its

it

is

art.

Marcel Duchamp's "Urinal""'

for

example,

not protected

is

merely a urinal and the "author" did nothing but proclaim that

placement

in a

museum. On

act

became

art

the other hand, Tinguely's scrap metal sculptures are

protected since the author performed an act of creation in this case.^

must be some human

it

of creation for the product of

Essentially, there

this creative

process to be

protectible under the UrhG.^^

Consequently, musical works must be such a personal
protected.

Any composition,

other device, which

considered a

^^

human

is

human

creation to be

prepared with or without the aid of a machine, instrument or

put together or controlled by the creator himself must be

creation and a personal creation of the author. Accordingly, almost

Haimo Schack, Urheber- imd Urhebervertragsrecht, 103 (1997)
Marcel Duchamp placed a normal urinal in a museum and proclaimed that it was therefore art.
^^
See. Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 79 (1997)
'^
Id.; Some legal scholars have suggested that such proclamations of art should be regarded as a sufficient
act of human creation. See Max Kummer: Das urheberrechtlich schuetzbare Werk (1968), 75; Max
Kummer: Die Entgrenzung der Kunst und das Urheberrecht (1976), 89-1 15, 95; This view has not received
much sympathy and has been rejected entirely by the vast majonty of copyright scholars in Germany
because what is protected must not be defined by the author but needs to be defmed objectively. See
Gerhard Schricker/ Ulrich Loewenheim, Kommentar zum UrhG, § 2 Nr. 6 2"'' Ed. 1999); Eugen Ulmer:
See.

^'

Urheber- und Verlagsrecht (1980); Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht (1997)
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every piece of music satisfies this requirement, except for "creations" in which the
"author" expressly wishes to give up control over the progression of sounds.

The work must have some

(2)

content-based, but simply

intellectual content. This

means

individual expression of creativity.

much

practical functions,

requirement

is

less that

that a

work

However,
it

it

is

only protectible

does not

mean

if

that the

it

is

the author's

work cannot have

needs to be aesthetically pleasing in any way.

The

a very low threshold to protection.

Pieces of music that satisfy the

first

requirement generally pass this threshold as

well. Since copyright is not content-based, protection is

that is

does not render copyright law

an individual expression

in this sense,

be

it

awarded

to

any kind of music

'muzak', a symphony, a military march

or Metallica's latest single.

The idea

(3)

medium

is

form

which

in

in itself is not

considered a protectible work. While fixation in a tangible

not required in order to achieve protection, the

it

work must be presented

can be perceived by others. ^^ Accordingly, a live performance or

broadcast and even improvised speech can be protected under the

are perceptible.

work

is

There

a personal

distinction only

is

no idea-expression dichotomy^^

'intellectual creation'

comes

See remarks regarding "4.33" by John Cage, supra,

'^

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und

57

58

because of

into play regarding the scope

^*

'^M

p. 8,

its

UrhG

as long as they

in the true sense

content not

of the proprietary

its

rights.

footnote 41

Urhebervertragsrecht, 80 (1997)

80-81

Regarding

this

in a

terminology and concept important to U.S. Copyright law, see infra,
Urhebervertragsrecht, 80-81 (1997)

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und

p.

95

because the
form.

The

With regard

13

works

to musical

form

this

means nothing more than

that is perceptible,

be

it

at

a live concert, in sheet

While the work does not need

(4)

that

it

was

the author's

own

to

work must furthermore be

personality,

which

been expressed

in

some

music or other forms.

it

must be

original in the sense

copy or an imitation of another's

the creative expression of the author's creative

commonly assumed where

differently. ^° This is

music must be available

be entirely novel

creation as opposed to a

work.^^ The

is

that the

the idea behind the

work could have

one of the reasons for the German rule

author can only be an individual. Corporations have no personality,

let

that the

alone a creative

one; they cannot be authors in this sense and therefore cannot be copyright holders

Abnost any musical idea can be expressed

either.^'

be

difficult to

originality.

The

in different

ways wherefore

would

claim that a musical work does not deserve protection due to lack of
rule that corporations cannot

be copyright holders constitutes one major

difference between the copyright laws of Germany and the United States.

^^

Since ideas must remain freely available to everyone, only the concrete work

(5)

protectible. Concepts,

is

methods, styles and the like are not protectible. For the same

and because they can hardly be the expression of the author's creative

reasons

personality, facts are not protectible subject matter.^^ For example:

''

it

Id. at

82

Id. at

82-83 (stating that

Of course

" See Craig
that in the

this is a

low threshold

rarely relevant to the question

Arnold Schoenberg's

of protectibility)

corporations can be assigned the rights to economically exploit a work, see infra, p. 16
Joyce, William Patry, Marshall Leaffer, Peter Jaszi, Copyright Law, 273 {5^ Ed. 2000) (stating

United States the "work for hire doctrine" allows for corporate

entities to

be considered the

author of an employee's creation)

" Haimo

Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 82-83 (1997) (stating that by definition there can be

no author of facts)

14

concept of "twelve tone music"

compositions

not protected by copyright while his individual

is

are.^"*

Protection begins with the creation of the work, even if

(6)

published.

The copyright

the work's content.^^

is

not influenced

As mentioned

by the

legal

earlier, fixation,

has not yet been

it

age of the author or the legality of
publication or formalities are not

requirements for copyright protection.

The scope of protection

b.

Protection under the

commonly

UrhG

is

twofold:

The

first

group of protected rights

referred to as the Urheberpersoenlichkeitsrecht (hereinafter:

translated, the author's personality-related rights in the work.^^

these provisions are the result of the perception that the

some

extent an extension of the author's personality to

The provisions concerning

the

UPR

are §§ 12-14

work

German

is

UPR), roughly

rights contained in

an expression and to

which he has the exclusive

UrhG. The

right.^*^

fact that they are dealt

before any economical rights of the author demonstrates

considered to be in

The

how

is

the

central

with

UPR

is

copyright law, the emphasis being on the protection of the

author's creative personality rather than his or her economical interests.^^

"^

Id. at

83

Therefore works whose content

is

criminally relevant are

still

protectible subject matter, though the

author cannot claim damages or assign valid licenses, since the law cannot promote or protect profit from
illegal activities.

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und

Urhebervertragsrecht, 103 (1997); Oberlandesgericht

[Court of Appeals] Hamburg, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht

[GRUR]

[OLG]

1984, 663

^^

Haimo Schack., Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 103-108 (1997)
The term "moral rights" does not reflect what stands behind the German term
attempt of further clarification was made.
**
Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 144 et. seq. (1997)
^^

fully.

This

is

why

the

"

15

As

(1)

the general subject of copyright protection, §

intellectual relationship

although

section,

the emphasis

The use of

author to his work.

it

UrhG

states the personal

and

between the author and his work/° The droit d'auteur approach

shown by

clearly visible as

is

1 1

may

the

work

on personal and

is

intellectual relations

of the

only mentioned in the second part of the

be economically and practically more important than the

author's moral rights today. While §

1 1

UrhG

is

only a general provision, the susequent

Sections clarify the extent of the author's rights in particular.

(2)

§

decision

12 UrhG^' concerns the right to publish, clarifying that

if,

when and how

The work

(a)

is

his

work

is

the author's

when

it

has been

made

available to the public

Concerning musical works and sound recordmgs

with the permission of the author.

when

is

published.

published in this sense

publication normally occurs

it

the

work

is

made

available to the general public for

purchase through a publishing company or by the author herself. If the work
available in conventional formats like records, cassette tapes or

CDs

it

is

made

has been published

the UPR is the reason for any economical rights; the latter derive from it)
UrhG: "Das Urheberrecht schuetzt den Urheber in semen geistigen und persoenlichen Beziehungen
zum Werk und in der Nutzung des Werkes."
Translation provided by author: "Copyright protects the author's intellectual and personal relation to the
"
work and the use thereof.
^'
§ 12 UrhG: "(1) Der Urheber hat das Recht zu bestimmen, ob und wie sein Werk zu veroeffentlichen ist.
(2) Dem Urheber ist es vorbehalten, den Inhalt seines Werkes oeffentlich mitzuteilen oder zu beschreiben,
solange weder das Werk. noch der wesentliche Inhalt oder eine Beschreibung des Werkes mit seiner
Zustimmung veroeffentlicht ist.
Translation provided by author: "(1) The author has the right to decide whether and if so, how his work is
*^

Id. (stating that

™

§ 11

to

be published.

(2)

It is

reserved to the author to describe the contents of his work publicly as long as neither the work nor

work have been published with his perrrussion."
ist veroeffentlicht, wenn es mit Zustimmung des Autors der
"
zugaenglich gemacht worden ist.
the contents of the
^^

§

6 UrhG: "Ein Werk

Oeffentlichkeit

16

if the author's

Internet. If the

it

is

published

permission was granted. The same should apply to publication on the

work

is

if the

disseminated on the Internet, be

author consented,

it

given her permission to the dissemmation.

§ 12

(b)

UrhG

is

it

in

MP3

format or other formats,

unpublished as long as the author has not

73

also assigns to the author the sole right to describe her yet unpublished

work. This right reflects both moral and economical interests since publication
prerequisite for financial exploitation of the work.

against the

author's will

to

protect

It is

is

a

designed to prevent publication

her opportunities to profit economically from

publication as well as to protect her from undue criticism or misrepresentation or false

attribution

first

due to premature publication against her

publication.

The author has other

rights that

will.^"*

may

unauthorized publications but the right granted in §

The

right only goes

toward

allow her to prevent further
12

UrhG

ends with the

first

authorized publication/^ With publication the author also loses certain rights, such as

those granted in § 12 (2)

UrhG

UrhG

regarding the relaying of the work's content or the § 18

right to display exclusively. Certain uses

of the work also become legal without

permission upon publication, which will be dealt with in detail

Translation provided by author:
the permission

"A work

is

published

when

it

has been

made

at a later

stage of this

available to the public with

of the author."

" Haimo

Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 150,151 and 188-189 (1997); see also Mathias
Schwarz, Urheberrecht im Internet, Der Markenartikel 1996, 120, 122 (discussing the dissemination of
"Voodoo Lounge" - Video by the Rolling Stones over the web); see also Frederike Hanel, Napster und
Gnutella - Probleme bei der Obertragung von MP3-Dateien nach deutschem Urheberrecht. JurPC Web-

Dok. 245/2000, Abs. 1-57 (2000), http://www.jurpc.de/aufsatz/20000245.htm (last visited 6/5/2001)
(mentioning that regarding sound recordings, the "author" in this sense is the manufacturer)
Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 149-150 (1997); KG, Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift [NJW] 1995, 3392, 3394 (Botho Strauss) and Stroenholm, GRUR 1963, 364

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 149-150 (1997), quotmg Eugen Ulmer, Festschrift
Hubmann, 435 and Gerhard Schricker/Ulrich Loewenheim, Kommentar zum UrhG, § 12 UrhG Nr. 7

fuer
(2"''

Ed. 1999)

17

work. ''^ With regard to musical works on the Internet
publication clearly encompasses the right to

first

this

important since the right to

publication on the Internet

-

if the

first

work

has not been published in a different format beforehand, in which case the right to
publication has ended and the rights to copy and electronically render the

the relevant provisions.'^''

However,

§

12

UrhG

still

work

will

be

bears importance to the problems

discussed here since quite a few musical works have been distributed over the Internet

before being published with the author's consent.
actionable violation of the author's right to

Even though

work

UPR

is

7Q

the

UrhG

this

would be an

may

allow another to publish the

person rights concerning the use of the

•

This grant of the right to publish and other rights related to the publication

is vital

context of the music industry. Artists generally grant these rights to their

publisher/record company. This does not

rights to the record

company

another while the §12

(3)

§ 12

publication.

inalienable, the author

in conjunction with granting the other

work.
in

the

first

Under

The author

UrhG

mean

that the author assigns her

§12

UrhG

but rather that he allows these rights to be used/executed by

right stays with the author.

also has the right to

be recognized as such. This

may

be important

to

her because only by being recognized through her works in public can the author achieve

^^

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und

" See

infra, p.

Urhebervertragsrecht, 150 (1997);

compare §§ 48,

51, 59

UrhG

20

The band Metallica for example filed their complaint against Napster Inc. after their song "I disappear"
had been available through Napster's service before authorized publication. See Lars Ulrich, Note, The
Globe and Mail (Toronto, Canadan July M"^ 2000)
^''
Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 150 (1997), citing Eugen Ulmer Festschrift fuer
Hubmann, 435

"
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a reputation. ^°

It

includes the right to decide whether and

recognizable as the

work of

the specific author,

important result of § 13 UrhG.^'

§

against copyright piracy and plagiarism

the

work

is

UrhG

13

in

by making

which

how

is

work

the

be made

considered to be the most

conjunction with § 63
citation

is to

UrhG

protects

of the author mandatory when

quoted.^^ Internet users or others involved in the activities to be discussed

here rarely claim authorship. Accordingly, this problem has no real impact on the issue of

and will not be discussed

this thesis

Another

(4)

result

mutilation of her

of the droit d'auteur approach

work or any other

intellectual interests in the

The

work).

First,

it

Second,

to

is

it

work

subject of protection

three-tier test is

further.

commonly

(§

is

is

alteration that could

14

UrhG -

the author's right to forbid the

endanger her valid personal or

right to maintain the integrity

not the work itself but the author's interest in

it.

A

applied to determine whether the right has been violated:

be determined whether the work has indeed been mutilated or

must be shown

of the

altered.

that the alteration or mutilation is in conflict with the author's

vested personal or intellectual interests, and finally the test compares the author's

§ 13

UrhG: "Der Urheber hat das Recht auf Anerkennung seiner Urheberschaft

am

Werk.

Er kann

bestimmen, ob das Werk mit einer Vrhebenbezeichnung zu versehen und welche Bezeichnung zu verwenden
ist.

Translation provided by author: "The author has the right to be recognized as such.

decide whether the work

He

also has the right to

be marked as being authored by him and in which fashion this is to be done."
Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 152-153 (1997) (clarifying that this does not give the
author the protection against others revealing his or her true identity); Gerhard Schricker/Ulrich
Loewenheim, Kommentar zum UrhG, § 13 Nr. 6 and Nr. 12 UrhG (2"'' Ed. 1999)
^^
Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 152-153 (1997)
is

to

§ 14 UrhG: "Der Urheber hat das Recht, eine Entstellung oder eine andere Beeintraechtigung seines
Werkes zu verbieten, die geeignet ist, seine berechtigten geistigen oder persoenliche Interessen am Werkzu

gefaehrden.

"

Translation provided by author: "The author has the right to forbid any mutilation or alteration of his

which could

interfere with his vested personal or intellectual interests in the

work."

work

19

with the conflicting interests of

interests

mutilation

others.^"^

this

to the definition

on the hitemet

in a

way that

results in

may

be relevant when a work

since

it

is

a different

in

format,

work

like

is

the

MP3

format

is

but that

at stake

Another

(5)

25 UrhG,
order to

but

(6)

it

it

is

not changed significantly,

is

it

is

not violated by

economic

into a different format; her

simply made

interest

may be

not the issue in § 12 UrhG.^^

right resulting

copies of

may be of help

Apart

normally

master onto tape.

recording of a digital

mainly from the

UPR

is

the right to access. Codified in §

allows the author access to his work even if

make

is

not a mutilation or

Furthermore, the author's personal or intellectual interest in the work

mere transformation of the work

made

can hardly be referred to as an adaptation

an exact copy.^^ The compression into

adaptation in this sense because the

available

It

is

such a mutilation of the work. However,

should rarely be the case since the music distributed over the internet

copied from conventional sound carriers.

the

of alteration or

does not matter whether the alteration improves the work or has a negative

it

impact, hi the context of this thesis, the provision

available

As

in

it

or alter

it.

This right

is

it is

no longer

his property, in

irrelevant in the context

of

this thesis,

comprehending the extensive reach of the UPR.

from the rights directly resulting from the UPR, copyright protects

economical rights of the author (Verwertungsrechte) Other than
.

many

copyright laws,

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 155 (1997); Gerhard Schricker/Ulrich Loewenheim,
Kommentar zum UrhG § 14 UrhG Nr. 18 (2"*^ Ed. 1999)
See, Frederike Hand, Napster und Gnutella - Probleme bei der Ubertragung von MP3-Dateien nach
deutschem Urheberrecht, JurPC Web-Dok. 245/2000, Abs. 1 (2000),
1

<http://www.jurpc.de/aufsatz/20000245.htm>

even though the copy

in

MPS

this is sufficient to constitute

format

is

(last visited

6/5/2001);

different technically,

it is

BGHZ

exact to the

reproduction/copying in the sense of the

UrhG)

17, 266,

human

269

f.

(stating that

perception and that

20

the

UrhG

does not contain a

list

of rights or a bundle of rights defined

grants the author the exclusive right to exploit his

his

work

in the intangible

the author's rights, this

that the rights

is

form

(§ 15 UrhG).^^

a misperception.

While

The word

in

it

its

German

to exploit his

seems

like § 15

UrhG

does

""""insbesondere" (particularly)

work

is

It

tangible form and perform

mentioned are not an exclusive enumeration but merely the most

and important. The author's right
way.^^

work

in the act itself

list

shows

common

not limited to theses rights in any

copyright law operates on the premise that the author

is

entitled to profit

on

economically from her work wherever possible.
rights

mentioned except

work, does not mean

16

for §

UrhG

that only uses

However

this,

and the

fact that all

only become relevant upon public use of the

of the work targeted

at profit

need

to

be authorized.

**

Concerning economic interest violations see infra, pp. 20, 26, 32 et. seq.
§ 15 UrhG: ''(l) Der Urheber hat das ausschliessliche Recht, sein Werk in koerperlicher Form zu
venverten; das Recht umfasst inshesondere:
1.

das Verfielfaeltigungsrecht (Paragraph 16)

2.

das Verbreitungsrecht (Paragraph

1 7)

das Ausstellungsrecht (Paragraph 18)
(2) Der Urheber hatferner das ausschliessliche Recht sein Werk

3.

in

unkoerperlicher

Form

oeffentlich

wiederzugeben (Recht der oeffentlichen Wiedergabe); das Recht umfasst insbesondere:
1. das Vortrags-, Auffuehrungs- und Vorfuehrungsrecht (Paragraph 19)
2. das Senderecht (Paragraph 20)
3. das Recht der Wiedergabe durch Bild- und Tontraeger (Paragraph 21)
4. das Recht der Wiedergabe durch Funksendungen (Paragraph 22)
(3) Die Wiedergabe ist oeffentlich wenn siefuer eine Mehrzahl von Personen bestimmt ist, es sei denn, dass
der Kreis dieser Personen bestimmt abgegrenzt ist und sie durch gegenseitige Beziehungen oder durch
"

Beziehung zum Veranstalter persoenlich untereinander verbunden sind.
Translation provided by author: "(1) The author has the exclusive right to exploit

his

work

in its corporal

form; this right particularly includes:

make

copies (section 16)

1.

the right to

2.

the right to distribute (section 17)

3.

the right to display (section 18)

(2)

The author

also has the exclusive right to publicly perform his

work

in

non-corporal form (right of

public performance); this right particularly includes:
1.

the right to performance, recital

2. the right to

3. the right to rendition
4. the right to rendition

(3)

and presentation (section 19)

broadcast (section 20)

through optical or audio-carriers (section 21)
through broadcast (section 22)

The performance is public, if it targets a multitude of persons, unless the circle of persons
is some personal relation between these persons or the individual persons and the

there

organizer/promoter."
^^

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und

*''

Id.;

RGZ

128, 102, 113;

Urhebervertragsrecht, 168 (1997)

BGHZ

17, 266, 282;

BGHZ

116, 305,

308

is finite

and

21

Although there are certain uses
limit the author's rights to

private

is

that

need not be authorized, copyright protection does not

economically relevant uses.^° The fact that use of the work in

largely unrestricted^'

is

merely a reflection of the legislative decision

on the actions of the mediator rather than those of the consumers, since the
practically uncontrollable.^^

that the author should

The reasoning behind

have the opportunity

his work.^^ For example: If the original

owner and persons somehow

to profit

work

related to her.

is

15

§

UrhG

is

latter are

founded on the belief

from every expansion of publicity of
of users

sold, the circle

The author

profits once,

work. If hundreds of copies are prepared and sold, the circle of users

and extends beyond the original buyer's private sphere.
profit

to focus

from the expansion of publicity and accessibility

is

limited to the

from the sale of the
is

potentially larger

In this case the author's right to

is

reflected

by her

profits

from

granting the license to copy.^'*

Electronic distribution or electronic rendition? § 15 (2) UrhG^^ vs. § 17 UrhG^^

(a)

One of

^ Haimo

the major questions in the context of musical

This will be discussed

'^

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und
Id.;

Internet

Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 168-169 (1997); BGHZ 17, 266, 279
in detail in the context of infringement actions, infra, pp. 32 et. seq.

^'

"Mat

works on the

Urhebervertragsrecht, 168-169 (1997)

169

(Discussing that the above could easily be mistaken as an expansion of the author's economical

rights into the

secondary market, which

is

not the case.

The author has no

right to control

what happens

to

authorized copies that are already on the market an does not profit financially)
^'

See foomote 87

§ 17 UrhG: ""(I) Das Verbreitungsrecht ist das Recht, das Original oder Vervielfaeltigungsstuecke des
Werkes der Oeffentlichkeit anzubieten oder in Verkehr zu bringen.
(2) Sind das Original oder Venielfaeltigungsstuecke des Werkes mit Zustimmung des zur Verbreitung
Berechtigten im Gebiet der Europaeischen Union oder eines anderen Vertragsstaates des Abkommens

ueber den Europaeischen Wirtschaftsraum im Wegen der Veraeusserung
ist

(3)

ihre Weiterverbreitung mit

Ausnahme der Vermietung

Vermietung im Sinne der Vorschriften dieses Gesetzes

in

Verkehr gebracht warden, so

zulaessig.
ist

die zeitlich begrenzte, unmittelbar oder

mittelbar Erwerbszwecken dienende Gebrauchsueberlassung. Als Vermietung gilt jedoch nicht die
"

Ueberlassung von Originalen oder Vervielfaeltigungsstuecken ...
Translation provided by author: "( 1 ) The right to distribute is the right to offer
circulation the original

work or copies

thereof.

to the public or put into

is

22

whether

§

15 (2)

UrhG

15 (1),

(rendition) or §§

UrhG

17

(distribution^ ^ should be

applied to the offering of works for online use.^^ All acts of exploitation mentioned in §

1

5 (2)

UrhG

rendition

is

author; the

require the public rendition of the work.

public, if it

is

meant

number of persons

for a multitude

is

A

irrelevant.

As

defined in

of persons unrelated

to

rendition in front of

1

§

UrhG

5 (3)

a

each other and the

two persons can be

public in this sense, while the rendition in front of a hundred persons at the author's

wedding

is

not.

The term public

is

With

understood more broadly than in § 6 UrhG.

regard to musical works and their dissemination over the hitemet, §

1

5 (2)

UrhG

has been

suggested to grant a right to "electronic rendition".'

The
broadcasts,

radio) is

offering of

which

aimed

at

works

under

fall

§

15 (2)

its

while transmission over the Internet happens

Union or other member

Renting as understood

which

is

of

TV

or

origin with only

at the individual

(like

one broadcast company,

request of the user.'^'

The

of the work have entered the market by way of disposal within the European
of the Agreement on the Common Market with the consent of the rightful

states

owner, further circulation
(3)

to cable transmissions

UrhG. However, a cable broadcast

a broad public and has

(2) If the original or copies

seems similar

for online use

is

lawful, except renting.

in the

directly or indirectly

provisions of this act

aimed

at

economical

is

allowing another to use the work for a limited time

profit.

Renting

is

not the transfer of originals or

copies..."

The remainder of § 17 UrhG concerns types of works irrelevant to this thesis.
See. Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 172 (1997) (Discussing that since the right to
copy and the right to distribute are both transferable and are commonly transferred together, the reasoning
for including a separate right to distribute is difficult to see. However, it must be noted that the right to
distribute can

be limited in time and geographical scope, which gives the author additional control over the
work)

distribution of the
'*
"^

Mathias Schwarz, Urheberrecht im Internet, Der Markenartikel 1996, 120, 215
Urhebervertragsrecht, 179-180 (1997)

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und

Frederike Hanel, Napster und Gnutella - Probleme bei der Obertragung von MP3-Dateien nach
deutschem Urheberrecht, JurPC Web-Dok. 245/2000, Abs. 13 (2000),
<http://www.jurpc.de/aufsatz/20000245.htm> (last visited 6/5/2001); LG Miinchen I, Grundurteil vom
30.03.2000, 7 O 3625/98, JurPC Web-Dok. 73/2000, Abs. 60,

<http://www.jurpc.de/rechtspr/20000073. htm#0060>

Loewenheim, Kommentar zum UrhG,

§ 15

Rn. 27

(last visited

(2"''

Ed. 1999);

Juergen Becker, Zeitschrift fuer Urheber und Markenrecht

Schwarz
'°'

im

[ZUM]

6/5/2001); Gerhard Schricker/Ulrich

BGHZ

Internet, Stand:

13, 159, 161

-

Einzelangebot;

1995, 231, 245; Mathias Schwarz,

September 2000, 3-2.2, S. 35
Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 186-188 (1997)
(Hrsg.), Recht

1

in:
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user's access to the

of others. Yet
scholars

who

work does not

this is

necessarily happen at the

at first glance, the

access to works

view

is

too restrictive.

it

It

exploitative act reserved to the author

is

making

the

relevant time should not be the time of actual access

is

uploaded

to a site

has the benefit of including
15 (2)

UrhG

'"'

the hitemet,

Under

this

this

-

UrhG was

Oberster Genchtshof

(by

exploitation

presumption, the

available for online use.

the user but rather the time

transitory copies

made

in order to

the

UrhG

since the Internet

was

drafted and consequently could not consider

[OGH]

would

The

when

and thereby made available for access. This understanding

all

by

UrhG.

available on

upload as part of the

right to electronic rendition.'^^ This understanding also closes a

legal protection provided

the

work

by

make works

new form of

transmission) in non-tangible form under § 15 (2) UrhC'^"*

work

§ 15 (3)

§ 15 (3)

cannot be considered a 'broadcast' in the traditional sense

the Internet for online use should be considered a

when

On

must therefore be considered public under

indeed require simultaneous access. Accordingly, the right to

the

The language of

this

available to a multitude of unrelated persons, to anyone with a

is

connection to the hitemet.

However,

While

inherent to the term transmission.

is

does not contain anything requiring access to be simultaneous.

UrhG

many

considered to be a prerequisite for a "public" rendition by

claim that simultaneity

appears to be logical

same time with a multitude

GRUR Int.

gap

in the

certainly not thought of

its

implications.'^^

1987, 609, 612 - Video booths, successive publicity (Austria);

Mathias Schwarz, Urheberrecht im Internet, Der Markenartikel 1996, 120, 216 (comparing the situation
that
'°^

of

satellite

BGHZ

transmissions before the

113, 159. 161

-

EU

to

and cable transmissions)
1995, 231, 245; Gerhard Schricker/Uhich

directive concerning satellite

Einzelangebot; Juergen Becker,

ZUM

Loewenheim, Urheberrecht, Kommentar, § 15 Rn. 59-60 (2"'' Ed. 1999)
""•
Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 187 (1997) (citing
-"right of communication to the public")
'°^
Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 188 (1997)
"^^

§

Landgericht [LG] [State Court] Miinchen

I,

Grundurteil

vom

Art. 8

30.03.2000, 7

73/2000, Abs. 60, <http://www.jurpc.de/rechtspr/20000073.htm#0060>

WIPO treaty (12/20/1996)

O 3625/98, JurPC Web-Dok.

(last visited

6/5/2001)
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has been suggested that the above view

It

analysis

is

required where the suppHer of the

not only access the

work online but

also

work

make

understood as "electronic distribution" and

However
cannot

logical this

know

Generally,

it

may

seem,

it

is

seems inappropriate

approach.

distribution"

to

let

copies of

it.

§

This case could indeed be

includes the sale of the

17 UrhG.

within the scope of §

fall

most cases the "supplier"
copy of the work.

act.

Still,

there

may be some

merit to the

UrhG mentions two ways of

17

and Anbieten

work or copies

as well as

distribution,

(to offer to the public).

offered to the public. '^^ Inverkehrbhngen

work be

for the user to

the supplier's subjective views be decisive

(to enter into circulation)

latter requires that the

It

onhne use intended

or control whether or not the user will prepare a

Inverkehrbhngen

broadly:

for

inaccurate and that a different

impractical because in

regarding the legal classification of an

"electronic

is

The

interpreted

is

any other means of changing

possession. '^^ Examples of putting into circulation apart from the obvious are giving

blueprints to a potential client^

From
to

a

common

'°

or furnishing a hotel

room with copyrighted

sense point of view, the offering of music over the Internet

be a form of distribution. However, offering music for download

of works that do not exist

yet,

and concerning "offering

about whether the copies offered must already
the

Bundesgehchtshof did not see

Thomas Hoeren, Ueberlegungen zur

this as a

exist.

is

furniture.'"

may

appear

essentially offering

to the public", there is dispute

While some courts have held so"^,

requirement because

it

was deemed

especially

urheberrechtlichen Qualifizierung des elektronischen Abrufs,

Computer und Recht [CR] 1996, 517, 519
^
Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 173 (1997), Gerhard Schricker/Ulrich Loewenheim,
Kommentar zum UrhG, § 17 UrhG Nr. 6 (2"'' Ed. 1999)
"^^
Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 173 (1997), BGH GRUR 1972, 141, 142
'

"°BGHGRUR1985,
'"

KG GRUR

129, 130

1996, 968, 969; but see

OLG Duesseldorf GRUR

1983, 760, 761 (ftimishing of a sales

convention booth)
"^ Kammergericht [KG] [Court of Appeals in Berlin]

GRUR

1983, 174 (pirated video cassettes)
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made

important to include pirated material

right to copy'''*, is subject to exhaustion.

to order.'

It

would

The

'^

right to distribute, unlike the

create severe problems if the author

had control over further distribution as well. Therefore, the right
with the

first

distribution

by

to distribute is exhausted

"^ Since exhaustion of
the author, in order to protect trade.

the right constitutes a severe loss for the author, there are several requirements for

exhaustion to occur. The

right

by means of

obligation."^

first

distribution

must occur with the consent of the holder of the

meaning contract of

disposal,

sale,

gift

or

of protected music are based on a contractual relationship between the

Even though

in physical,

of

questionable whether most Internet transactions involving the transfer

It is

distribution, this

other contract

is

at first

parties.

glance the transfer of works over the Internet appears to be a

not the case, mainly because §

tangible form."

Digital

1

7

UrhG

concerns only the distribution

transmitted over the

files

web can

hardly be

considered tangible or physical forms of the work. The right to distribute does not

encompass the broadcast or other non-physical
However,
distribution of

it

could be argued that § 17

works

in digital

a computer hard drive
nature of the copy

is

is

distribution of the work.'

UrhG

form nevertheless.

It is

should be understood to cover the
accepted that copying a work onto

physical copying under § 16

hardly discernible."^

From

this

'^

UrhG even though

the physical

premise, the step to accepting that

"^ BGHZ 1
13, 159, 163; see also Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 174 (1997); Ulrich
Loewenheim, in Festschrift fuer Traub, 255; Gerhard SchrickerAJlrich Loewenheim, Kommentar zum
UrhG, § 17 UrhG, Nr. 4 (2"'' Ed. 1999)
'"•
Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 175 (1997), BGHZ 1 12, 264, 277 (operating

system)
"^

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und
Id. at

Urhebervertragsrecht, 174-175 (1997)

175; (Sale, gift and other such contracts are

all

obligations under

German

law.

The property

is

transferred in a separate transaction and the concept of consideration is generally unknown.)
"^ Mathias Schwarz, Urheberrecht im Internet, Der Markenartikel
1996, 120, 215-218
"^ Haimo Schack, Urheber1 1, 135, 144 (public
und Urhebervertragsrecht, 173 (1997), citing

BGHZ

playing of phonorecords), overturning
'

" See

infra, pp. 26,

27

RGZ

1

13, 413,

416 (Der Tor und der Tod)
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there

may be

non-physical distribution

is

not too great. '^° This approach would indeed

how

provide a simple solution to the problem of deciding

should be treated. Yet,

amendment

it

is

transmission over the Internet

incompatible with the requirement of physical distribution; an

to the copyright statute

would be necessary. Distribution

of physical copies of a work, hi the online environment

this is

the dissemination

is

simply not the case;

new

copies are prepared every time a user downloads a work.'^' These copies are indeed
physical in nature once they have been created, but the transfer of data

to the distribution

of physical copies, the copy becomes physical but

is

it

not equivalent

is

non-physical

during transmission.

Furthermore, as Schwarz recognizes as well, exhaustion could not be applied to
digital distribution since there

Internet,

for further use

of the works on the

a consequence hardly compatible with author's rights. '^^ Consequently, an

extension of §

problems

would be no protection

at

17

UrhG

hand, but

the legislative have

it

now

cover digital distribution

to

is

may

well be a solution to the

not feasible under the current statute. '^^

recognized that § 15

UrhG

is

to

be applied.

The

courts and even

'^"^

'^°

Mathias Schwarz, Urheberrecht im Internet, Der Markenartikel 1996, 120, 217
Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 188 (1997), Mathias Schwarz, Urheberrecht im
Internet, Der Markenartikel 1996, 120, 217; but see Arthur Waldenberger, Teledienste. Mediendienste und
'^'

die Verantwortlichkeit ihrer Anbieter,
'^^

'^^

ZXJM

1997, 181

Mathias Schwarz, Urheberrecht im Internet, Der Markenartikel 1996, 120, 217-218

See also supra,

p.

LG Munchen

Grundurteil

I,

23

vom 30.03.2000,

7

O 3625/98, JurPC Web-Dok.

<http://www.jurpc.de/rechtspr/20000073.htm#0060>
available for access and

download

is

(last visited

6/5/2001);

also reserved to the author in Art. 8

<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ip/wipo-copyright/index.html>
the latest proposition for a Directive of the

73/2000, Abs. 60,

The

WIPO

right to

keep a

file

Copyright Treaty

(WCT)

6/5/2001) and in Art. 3 Abs.

1 of
European Parliament and Council addressing the harmonization

(last visited

of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, <http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/de/com/dat/1999/de_599PC0250.html> (last visited 6/5/2001); see also statement of the Bundesjustizministerium [German Ministry of Justice] at <http://www.bmj.bund.de/misc/1998/urh_98.htm>
visited 6/1/2001)

(last
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The

right to prepare copies

The

right to

(b)

rights in the work.

painting

by hand

thousands of

CDs

whether the copy
original work.

§ 16

UrhG'^^

copy the work may be the most important of the author's exclusive

It is

as

is

-

irrelevant

how

much copying

copies/reproductions are made; the replication of a

in the sense

containing copies of a

is

The

work

of

§ 16

UrhG

as

is

or sound recording.

of transitory nature and whether the copy

definition of copying under § 16

UrhG

the manufacture of

It

is

also irrelevant

alters the size

of the

only requires that the copy be

of such physical nature that the work can be recognized by the human senses, with or
without the aid of a machine or device.

'^^

t

Accordingly, copying a musical work or sound recording

CD-ROM,

floppy disk or similar

saving data in the computer's

memory

RAM

devices

is

T7
"

onto a hard dnve,

clearly copying in this sense.

constitutes copying.

Concerning electronically

transmitted works or copies of works no legal differences are apparent; the
apply. '^^ Therefore, the uploading or

§ 16

Even

downloading of copyrighted works

is

same

rules

copying under

UrhG.

§ 16

UrhG:

''(I)

Das

Vervielfaeltigungsrecht

ist

das Recht, Vervielfaeltigungsstuecke des Werkes

welchem Verfahren und in welcher Anzahl.
(2) Ein Vervielfaeltigung ist auch die Uebertragung des Werkes auf Vorrichtungen zur wiederholbaren
Wiedergabe von Bild- und Tonfolgen (Bild- oder Tontraeger). gleichviel. ob es sich um die Aufnahme einer
Wiedergabe des Werkes aufeinem Bild- oder Tontraeger oder um die Uebertragung des Werkes von einem

herzustellen, gleichviel in

Bild- oder Tontraeger aufeinen anderen handelt".
"( 1 ) The right to copy is the right to prepare copies of the work, no matter
which manner or m what quantity these are prepared.
(2) A copy is also the recording of the work onto a device for repeated playback or rendition of sounds or
images (sound- or image carrier), no matter whether it is the recording of a rendition of the work onto such
sound- or image carrier or whether it is the transposition of the work from on sound- or image carrier to

Translation provided by author:
in

another."
'^''

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und
This

is

Urhebervertragsrecht, 170-171 (1997)

equally true for other types of protected works.

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 171 (1997), citing BGHZ 1 12, 264, 278 and MAI
Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 51 1, 518 (9*^ Cir. 1993); see also Mathias Schwarz,
Urheberrecht im Internet, Der Markenartikel 1996, 120, 215
'" Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 171
(1997), citing the European Communities
suggestion for a protocol to the Berne Convention Art. 9, see generally Reinhold Kreile, Bericht ueber die
'^^
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Unlike the UPR-related
to musical

works

and distribute
since

it

action

this is generally the case.

to their record

may mean

company

fri

sound recording copyright

Sound Recordings

UrhG

Section 85

(§ 85

-

§

85

it

transferred.

With regard

Musicians regularly transfer the rights to copy

in their contract

the case

production of sound carriers as well,

(c)

copy may be

with the

that not only the author but also the record

infringement,

for

rights, the right to

latter.

'^°

This

is

company could

of a record company that maintains

is

UrhG

grants the manufacturers of sound recordings the exclusive and

Internet.
''"

1996,

See

A

sound

defined as any fixation of tones of a performance or other tones. This

WIPO-Sitzungen ziim moeglichen Protokoll zur Berner Konvention

Mai

own

its

UrhG).

includes recordings of musical works and other perceptible sounds.

24.

bring an

could also bring an action for infringement of the

independent right to copy and distribute the sound recording of a work.'^'
recording

relevant

ZUM

infra, p.

1996, 964; This will be addressed in

32

et.

more

unci

The manufacturer of

zum "neuen Instrument" vom

22.-

detail in conjunction with application to the

seq.

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 172 (1997)
§ 85 UrhG: "(I) Der Hersteller eines Tontraegers hat das ausschliessliche Recht den Tontraeger zu

vervielfaeltigen

und zu

verbreiten. 1st der Tontraeger in

einem Unternehmen hergestellt warden, so

gilt

der

Inhaber des Unternehmens als Hersteller. Das Recht ensteht nicht durch Vervielfaeltigung eines
Tontraegers.

Das Recht erlischt 50 Jahre nach dem Erscheinen des Tontraegers oder, wenn seine erste erlaubte
Benutzung zur oeffentlichen Wiedergabe frueher erfolgt ist, nach dieserjedoch bereits 50 Jahre nach der
Herstellung wenn der Tontraeger innerhalb dieser Frist nicht erschienen oder erlaubterweise zur
oeffentlichen Wiedergabe benutzt worden ist...
(3) Paragraph 27 Abs. 2 und 3 sowie die Vorschriften des sechsten Abschnitts des Ersten Tells mit
"
Ausnahme des Paragraphen 61 sind entsprechend anzuwenden.
Translation provided by author: "( 1 ) The manufacturer of a sound recording has the exclusive right to copy
and distribute this sound recording. Was the sound recording manufactured by a business, the owner of the
business is considered the manufacturer. The right does not arise from the duplication of a sound recording.
(2) The right ends 50 years after publication of the sound recording or, if its first authorized use for public
performance happened before that date, after this use but already 50 years after production of the sound
recording if the sound recording was not published or lawfully used for public performance before the end
of this time.
(3) Section 27 para. 2 and 3 and the provisions of the sixth division of the first part except for section 61 are
to be applied accordingly."
(2)

29

a sound recording consequently holds the right in said recording even if the sounds are

not a protectible work.'^^ § 85

regarding the

work

UrhG

UrhG. Accordingly the manufacturer's

concerned.

in the

right in the

same way

the

same

rights the author holds

sound recording

is

in §§

15-17

by

online

affected

as the author's right as far as §§

15-17 are

'^^

Performance and display

(d)

some of

sound recording, including the rights granted

for the

copying and transfer

grants

Sections 18 and 19

UrhG

-

§§ 18, 19

UrhG

cover the rights display a work and the right to perform

a work. These provisions are irrelevant in the context of this thesis. For the
the rights contained in §§ 20, 74-76

I,

87 94

UrhG

same reason

are not discussed here.

Limitations of the author's rights - general overview

c.

Limitations of copyright are contained in §§ 45-63 UrhG. While the rights
attributed

to

the

author are absolute and exclusive rights, they are not unlimited.

Limitations are necessary to safeguard public interest. All limitations on copyright have

in

common

that they generally

do not

Furthermore, the provisions in §§ 45-63

limit the

UrhG

UPR

are not

but only the economic

all

rights.'^'*

true limitations; they are often

closer in nature to affirmative defenses and will be presented here only shortly, while the

ones relevant to the issue will be addressed

'^^
'^^

of infringement

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 270 (1997)
Cf. Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 269 (1997) (Copying of a sound

not only the copying from a
material

was played from

computer
'^^

in detail in the context

is

a

CD, record
sound

carrier Consequently,

copying material from a sound carrier onto a

well within the scope of copying) Cf. supra, p. 26

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und

carrier includes

or other sound carrier device but also recording off the air if the

Urhebervertragsrecht, 203-204 (1997)
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actions under § 97

UrhG

as justifications.

The

limitations concerning the author's rights

apply to the manufacturer's rights in the sound recording as well.

(1)

64 UrhG

Temporal limitation

-

The most important

limitation

of any copyrighted work

§

to the life

on copyright

may seem

The

transition

is §

64

UrhG which

limits protection

of the author plus 70 years. '^^ The right
1

recording expires 50 years after

limitations.

135

its

^7

publication.

The temporal

of the work from the author's property

in a

sound

limitations are true

domain

to the public

incongruent with the proprietary, natural law philosophy. However,

it

must be

considered that unlike material goods, immaterial goods slowly evolve from being the
author's very

legislature

had

own
to

personal creation to being

draw a

clear line to determine

Geistige Auseinandersetzung

(2)

§§ 45-63

UrhG

-

§§ 45-63

common good and

when

knowledge. The

this point is legally reached.

UrhG

provide several limitations to the author's rights and the sound

recording rights in addition to the temporal limitation. These provisions generally serve
to

promote geistige Auseinandersetzung

(intellectual dispute), as well as to ensure the

copyright law's compliance with Art. 5 Grundgesetz (GG), which contains freedom of

§
first

85 (3) UrhG, supra,

p.

27 (The temporal limitation

is

defined differently

- 50 years

after publication or

authorized public use of the sound recording)
"

64 UrhG: "Das Urheberrecht erlischt siebzig Jahre nach dem Tod des Urhebers.
Translation provided by author: "The copyright lapses seventy years after the author's death."
§ 85 UrhG et. seq.
138
Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 204-205 (1997) (stating that the limitation
§

the

same

common

European Union member

is

and givingexamples for the transition fi-om property
good: well known quotes, pieces of "traditional" music or the like)
in all

states

now
to

"

.
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opinion, press, art and science.

needed themselves

to create

may

by means of copyright law;

UrhG

Sections 48-50

(a)

Copyright holders

not take from others what they

this

would

violate Art. 5

GG

140

concern news reporting about current events and are not

relevant in the context of this thesis.

Section 51

(b)

quotations.'"*'

UrhG

allows quotations from copyrighted works, including musical

The provision allows

three kinds of quotations: the Grosszitat (grand

quote), the Kleinzitat (simple quote) and the Musikzitat (musical quote). All three have in

common

'^^

GG:

only

they

that

benefit

authors

incorporating

quotes

in

works

are

that

Jeder Mensch hat das Recht. seine Meinung in Wort, Schrift und Bildfrei zu aeussern
und sich aus allgemein zugaenglichen Quellen ungehindert zu unterrichten. Die
Pressefreiheit und die Freiheit der Berichterstattung durch Rundfunk und Film werden gewaehrleistet.
Art. 5

und zu

"(1)

verbreiten,

Eine Zensur findet nicht

statt.

Diese Rechtefinden ihre Schranken in den Vorschriften der allgemeinen Gesetze, den gesetzlichen
Bestimmungen zum Schutze der Jugend und in dem Recht der persoenlichen Ehre.
(2)

(3) Kunst, Wissenschaft,

Forschung und Lehre

sindfrei.

Die Freiheit der Lehre entbindet nicht von der

Treue zur Verfassung.

human has the right to freely express and distribute his opinion
image and to obtain information from publicly accessible sources unimpeded. The
freedom of the press and the freedom of reporting through radio and film are guaranteed. There will be no

Translation provided by author: "(1) Every
in speech, writing or

censorship.

(2)These rights find their limitations in the provisions of the universal laws, the statutory provisions for the
protection of youth and the right to personal honor.
(3) Arts, science, research

and teaching are

free.

The freedom of teaching does not

release

from loyalty

to

the consitution."
140
''"

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und

Urhebervertragsrecht, 21

1

(1997)

UrhG: "Zulaessig ist die Vervielfaeltigung, Verbreitung und oejfentliche Wiedergabe, wenn din
einem durch den Zweck gebotenen Umfang
1. einzelne Werke nach dem Erscheinen in ein selbstaendiges wissenschaftliches Werk zur Erlaeuterung
des Inhalts aufgenommen werden,
2. Stellen eines Werkes nach der Veroeffentlichung in einem selbstaendigen Sprachwerk aufgenommen
§ 51

werden,
3.

einzelne Stellen eines erschienenen Werkes der

angefuehrt werden.

Musik

in

einem selbstaendigen Werk der Musik

"

Translation provided by author: "The copying, distribution and public rendition in a reasonable amount

with regard to the purpose
1

of single works

is

allowed

after their publication in order to include these in

an independent

scientific

reasons of clarification of the content,
2.

of pieces of a work

3.

of pieces of a musical work

after

its

publication in an independent
after its publication in

work of language,

an independent musical work."

work

for
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copyrightable in and of themselves. The
identify a source

the

new work.

two types of quotes may only be used

first

and require some connection

in content

to

between the works quoted and

^'*

The musical quote allows

the

composer of a copyrightable musical work

include pieces of another's copyrighted musical

some relevance

in the context

copyrighted work

may be

relevant for the issue of

The musical quote may be of

of infringements on the Internet since an excerpt

part of a

OSP

work.'"*"^

new work

and P2P

posted on the web. However, this

liability since the

to

is

fi-om a

hardly

alleged infringements in this

context almost exclusively concern the copying of entire works of music.

Section 52 UrhG''*'* allows public rendition of a copyrighted

(c)

work without

permission of the author under certain circumstances. Where the person offering or

promoting such rendition gains no economic

it

is

profit

and the rendition

is

free

of admission,

permissible even without the author's consent, yet the author must be compensated

nevertheless.''*^

Other exceptions are made for religious services, renditions in schools for

educational purposes limited to the students and for other social purposes not relevant in
the online environment. Since § 52

action under § 97

UrhG,

it

will

UrhG may

be discussed

serve as a defense in an infringement
''^^

in detail there.

'
Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 213 (1997); Gerhard Schricker/Ulrich Loewenheim,
Kommentar zum UrhG, § 51 Nr. 20 (2"'' Ed. 1999)
'*'
Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 213-214 (1997) (giving an example of a musical

quote: Peter Tchaikovsky's Overture 1812,

which contains

the Marseillaise)

52 UrhG: "Zulaessig ist die oeffentliche Wiedergahe eines erschienen Werkes, wenn die Wiedergabe
keinem Erwerbszweck des Veranstalters dient, die Teilnehmer ohne Entgelt zugelassen werden... Fuer die
"
Wiedergabe ist eine angemessene Verguetung zu zahleti...
§

Translation provided by author: "The public rendition of a published

work

is

permissible without

authorization if the rendition does not serve for profit of the promoter, the participants are admitted without

A reasonable compensation must be paid. ." [to the author]
UrhG; The reimbursement occurs through the GEMA, see infra, pp. 47-52
52
§
Infra, pp. 36-47

a fee.
'**

"•*

.

.

.
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Possibly the most interesting and important limitation in the context of this thesis

(d)

53 UrhG.''^^ Section 53 UrhG*'*^ allows the copying of copyrighted works (and sound

is §

recordings) for private use if the

work being copied was obtained

lawfully.

It is

most

the

important defense in the context of infringements in the online environment and will
therefore be addressed in detail as a "justification" in the context of § 97 UrhG.''*^

'"^

53 UrhG: "(1) Zulaessig

§

Der zur

herzustellen.

ist

anderen herstellen lassen; dock

wenn

...nur,

(2)

Zulaessig

geboten

zum privaten Gebrauch

diesfuer die Uebertragung von Werken aufBild- und Tontraeger...

gilt

es unentgeltlich geschieht.
ist,

zum eigenen

1.

einzelne Vervielfaeltigungsstuecke eines Werkes

Vervielfaeltigung Befugte darfdie Vervielfaeltigungsstuecke auch durch einen

einzelne Vervielfaeltigungsstuecke eines Werkes herzustellen oder herstellen zu lassen

wenn und soweit die Vervielfaeltigung zu diesem Zweck

wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch,

ist.

zur Aufnahme in ein eigenes Archiv, wenn und soweit die Vervielfaeltigung zu diesem Zweck geboten
und als Vorlage fuer die Vervielfaeltigung ein eigenes Werk benutzt wird,

2.

ist

zur eigenen Unterrichtung ueber Tagesfragen...

3.

zum sonstigen eigenen Gebrauch,
wenn es sich um kleine Telle eines erschienenen Werkes
handelt
b) wenn es sich um ein seit mindestens zwei Jahren vergriffenes Werk handelt.
4.

a)

...(6)

Die Vervielfaeltigungsstuecke duerfen weder verbreitet noch zur oeffentlichen Wiedergabe benutzt

werden. Zulaessig istjedoch, rechtmaessig hergestellte Vervielfaeltigungsstuecke von Zeitungen und
vergriffenen Werken ...zu verleihen...

Translation provided by author:

copies

may

"{
1

)

"

It is

permitted to

make

be prepared by the person authorized to do so

sound carrier

as transposition or copying onto an image- or

work for private use. These
by others for this person, as far

single copies of a

in this section or
is

concerned

this is

only permitted

if

it

is

not done for profit.
(2)

It is

permitted to

make

single copies of a

for personal scientific use if

1.

2. for

mclusion

and insofar as

in a private archive if

work or have
it

is

single copies of a

work prepared

reasonable for this purpose,

and insofar as

it

is

reasonable for this purpose and the work copied

is

the users lawfully obtained work,
3. for

the personal information about current events,

4. for

other personal use

a) if

b)
.

.

only a small amount of a previously published work

.(6)

is

copied

previously published work has been unavailable for at least two years.

if a

The copies so prepared may not be

distributed or used for public performance

of the work.

It is

permitted however, to lend... copies of newspapers and unavailable works."
'"^

See

BGHZ

17, 266,

277-279 (before 1965,

exception" though, which meant
"•'

Infra, pp.

47-52

its

§ 15

application

LUG offered a similar defense;

was construed narrowly by

it

was considered

the courts)

a "true
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Infringement actions

d.

Section 97

UrhG

is

-

97 UrhG:

§

most important of the provisions making violations of the

the

author's rights and sound recording rights actionable;

for a civil claim) for infringement.

Objectively, § 97

violated

UrhG

(Rechtsverletzung)

.

it is

the Anspruchsgrundlage (basis

'^°

requires that one of the rights protected in the statute be

This encompasses only absolute, exclusive rights. The

language of the provision includes not only the rights stated in §§ 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,
etc.

UrhG

The

violation

but also rights contained in §§ 74-76

I

must also be rechtswidhg (unlawful). Unlawfulness

an exclusive right

is

violated, so that the defendant bears the

justification for his or her actions to avoid liability.

(sine

qua non + adequacy)

relationship

violation of the exclusive right, hi

'^°

UrhG, 83 UrhG,

'^^

is

85, 87,

94 UrhG.'^'

presumed whenever

burden of proving a

There must be an adequately causal

between the alleged infringer's action and the

German

private law, the sine

qua non

test is

generally

Wer das Urheberrecht oder ein anderes nach diesem Gesetz geschuetztes Recht
vom Verletzten auf Beseitigung der Beeintraechtigung, bei
Wiederholungsgefahr auf Unterlassung und, wenn dem Verletzer Vorsatz oder Fahrlaessigkeit zur Last
faellt, auch auf Schadenersatz in Anspruch genommen werden. An Stelle des Schadenersatzes kann der
Verletzte die Herausgabe des Gewinns, den der Verletzer des Rechts erzielt hat, und Rechnungslegun ueber
diesen Gewinn verlangen.
(2) Urheber, Verfasser wissenschaftlicher Ausgaben, Lichtbildner und ausuebende Kuenstler koennen,
wenn dem Verletzer Vorsatz oder Fahrlaessigkeit zur Last faellt, auch wegen des Schadens, der nicht
Vermoegensschaden ist, eine Entschaedigung in Geld verlangen, wenn und soweit es der Billigkeit
§

97 UrhG:

"(1)

widerrechtlich verletzt, kann

entspricht.
"

Ansprueche aus anderen gesetzlichen Vorschriften bleiben unberuehrt.
Translation provided by author: "(1) Whoever violates the author's right or any other right protected in this
act without justification may be subject to a claim for removal of the impairment or disturbance to the
protected right brought by the injured, and if there is a danger of recurring injury suit for an injunction may
be brought; and if the injurer was negligent or acted intentionally he is subject to a claim for damages.
Instead of damages, the injured may claim surrender of the profits made by the injurer and information
regardmg these profits.
(2) Authors, authors of scientific works, photographers and practicing artists may claim damages for
immaterial damage as well if the injurer acted negligently or with intent if and insofar as it is reasonable.
(3) Claims arising under other provisions are not preempted."
Criminal charges for copyright infringement can be brought under §106 Strafgesetzbuch (StGB) and will
(3)

not be discussed here.
'^'

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 289 (1997)
'" Id at 290
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limited

by

the so called "theory of adequacy".

^^^

This means that only such sine qua non

contributions or actions are grounds for liability, which are not completely outside the

scope of the normal course of events.
the "possibility of

damage

'^"^

The

was

to the right

tests generally

used today are either whether

so remote that

it

could not reasonably be

foreseen or taken into consideration under the normal course of events", or whether "the
[causal] event substantially increased the

not".'^^ Furthermore, liability only arises

intended scope of protection.

injunction,

Fault,

it

is

meaning

damage

is

covered by the provision's

To show infringement and

Germany and

UrhG and

question

is

the Internet

the

rights

damages.

at fault.

the hitemet

- The

individual user

whether the individual users actually infiinge copyrights by

in

the

work and/or

whether OSPs or central

entities at the core
I

copynght mfringement under German copyright law.

Whether

the individual

sound recording by uploading,

the

downloading or transferring copyrighted works over the Internet
to the question

the benefit of an

'^^

to recover

transferring or exchanging copyrighted material over the Internet.

user infringes

get

must only be shown

intent or negligence,

first

the

was

Section 97

The

when

not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the infringer

B. Copyright protection in

1

^^^

danger of damage to the protected right or

is

technically irrelevant

of P2P networks are

liable for

CO
It

will nevertheless

be discussed

This theory was developed by von 5ar (1871) and von Kries (1888) and generally accepted by the courts
in

1902; see generally Palandt/Heinrichs,

''^

Palandt/Heinrichs,

BGB,

'" Id. at
§ 249 Nr. 59, 60, citing

BGHZ
'^*'

'"
'^*

57,

BGB,

Introduction to § 249 Nr. 58 (59*^ Ed. 2000);

RGZ 69,

59,

RGZ

78, 272,

RGZ

152, 401,

RGZ

255

BGB, Introduction to § 249 Nr. 62, 63 (59*^ Ed. 2000)
Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 295 (1997)
Palandt/Hemrichs,

See

infra, pp. 53,

58

RGZ

50,

222

Introduction to § 249 Nr. 58 (59*^ Ed. 2000)
158, 38,

BGHZ 3,

266,

36

since

it is

such a prerequisite in U.S. cop>Tight law'^^ and the comparison

in determining

which solutions

to the

may be

useful

problem can be found.

Rechtsverletzung - Violation of the author's exclusive rights

a.

Typical activities of Internet users that could be violations of the exclusive rights
in a musical

work or sound recording

-

Downloading of music from

-

Making such

-

files,

are:

a website or another user's hard-drive,

located on their

own

hard-drive, accessible to others, and

Uploading of published or unpublished works of

this nature

onto their

own

website or Bulletin Boards (BBS).'^*^

The uploading and downloading of copyrighted music onto or from
constitutes copying of the

copy

work

as stated above.'^' Since § 16

UrhG

to the author, this copying, if unauthorized, is an infringement

Rechtsverletzung
rights in a

(literally: injury to the right)

required

by

§

the Internet

assigns the rights to

of this

right,

is

it

97 UrhG. With regard

sound recording, copying the former onto a computer or downloading

the

it

to the

from

the Internet or another user's hard drive also constitutes a violation of the manufacturer's

exclusive right to reproduce the

sound recording

in the

work (§§

same way

as

it

85, 16

UrhG)

since the § 16 right applies to the

applies to the work.'^^

The user who posts a copyright-protected work on a BBS,
for online use and/or

'^^
'*'

download or grants access

See infra, pp. 1 16 et. seq.
See Michael Neuber, Urheberrecht im
Supra, pp. 26-27

'" See supra,

p.

27

to protected

Internet: Kapitel (Chapter) 3

C

his private

homepage

works stored on

his hard

37

drive also violates the right to electronic rendition under § 15 (2) UrhG.'^^

approach that considers the offer for use and download a matter of
followed, a violation of the author's exclusive right

would have been violated
to distribute her

violates the right to

causal for other users' infringements of § 16

work was unpublished and

If the

proprietor of the site

if the

may

7

UrhG were

would grant the author the exclusive
it

UrhG by downloading

also be in violation

be

made

right

could be argued that

copy yet another time, since

is

to

it

is

adequately

the work.

available on a user's website, the

of the right

to first publication (§ 12

UrhG)

author did not consent.'^"*

Rechtswidrigkeit

b.

it

1

if the

would have occured, since §17 UrhG

work, electronically or otherwise. Furthermore,

download

the offer for

in that case since

§

Even

-

Unlawfulness

The infringement must be unlawful

for liability to arise

case of copying by uploading or downloading the right to copy

work and

the sound recording, and the §

15 (2)

UrhG

under

§

97 UrhG. In the

(§16 UrhG) regarding

the

right to electronic rendition

regarding the work, are violated wherefore the unlawfiilness of such action

is

presumed.

A defendant can rebut this presumption by asserting a justification.

(1)

This

under

§

is

where

§

53 (1) or (2)

53 UrhG'^^ becomes important. If copying a work

UrhG

it

is

not unlawful, so that a defendant can rebut the

presumption by proving that the infringing activity

and thereby avoid

'" Supra,
pp. 20-25

See supra,

p.

16

liability.

is justified

falls

within the scope of said section

38

Section

(a)

53

(1)

UrhG

allows

recordings) for private use.'^^

It

copying of protected works (and

the

grants a compulsory license

by

law.'^^

does not differentiate between analog and digital copying, wherefore
both in the same way.'^^ Private use

and the copies

may

but

one

it

may

it

may be

not be used in public'

for non-private

A

far

more

CD may be

'^^

lent to a family

in the

member

applicable to

Section 53 (2)

UrhG

or close friend but

members and

presence of family

friends

permits the same as paragraph

purposes under certain circumstances. However, the boundaries

is

permissible under § 53 (2)

controversial question

is

UrhG

what the language of

addition to the private nature of the use. According to § 53 (1)

"reproduction of the wor/:"'^^ In interpreting this language,
that the

is

understood as making security copies and the like

played back

within which such reproduction

(b)

The provision

only be used within a relatively close circle of family and friends.

For example, a copy of a song on
not to a stranger,

is

it

sound

are closely drawn.

§

53

UrhG,

it is

UrhG

the

'^'

requires in

copy must be a

unanimously recognized

person preparing the copy need not be the owner of the source, which follows

'^'

For the provision verbatim and author's translation, see supra, p. 32, footnote 147
Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 216 (1997), KG GRUR 1992, 168, 169; See. BGH
GRUR 1978, 474, 476 (paragraphs (1) and (2) of § 53 UrhG only permit the preparation of "single" copies
from an origmal that was lawfully obtained; how many "single copies" may be made under § 53 UrhG is
'^

disputed but courts have consistently held that up to seven copies are permissible);
857, 859 (Austria) (19 copies legal under § 53
'^^

Til Kreutzer, Napster, Gnutella

&

UrhG

Co.. Rechtsfragen zu Files haring-Netzen

Vrheberrechts de lege lata und de lege ferenda-Teil
'*"

Til Kreutzer, Napster. Gnutella

&

OGH GRUR Int.

1994,

in this case)

I,

GRUR 2001,

193,

aus der Sicht des deutschen

200

Co.. Rechtsfragen zu Filesharing-Netzen aus der Sicht des deutschen

1, GRUR 2001, 193, 199
Gerhard Schricker/Ulrich Loewenheim, Kommentar zum UrhG, § 53, Rn. 12 (2"** Ed. 1999); Frederike
Hanel, Napster und Gnutella - Probleme bei der Obertragung von MP3-Dateien nach deutschem
Urheberrecht, JurPC Web-Dok. 245/2000, Abs. 34 (2000), <http://www.jurpc.de/aufsatz/20000245.htm>

Vrheberrechts de lege lata und de lege ferenda-Teil
'*'

(last visited
'^''

BGHZ

6/5/2001)

17,

376 (playback of copyrighted music

entertainment purposes and not for profit)

at

corporate event

is

not pnvate, even if it

is

only for

39

from § 53

However,

(2) Nr. 2 UrhG.'^^

copy must be

possession

in

Nevertheless, there

is

it is

also widely recognized that the source for the

of the person preparing the reproduction

a dispute about whether the source for the copy must be an original

of the work, meaning the original or a licensed copy.'^^ There

from the courts on
licensed

copy

as the source

this issue

'^^,

as the source.'''^

from any

is

no decisive decision

although there seems to be a tendency toward requiring a

Those scholars

of legal reproductions under

to relieve the user

legally.'^'*

liability as

§

copy

in opposition to requiring a licensed

UrhG

53

argue that the legislative intended

long as the copies are used for private purposes.

'^^

This would include copying by downloading or uploading material over the Internet,

even where the user

is

not in possession of the work as long as the purpose

However convincing

this

may

narrowly. This becomes clear after a closer look
legislative history

context

'^'

- property

at

of the provision. The limitations

included because like

is

all

UrhG must be

seem, § 53

property, the copyright

is

is

private.

interpreted

the systematics of the

more

UrhG and

to the author's exclusive rights are

subject to "'Sozialbindung'' (social

constitutionally defined as being a privilege and an obligation to

See § 53 (2) UrhG and translation, supra,
Emphasis added by the author

p. 32, footnote

147

Supra, p. 32, footnote 147; see also Frederike Hanel, Napster und Gnutella - Probleme bei der
Obertragung von MP3-Dateien nach deutschem Urheberrecht, JurPC Web-Dok. 245/2000, Abs. 17 (2000),

<http://www.jurpc.de/aufsatz/20000245.htm>
'^'

Id; see also

KG GRUR

(last visited

6/5/2001)

1992, 168, 169 (copies of dias)

Andreas Leupold/Dormnik Demisch, Bereithalten von Musikwerken zum Abrufin digitalen Netzen,
380; Juergen Weinknecht, Rechtslage bei MP3-Daten,
<http://www.weinknecht.de/mp3.htm> (last visited 6/5/2001) (arguing that a licensed copy is necessary);
but see Dietrich Harke, Musikkopien - illegal?, http://www.heise.de/ct/00/05/ 1 12> (last visited 6/5/2001)
Frederike Hanel, Napster und Gnutella - Probleme bei der Obertragung von MP2-Dateien nach
deutschem Urheberrecht, JurPC Web-Dok. 245/2000, Abs. 20-21 (2000),

ZUM 2000, 379,

<http://www.jurpc.de/aufsatz/20000245.htm>

(last visited

6/5/2001)

Andreas Leupold/Dominik Demisch, Bereithalten von Muiskwerken zum Abrufin digitalen Netzen,
ZUM 2000, 379, 380; Juergen Weinknecht, Rechtslage bei MP3-Daten,
<http://www.weinknecht.de/mp3.htm> (last visited 6/5/2001); KG GRUR 1992, 168, 169 (copies of dias)

MonkemoUer, Moderne Freibeuter unter
illegal?, <http://www.heise.de/ct/00/05/l

uns,

12>

GRUR Int.

(last visited

2000, 663, 665; Dietrich Harke, Musikkopien

6/5/2001); Til Kreutzer, Napster. Gnutella

&

-
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society).

'^^

This clarifies that the subject of the hmitations can only be the personal and

economical relations between the author and the work. The subject of protection

the

is

work. The work, however, would not be affected where copies are prepared from
unlicensed,

already illegal, reproductions.

i.e.

would have positively sanctioned
illegal situation

by giving

it

is

meant

the protection of the limitations. This

requires the source for a justified

UrhG

the legislative

the production of illegal copies

the legislature. '^° This analysis alone

Furthermore, § 53

Had

an

would be

copy

and maintained

was not

it

this

the intention of

sufficient to determine that § 53

UrhG

be the original or a licensed copy thereof

to

Ausnahme

to express this,

(exception) and must therefore be interpreted

narrowly'^', so as not to create an imbalance between the private nature of property and

the obligation to the public

it

narrow interpretation of § 53

incurs for the owner.

UrhG

is to

be found

in §§

Another argument

398

et.

seq.,

405

in favor

BGB

,

of a

which

apply analogously concerning contractually conferred rights to use a copynght.
Contractually conferred rights to
1

KS

ownership.

Co.

:

§53

does not create

this possibility

in

good

faith

by law because

regarding

there

is

no

Rechtsfragen zu Filesharing-Netzen aus der Sicht des deutschen Urheberrechts de lege lata und de

lege ferenda-Teil
^

UrhG

use cannot be acquired

1.

GRUR 2001,

193

Hand, Napster und Gnutella - Probleme bei der Obertragung von MP3-Dateien nach
deutschem Urheberrecht. JurPC Web-Dok. 245/2000, Abs. 22 (2000),
'

Frederike

<http://www.jurpc.de/aufsatz/20000245.htm>

(last visited

6/5/2001)

'''Id
'*'

See.

BGH GRUR

1997, 459, 463 (CB-infobank

<http://www.jurpc.de/rechtspr/19970006.htm>

I),

JurPC Web-Dok. 6/1997,

(last visited

general rule are generally interpreted narrowly in

German

6/5/2001) (provisions that are exceptions from a

law)

'*'

Frederike Hanel, Napster und Gnutella - Probleme bei der Obertragung von MP3-Dateien nach
deutschem Urheberrecht, JurPC Web-Dok. 245/2000, Abs. 22-23 (2000),

<http://www.jurpc.de/aufsatz/20000245.htm>
'*^

'^^

398 BGB
Manfred Rehbinder, Urheberrecht, §43

See

(last visited

6/5/2001)

§

'*^BGHZ5,

116, 119.

II,

10. Aufl.

1998
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1

objective element that

cannot be 'good
either,

the acquiring party

faith' in contractual transfers

since this

Ultimately, § 53

would make

would be against

UrhG

original or a licensed

personal use

may

the copies legally

rights,

the intentions of §§

it

If there

cannot be created by law

398

et.

405 BGB.

seq.,

should be interpreted to require the source of the copy to be the

copy thereof for the copy

to

The most important aspect of § 53 UrhG

(c)

only be

made from

made under

§

53

be

legal.

apart

from the rule

that copies for private

lawfrilly obtained authorized

UrhG may

rule severely restricts the scope of what

it

of these

Sift

worthy of protection.

copy

is

the rule that

not be distributed (§ 53 (6) UrhG). This

may be done

with the copies legally prepared and

applies equally in the online environment.

If a user

(d)

carrier she

merely copies a work onto her hard drive from a

owns, she should be well within the scope of

§

or other sound

53 (1) UrhG, since

constitutes copying for private use.

The same must apply

from one of the user's computers

to

no matter

another,

CD

this clearly

for "space-shifting" a

in

what way

this

is

copy
done,

including transfers via the Internet. If a user downloads a work, a copy of which she does
not already own, from the Internet however, she cannot claim the justification under § 53

(1)

UrhG, since the

withm

'*^

original

was not lawfully obtained and

the close circle of family and friends.

is

has been argued that § 53

generally not

UrhG

should

Juergen Weinknecht, Rechtslage bei MP3-Daten, <http://www.wemknecht.de/mp3.htm and

http://www.weinknecht.de/uii01.html>
'^^

It

the other user

(last visited

6/5/2001)

Andreas Leupold/Domonik Demisch. Bereithalten von Musikwerken zum Abrufin digitalen Netzen,
ZUM 2000, 379, 385
Frederike Hanel, Napster and Gnutella - Probleme bei der Obertragung von MP3-Dateien nach
deutschem Urheberrechi, JurPC Web-Dok. 245/2000, Abs. 22-23 (2000),
See,

<http://www.juipc.de/aufsatz/20000245.htm>

(last visited

6/5/2001)

42

apply as a justification in cases in which users take advantage of filesharing to copy
'^^
protected works.

same arguments
and

use

The arguments

that

copying

association.... ).'^°

§

53

UrhG

have caused the implementation of compulsory licensing
an

with

conjunction

in

of blank media

manufacturers

of such an appHcation of

in favor

pay a

to

The main argument

is,

automatic

fee

that

the

to

GEMA

(the

for private

by requiring

imposed

German

impossible to monitor

is

it

fee

are the

all

artists

private

reproduction activity and that such monitoring would not be in compliance with privacy
laws, the constitutional guarantee of the "private sphere" and free speech guarantees.'^'

Therefore § 53

UrhG

should be interpreted widely (even beyond the boundaries of

On

language possibly) in these cases. '^^

the other hand, this

scheme can be

its

criticized as

being too general and arbitrary and consequently unjust. The more uses there are for a
certain device, the

that

more general and

do not use the devices

to

arbitrary the rule

seems because even those users

copy protected works pay the included

of the compulsory licensing solution recognize

this

fee.

The proponents

drawback but find

it

to

be

less

dangerous and problematic than monitoring data-traffic and thereby invading the privacy

of all

users.

'^"^

They recognize

that the reproduction

under German law, but propose

argument brought forward

that

in support

theirs

is

of a copyrighted work cannot be free

the only viable solution.'^"* Another

of this approach

is that it is

practically impossible to

Til Kreutzer, Tauschboersen wie Napster oder Gnutella verletzen nicht das Urheberrecht,

http://www.heise.de/tp/deutsch/inhalt/te/4857/ 1. html (last modified 2/7/2001); Til Kreutzer, Napster,

''°

&

Fileshahng-Netzen aus der Sicht des deutschen Urheberrechts de lege
193
See, Ulnch Andryk, Musikerrecht, 24-38 (1995)

Gnutella
lata

undde

Co.. Rechtsfragen zu

lege ferenda-Teil

Til Kreutzer,

1,

GRUR 2001,

Tauschboersen wie Napster oder Gnutella verletzen nicht das Urheberrecht,

http://www.heise.de/tp/deutsch/inhalt/te/4857/l.html (last modified 2/7/2001); Til Kreutzer, Napster.

Gnutella
lata

&

undde

'''Id.
'''Id.

''Ud.

Co., Rechtsfragen zu Filesharing-Netzen aus der Sicht des deutschen Urheberrechts

lege ferenda-Teil

1,

GRUR 2001,

193, 199

de lege
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rely

on a

traditional

system of individual licensing in the context of the hitemet and

especially with the advent of

P2P

software. '^^ Finally,

it is

argued that the development

of European law has taken the direction of allowing private

digital

copying in

this

manner, as indicated by the proposal for a Multimedia Directive.

While these arguments
vital aspect

of the problem

are convincing to

in the online

The user of a tape recorder or a

some

do not consider one

extent, they

environment - the magnitude of the userbase.

similar device

may

prepare copies and even grant persons

within his circle of family and friends access to these without infringing copyright under

§

53 UrhG. Regarding these media, the "compulsory license by law" solution of § 53

UrhG

certainly appropriate for the reasons brought forward.

is

the "analog" user and the fritemet user, however,

create an archive of the

persons

unknown and

works she owns

his

CDs

at will

that the

for the express

unknown persons

and such

activity

into his

purpose of

home

to let

letting a multitude

The owner of

justified

activity

CD

under

§

53

to the "folders" containing copyrighted

material on his hard drive does exactly this, only in a digital manner.

same

a

of

them browse through and

would not be considered

UrhG. The hitemet user who grants access

difference between

former will generally not

unrelated to her prepare copies of the works.

collection does not invite

copy

is

The

suddenly be justified? Simply because

it

Why

should the

takes place in digital form? This

can hardly be the case. Furthermore, the hitemet user granting access to her hard drive, so
that others

can share her copies of protected works, can hardly claim that the millions of

Til Kreutzer,

Tauschboersen wie Napster oder Gnutella verletzen nicht das Urheberrecht,

http://w\vw.heise.de/tp/deutsch/inhalt/te/4857/l.html (last modified 2/7/2001); Til Kreutzer, Napster,

Gnutella

&

Co., Rechtsfragen zu Filesharing-Netzen aus der Sicht des deutschen Urheberrechts

de lege

GRUR 2001, 193, 200-201
"^ Til Kreutzer, Napster, Gnutella & Co., Rechtsfragen zu Filesharing-Netzen aus der Sicht des deutschen
Urheberrechts de lege lata und de lege ferenda-Teil I, GRUR 2001, 193, 200; compare Art. 5 II
b of

lata

und de lege ferenda-Teil

I,

lit.
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users that have the ability to

Yet

friends.

law.^^'

It

would be

this limitation

may be
the

true that the

53

§

which the copy

be true

of the

§

53

files

from her are within her

UrhG

justification

is

is

UrhG

it

not feasible. Private

is

currently requires a legally obtained original source from

prepared which in turn means that that which
if the

copy

is

meant

is

offered for copying

for private use only.

been reached yet and the law cannot be changed
legislation just because

and sound recordings

A

it

for

in anticipation

that point has not

of a new piece of

download without permission of the author remains

may

seem

private use and the

UrhG and

to

be a reason

work was

^°°

illegal.

be required where the user had legally obtained a copy

of a work and then downloads a copy of the same work from the web.

53 (1)

mat

would be more convenient. Offering copyrighted musical works

different analysis

there does not

It

development of European law indicates a coming change towards the

compulsory licensing scheme proposed by Kreutzer and others, but

(e)

of family and

compulsory licensing and automatic fee based solution

cannot be copied legally, even
that the

circle

expressly contained in the

most viable one/^^ but under the current law

copying under

illegally

download

to differentiate

-

lawftilly obtained. This appears to

the legality of such activity

its telos.

makes

the user

On

On

the one

a single

hand

copy

for

be the exact scenario of §

the other

hand

§

53

UrhG was

proposed Multimedia Directive (Doc. 95 12/00), <http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/de/com/dat/1999/de_599PC0250.html> (last visited 6/5/2001)

the

§

53 UrhG, see supra,

p. 32,

footnote 147

"*/«/ra, pp. 39-41
"' Thorsten Braun, Rechtsfragen von Filesharing-Systemen aus Sicht des deutschen Vrheberrechts

Entgegnung auf das Thesenpapier von

Till

Kreutzer

-,

These

1

-

(2001), <http://www.hgb-

leipzig.de/~vgrass/semi-napster/braun-thesen.html> (last visited 6/5/2001); See also Frederike Hanel,
- Prohleme bei der Obertragung von MP3-Dateien nach deutschem UrheberrechX,
JurPC Web-Dok. 245/2000, Abs. 22-23 (2000), <http://www.jurpc.de/aufsatz/20000245.htm> (last visited

Napster und Gnutella
6/5/2001)

^^ Thorsten Braun, Rechtsfragen von Filesharing-Systemen aus Sicht des deutschen Urheberrechts
Till Kreutzer -, These 1 (2001), <http://www.hgb-

Entgegnung auf das Thesenpapier von

leipzig.de/~vgrass/semi-napster/braun-thesen.html> (last visited 6/5/2001)

-
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not intended to facilitate or legalize copying from any source but only from that copy that

was lawfully obtained.^°' Since

the provision

is

a severe limitation to the author's rights

should be construed narrowly in light of the premise of
author

is

German copyright law

it

that the

the primary subject of protection and entitled to profit from exploitation of his

The user may make a copy of

or her work.^°^

the

work from her

computer or onto another medium with or without using the Internet
she must do so from the original or a licensed copy.

pose a severe danger

internet could

original onto her

in the process, but

The copying by download from

to the author's rights

since the

the

whole concept

significantly facilitates illegal copying and arguably contributes to wide-scale copyright

piracy by supporting services that are primarily used for just that.

Any

copy works without having

to

thanks to the Internet.

It

lawfiilly obtained a

copy from which

could ftirthermore be argued that

determine whether the user

who

lawfully obtained a copy of the

it

is

claims to be justified under § 53

work

in

"normal" cases;

practically impossible. In addition, the rule that the

user could indeed

reproduce the work,
difficult

UrhG had

in the online

argued that there

is

no reason

to

it

is

copy may only be made from the
of

right to prepare copies for private use

punish those

to

actually

environment

original or a licensed reproduction is equally valid for both paragraphs

However, the user also has the

enough

who have adhered

to the

§

and

53 UrhO.^^^

it

law and

could be
lawfiilly

obtained the original by restricting this right simply because of the manner in which the
legal copies are prepared. This

ignores that § 53

UrhG was

may

be convincing to some extent, but the argument

introduced as an exception and must be interpreted narrowly

^°'

See Frederike Hanel, Napster und Gnutella - Probleme bei der Ubertragung von MP3-Dateien nach
deutschem Urheberrecht, JurPC Web-Dok. 245/2000, Abs. 17-25 (2000),
<http://www.jurpc.de/aufsatz/20000245.htm>
^"^

BGHZ 5,

1

16,

1

19; see also supra, p. 18

(last visited

6/5/2001)
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to protect the author.

There

is

It is

not meant to endorse or facihtate any form of illegal copies.

no way around the requirement

of a copy, to be justified under

that the source

53 UrhG, must be the original or a licensed copy thereof

§

53

UrhG was

introduced for practical reasons

infringements on a large scale

- not

-

^^'^

should not be forgotten that

It

the inability to control individual

as a favor to the public.^^^ Consequently, the

unauthorized download of protected works over the Internet

UrhG even

if the user

the

copy was made

necessary.

purposes
this

It

for the user's

seems improbable

at all

and even

if that

under § 53 (2)

own

3.

either, since the

download neither serves

events, nor

transmitted

a.

by broadcast

for

^"^
^°'

and 4
as a

(2) 2

[official statement],

a.

of

53 (2)

§

UrhG

cannot be called upon

means of information concerning

(Nr. 3), and

may

it is

much

be found

UrhG by downloading

published

in:

whether

too only allows the reproduction from the

less a printed

in §

§

53 (2) Nr. 4

53

GRUR 45

UrhG

in the rarest

Supra, pp. 32-43
Supra, pp. 32-43

Amtl. Begruendung
^^ Supra,
pp. 32-43

to

cannot serve as a justification for

two years or more. Accordingly,

a justification for the violation of § 16

^°^

it

In rare cases a justification

work has been unavailable

for scientific

were the case, there would be serious doubt

Numbers

lawfully obtained original.

purposes and the reproduction was

download musical works

that a user will

unauthorized copying by downloading, since

required for Nr. 4

not justified under § 53

UrhG. This may be the case where

1.

scientific

form of copying was necessary. Section 53

is it

is

had legally obtained a copy of the work.

A user may also be justified

(f)

§

(1965) 240, 287

current

work

as

b, if the

only supplies

of cases.
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When

(g)

by

and thereby makes these available to a multitude of anonymous

others^^^

makes another copy of

usually

under

may

a user posts works located on his hard drive on the hitemet for download

§

made

The copy

is

not

made

for

it

justification

not the solution found by the present

is

any of the purposes mentioned

available to the public in violation of § 53 (6)

UrhG

for purely private use under § 53 (1)

since

UrhG and
it

is

53 (2) UrhG,

in §

The

copies of a

(§

53 (1)

sites or

The

2.

last

copying of sound recordings under

possible justification under § 53

work on a sound

carrier prepared

53

UrhG

UrhG may be

As

far as

is

is

indeed free

at

for oneself

many of the music

does not satisfy the requirements of § 53 UrhG.

this alone

by the other

to

copy one certain work.^°^

It

is

also

file

contractual relationship between the persons involved at all.^'°

The perception

UrhG was

not intended to encompass the activities at issue

^"^

Regardless whether the work

^"^

Supra, pp. 32-43

^"^

BGH GRUR

is

posted on the user's homepage or on a BBS.

1997, 459, 462- (CB-infobank

<http://www.jurpc.de/rechtspr/19970006.htm>

I),

JurPC Web-Dok. 6/1997,

(last visited

6/5/2001)

must be

more than

questionable whether the electronic request to download a

(1) 2.2

no valid

the permission to have

courts have determined that the person preparing the copies for another

individually instructed

sound

either.

by others without reimbursement

2 UrhG). While the preparation of copies

through P2P networks,

§

is

intended to be accessible to a

recordings are concerned, the same analysis applies. Accordingly, there

justification for the

it

the copying does not occur

multitude of persons outside the user's circle of family and friends.

(h)

he

53 UrhG, as shown above, and even though the compulsory licensing approach

ultimately prove to be a viable solution,

law.^*^^

any

the work. In this case, he cannot claim

users,

creates the required

is

further

that § 53

backed by

48

the fact that digital copies were

enacted.'^"

The goal behind
means

afford the technical

must not be abused
in cases

to

to the legislators at the

UrhG was

53 (1) 2.2

copy

is to

strict

time the provision was

to enable persons

to reap the benefits

circumvent the

of doubt the provision

A

(2)

to

§

unknown

of

§

53 UrhG.

who

The provision

requirements set forth in § 53 (1)

be interpreted narrowly, since

it

is

could not

1

UrhG and

an exception.

213

user posting works for download or allowing access to her hard drive for that

purpose could, however, claim to be justified under § 52 UrhG, asserting that the
uploading of the work to his homepage concerns § 15 (2)

both provisions are affected because the work

truth,

before

it

can be

made

Where

he could claim that

economic

interest

(2),

a user posts a published

it

and

is

rather than § 16

UrhG. In

generally copied (§ 16

UrhG)

accessible to others on, and transferred over the hitemet (§ 15 (2)

UrhG). Regarding infringement of §15
justification.

UrhG

is

§52 UrhG^''*

work on

his private

relevance as a

homepage

or on a

BBS,

a public "electronic rendition" of the work, that he has no

that the other users, the public, are not

Under such circumstances,

may have

charged an admissions

fee.

the user legally need not obtain permission from the author.^

'^

"'°

Mathias Schwarz, Recht im Internet, Stand: September 2000, 3-2.2, S. 81
^" Frederike Hanel, Napster unci Gnutella - Probleme bei der Obertragung von MP3-Dateien nach

deutschem Urheberrecht, JurPC Web-Dok. 245/2000, Abs. 43 (2000),
<http://www.jurpc.de/aufsatz/20000245.htm>
^'^'^

(last visited

6/5/2001)

Bundestags-Drucksache 4/270, S.74.
Frederike Hanel, Napster und Gnutella

- Probleme bei der Obertragung von MP3-Dateien nach
deutschem Urheberrecht, JurPC Web-Dok. 245/2000, Abs. 43 (2000),

(last visited 6/5/2001); see also Nordemann, Urheberrecht,
Kommentar, 9. Aufl., § 53, Rn. 2. (§ 53 (1) 2.2 UrhG does not provide a justification for a copy shop owner
who makes copies of a rare essay to sell them to students - nothing else can apply to the user who
contributes to the excessive illegal copying of a work by making it available in a peer to peer filesharing

<http://www.jurpc.de/aufsatz/20000245.htm>

system)
''"^

'

For verbatim text of § 52 UrhG and translation, see supra, p. 3 1, footnote 144
Tauschboersen wie Napster oder Gnutella verletzen nicht das Urheberrecht,

Til Kreutzer,

http://v\rww.heise.de/tp/deutsch/inhalt/te/4857/l.html (last modified 2/7/2001) Til Kreutzer, Napster,
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argued by some that

is

It

download, even

The argument

§

if the copies

is that

UrhG

52

allows making protected works available for

were made from other users' hard drives

copies legally

made under

§ 53

UrhG may then

'^

in the first place.

also be displayed or

rendered legally under § 52 UrhG, even outside the user's circle of family and friends, in
spite

of

seem
under

§

53 (6) UrhG, which specifically forbids

at first

glance,

it

has been clarified that copies

(through

GEMA^'^

§

52 UrhG, the user

or otherwise). This

is

made by download

justifies the public offering for

work would

download were

distribufion

still

is

not justified.'^^^

are not justified

under § 53 UrhG,

§

52

UrhG

it

UrhG

or §53 UrhG.^^'

would not be permissible

UrhG

Even

a

if

to render or

explicitly forbids the public

and display of copies made for private use.
this,

Kreutzer argues that § 52

UrhG

should not apply

when

§

the opposite

were

true, the

&

Whether

download notwithstanding, the users who then download

not be jusfified under either § 52

justified

To overcome

Gnutella

may

required to pay a fee to the author

is

display the material under § 52 UrhG, since § 53 (6)

it

this

generally not the case in online scenarios,

wherefore the offering of material for download

if

However convincing

53 UrhG.'^'^ Accordingly, those copies could not be legally rendered under § 52

§

UrhG. Furthermore, even under

the

this.^'^

52

UrhG

"limits" § 53 (6)

applies. This proposition is

UrhG;

that

it

based on the argument that

determination whether or not a copy could be displayed

Co., Rechtsfragen zu Filesharing-Netzen aus der Sicht des deutschen Urheberrechts

de lege

GRUR 2001, 193, 201
^"'
Til Kreutzer, Napster, Gnutella & Co., Rechtsfragen zu Filesharing-Netzen aus der Sicht des deutschen
Urheberrechts de lege lata und de lege ferenda-Teil I, GRUR 2001, 193, 201
lata

und de lege ferenda-Teil

I,

'^'Id
^'^
^'^

Supra, pp. 32-47
See generally, Ulrich Andryk, Muiskerrecht, 24-36 (1995) (describing

GEMA and

-^

its

role)

Thorsten Braun, Rechtsfragen von Filesharing-Systemen aus Sicht des deutschen Urheberrechts
Entgegnung aufdas Thesenpapier von Till Kreutzer -, These 1-2 (2001), <http://www.hgbleipzig.de/~vgrass/semi-napster/braun-thesen.html> (last visited 6/5/2001)
"'5ee/</., These 1-3

"^

§

53 (6) UrhG, see supra

p. 32,

foomote 147

-
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legally under § 52

UrhG would depend on

the opportunity to access the original or an

authorized copy, and that these facts are irrelevant regarding the author's

However, there

is

no basis

in the

were legally prepared under

that

in the circle

law for

§

Copies of CDs, for example,

this proposition.^^'*

53 (1)

UrhG may

of family and friends and there

is

interests.'^^^

not be displayed publicly, but only

no reason

to

apply the law differently,

simply because the copies are offered in the online environment instead of the "brick and

UrhG

mortar" world.'^^^ The systematics of the

UrhG

52

rather than the

positioned after a

UrhG

is

opposite,

limits §

is

Furthermore, like § 53 UrhG, § 52

in the law.

an exception limiting the rights of the author and must therefore be interpreted

it

cannot be applied to offers for downloads

such cannot be understood as a rendition

Making

the

UrhG). This

is

in the sense

is

to one's hard drive for

anyone with

another act that constitutes copyright infringement (§§15

P2P systems

exactly what persons using Napster or other

this activity again is

individual requests;

at

of § 52 UrhG.^^*^

copy available by granting access

access to the Internet

all,

UrhG

because usually the exception or limitation

more general provision

narrowly. Accordingly

(3)

also suggest that § 53 (6)

do.

(2),

16

First

of

adequately causal for the preparation of copies by others, which

is

sufficient to constitute an infringement

"^^

Til Kreutzer, Napster, Gnutella

&

of

§ 16

UrhG, the

right to copy. Like above, a

Co., Rechtsfragen zu Filesharing-Netzen

Urheberrechts de lege lata und de lege ferenda-Teil

I,

GRUR 2001,

aus der Sicht des deutschen

193, 203

See, Thorsten Braun, Rechtsfragen von Filesharing-Systemen aus Sicht des deutschen Urheberrechts

Entgegnung auf das Thesenpapier von

Till

-

Kreutzer, These 1-2 (2001), <http://www.hgb-

leipzig.de/~vgrass/semi-napster/braun-thesen.html> (last visited 6/5/2001)

"^

Cf.

id

'''Id
''''

This

is

essentially

what Napster or other P2P users engage

in.

The P2P software

facilitates the direct

contact between two computers thereby enabling users to "open" their hard drives to others while online.

For a detailed description of centralized and decentralized P2P systems, see infra p. 53 et. seq., p. 136 et.
seq.; see generally. Til Kreutzer, Napster, Gnutella & Co.: Rechtsfragen zu Filesharing-Netzen aus Sicht
des deutschen Urheberrechts de lege lata und de lege frrenda-Teil 7, GRUR 2001, 193, 195-196
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may

user

UrhG

assert § 53

as a defense, but again the copies

not prepared for the uses specified in § 53

UrhG and

beyond the

are

friends. Secondly, the right to (electronic) rendition (§ 15 (2)

well.

Regarding

this,

neither § 53

UrhG

nor § 52

downloaded by others were

UrhG

of family and

circle

UrhG)

will

be infringed as

provide a justification, for the

reasons discussed above.^"^ Again, the analysis comes to the same result for sound
recording rights since these include the rights described in §§ 15-17 UrhG.

If a user

(4)

situation

may

to copyright,

only sends one copy to another user (via email for example)^^^, the

be different. Schwarz argues that individual communication

even

if

communication as such
it

is

irrelevant in the context

why

hard to understand

is

the copying for

infringement of § 16
necessarily copied

but argues that this

UrhG need

many
is

is in

is

user

16,

who downloads

UrhG

97

since

it is

not public^"'^,

UrhG, especially since an

work

is

and serve exclusively for

he considers irrelevant.
the realm of § 15 (2)

not a reproduction under § 16 UrhG.

download by others

5

irrelevant since these copies are transitory

material available to the public

download

1

true that individual

times in the process of being "communicated" over the Internet,

that

the

§

is

not be public. Schwarz recognizes that the

communication

the individual

of

it

not relevant

"communication" of protected works should

be considered an infringement under §§

not

While

protected works are communicated.

is

violates § 15 (2)

UrhG by making

this material violates § 16

UrhG,

If

making copyrighted

this

does not mean that

The user who posts

material for

the material available while the

UrhG by copying

it

onto her computer.

"^ Supra,
pp. 32-49
^^^
Supra, p. 27
^^°
This rarely occurs in real life, but for the sake of argument the scenario is included.
^" Mathias Schwarz, Urheberrecht
im Internet, Der Markenartikel 1996, 120, 216
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Equally, the sender in individual communication

recipient copies

her hard drive.
not violate §
incorrect to

it

1

it

makes material

available and the

by saving the email, and more importantly the attachment, onto
of course correct

It is

5 (2)

assume

UrhG

since there

that the sender in individual

is

that unauthorized

communication does

no publicity to the communication. However,

copying of protected works

is

is

not justified

Any

copying

is

original

and the recipient

only justified under § 53

justification to

of a work

be found

in the mail,

it

containing the infringing

electronic

(5)

UrhG where

in this scenario copies

in §

53 UrhG.

would not be

work was

communication any

If

less

from another's

someone were

to

is

unauthorized

UrhG

right.

Since

the user copies from his or her

own

original, there is

no

send an unauthorized copy

of an infringement simply because the

individual communication. There

different unless the individual

between family members or close

UrhG

a violation of the author's § 16

is still

it

legal simply because

occurs within or because of private individual communication.

copying that

his or

is

no reason

letter

to treat

communication takes place

friends.^^^ In that case, the justification

under

§ 53

should apply."^

In

the

end,

the

violation

of the

author's

(and/or

the

sound

recording

manufacturer's) rights by the individual users cannot be justified under any of the
justification provisions in the

UrhG.

"^ 15
§
(3) UrhG requires publicity, see supra, p. 19, footnote 87
"^ Mathias Schwarz, Urheberrecht im Internet, Der Markenartikel 1996, 120, 216
"^
32-47
supra,
Cf.

^^^

pp.

Frederike Hanel, Napster und Gnutella

- Probleme bei der Ubertragung von MP3-Dateien nach
deutschem Urheberrecht. JurPC Web-Dok. 245/2000, Abs. 34-35 (2000),
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c.

Identity of the Infringer

-

Causation

The next question must be

the identity of the infringer. § 97

UrhG shows

that not

only the person(s) directly performing the infringing activity can be infringers, but rather
that

anyone who causes or contributes

to the infringement is liable.

The

test is

whether

the alleged infringer adequately caused the infringement^^^. Obviously, the individual

copy and making

user's preparing a

available to others

it

It is

that the acts

performed by the user will

calls

this

sine qua non for the

normal course of events

also foreseeable and within the scope of the

infringement.

Schwarz

is

result in a violation

of the author's

rights.

"Vervielfaeltigung auf Distanz" (reproduction at a distance) and

recognizes that the reproduction can be attributed to the person allowing the download as
well, as long as she can determine and decide

material.

d.

who may

access and download the

^"'^

Fault

As mentioned

above, fault need not be shown in order to get an injunction, but

only to recover damages. Nevertheless, the issue will be discussed here since claims for

damages

are very relevant in the context and the potential

Fault for civil liability-purposes

is

already present where the alleged infringer

damages could be immense.

defined in § 276

knows

BGB."

that his action

may

Since intent

is

lead to the result

"^ Id. at Abs. 34
"^ For the concept of adequate causation, see supra,
p. 34
^^*
Frederike Hanel, Napster und Gnutella - Probleme bei der Ubertragung von MP3-Dateien nach
deutschem Urheberrecht, JurPC Web-Dok. 245/2000, (2000),
<http://www.jurpc.de/aufsatz/20000245.htm> (last visited 6/5/2001); see also Mathias Schwarz GRUR
1996, 836,840
"^ 276 BGB: "Der Schuldner hat, sofem nicht ein anderes bestimmt ist, Vorsatz und Fahrlaessigkeit zu
§
."
vetreten. Fahrlaessig handelt, wer die im Verkehr erforderliche Sorgfalt ausser acht laesst.
.
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declared illegal by law and accepts this possibility (dolus eventualis)^'*^, the individual

users

who

be argued

transfer copyrighted

that they

do not know of the

possibility that they

this

that this

may

results

at fault. It

of their actions and they

might be violating copyright

their actions create a

aware

music over the Internet are clearly

law.^"*'

copy of the work or allow others

constitute copyright infringement

Not only

to

do

so,

can hardly

may even

see the

are they aware that

they are also largely

and they willfully

act in spite

of

knowledge. Even where the user does not have knowledge of copyright law and

accordingly cannot positively

intent

when knowing

know of

7*1?

the facts that constitute infringement.

when they engage

intentionally

the possibility of infringing the former, she has

The

in the infringing activities described

individual users act

and are consequently

at fault.

Section 97

2.

UrhG and

the hitemet

The next important question

- P2P

is

copyright infringement in the context of
distinctly different systems

and decentralized

liability

before Directive 2000/3 1/EC

whether and

P2P

how

there can be liability for

systems. In answering this question two

of peer-to-peer filesharing must be distinguished - centralized

networks.^'*"'

is liable for intent and negligence, if nothing else is provided
"
he who ignores the care duly required in the situation.
Palandt/Heinrichs, BGB, §276 Nr. 10 (59*^ Ed. 2000); see also RGZ 57, 241 (stating that the perpetrator

Translation provided by author: "The debtor
for. Negligent
^"^

is

need not know
^*'

that her actions are illegal)

Til Kreutzer,

Tauschboersen wie Napster oder Gnutella verletzen nicht das Urheberrecht,

<http://www.heise.de/tp/deutsch/inhalt/te/4857/l.html> (last modified 2/7/2001) (stating that

and
^"^

42%

of non-users of filesharing systems are convinced

28%

of users

that their actions violate copyright law)

Palandt/Heinrichs, Introduction to §249 (59*^ Ed. 2000)

^^^

Frederike Hanel, Napster und Gnutella - Probleme bei der Ubertragung von MP3-Dateien nach
deutschem Urheberrecht, JurPC Web-Dok. 245/2000, Abs. 27 (2000),

<http://www.jurpc.de/aufsatz/20000245.htm>

(last visited

6/5/2001)
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Centralized

a.

P2P networks

In centralized

-

Napster

systems like Napster, the individual users' computers are connected

via a central server network, maintained

a

member

lists

of

by a central P2P "provider". Each user becomes

of the so-called "Napster Music Community".

all files

available

from

all

members

engine allows users to browse the

""^

The

central servers prepare

currently logged onto the system and a search

files for certain artists

or

titles.

The

central entity also

provides the users with each other's IP-addresses necessary to complete a

Decentralized

b.

P2P networks

-

"

file transfer."

Gnutella

In decentralized systems like Gnutella

on the other hand, the individual

users'

computers are not connected via a central server or server network. The exchange of

files

also happens from one user to the other (peer-to-peer), but the users have to obtain other

users' IP addresses

and available

files

themselves. There

services and the software necessary for the file transfers

a multitude of sources.

users.

^"^^

For

this reason, there

They, as was shown above, are indeed

^^^

See also infra, pp. 136 et. seq.
See generally
Records, Inc.

A&M

v.

rev'd in part, and rem'd, 239 F.3d 1004
^^

Napster,
(9"''

1

14

UrhG

is at

supra, pp. 32-47

liability for

from

anyone but the

F.Supp 2d, 896, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2000), ajfd

(last visited

6/5/2001)

one

hand."

in part,

2001) (describing the Napster service)
Probleme bei der Ubertragung von MP3-Dateien nach
Cir.

<http://www.jurpc.de/aufsatz/20000245.htm>
Cf.

available on the Internet

can be no

Frederike Hanel, Napster und Gnutella deutschem Urheberrecht, JurPC Web-Dok. 245/2000, Abs. 28 (2000),
^"^

no central entity providing

liable for copyright infringement unless

of the rare cases of justified copying under § 53

^"^

is

is
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Legal evaluation of

c.

P2P networks

Three main questions arise regarding centralized P2P systems.
be transferred legally under § 53
the

work infringed and

UrhG? Second,

is

First,

can the

files

the author's right to transmission of

third,

can the (central) P2P "provider" be held liable for the

clear

that

infringements as well.
Generally,

unauthorized

it

is

copying

must

profit

download

is

at

in the

least

law protects the author from

Internet,

downloading of such

computers' hard drive (or

reproduce (§16 UrhG)

copyright

and transfers over the

filesharing or otherwise because

users'

German

reserved to the author."

be

through

it

files creates

copies stored on the

RAM)

computers'

peer-to-peer

and the

right to

Since the law requires that the author

from every economically relevant exploitation of her work, offering a
is

relevant to copyright as well.

rendition (§ 15 (2) UrhG), as

violates the author's right to electronic

shown above. ""^^ These infringements

violations of a right required under § 97

Whether

It

file for

are the unjustified

UrhG.

the central entities at the heart of a centralized

for these infringements as well is the real question.

It

P2P system

incur liability

has been argued that this

is

not the

case because the software and services provided are merely a device to copy materials

and the development, manufacture and public offer of devices for copying material are
not forbidden under the

UrhG

or any other

German

software and services provided by a central

"reproduction

^"^^
^''''

^"

at

law."'

This

P2P "provider"

is

generally correct.

The

are indeed only tools for

a distance" and can be regarded as devices for copying under

German

Supra, pp. 16,53
Supra, pp. 47-53
Til Kreutzer,

Tauschboersen wie Napster oder Gnutella verletzen nicht das Urheberrecht,

<http://www.heise.de/tp/deutsch/inhalt/te/4857/l.html> (last modified 2/7/2001); Til Kreutzer, Napster,
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law.

VCRs,

CD

writers,

even double

VCRs

especially intended to facilitate copying of

videotapes and other such devices capable of copying protected works are not illegal."

However,
illegal

has also been recognized that the manufacturers of equipment capable of

it

copying must do what

is

in their

power

to prevent infringements

mittelbare Stoerer (indirect disturbances) under § 1004

Those regarding
on the central

liability

because they are

BGB.~"

filesharing as legal for the individual user consequently

entity's part

because there

no violation of a

is

deny any

right

by

the

individual users and the central entities never prepare a copy of the material themselves.

The argument

made

is

that,

even

if

the individual user

could only be liable as an accessory of some kind."
understanding go on to argue that the Teledienstgesetz
limit such liability.""

wherefore the

last

will

argument

commit

the infringer

As

be seen, the

fails entirely."

'

TDG

were
"

liable, a

P2P

"provider"

Yet the proponents of

(TDG) would exclude

this

or at least

not applicable to copyright issues,

is

Furthermore, the

UrhG does

the infringing activity herself but rather regards

not require that

any

act adequately

causal to the infringement as sufficient to find liability."^^ This should certainly not be

labeled accessory liability.

transferring protected

Gnutella

&

'

BGHZ

the individual users

do

music through the use of the P2P network

in

infringe copyright

most cases wherefore

17, 266, 290;

2, GRUR 2001 307
BGH GRUR 1964, 91. 92; BGHZ 42.
.

118,

127;BGHNJW

1984, 1106

Thorsten Braun, Rechtsfragen von Filesharing-Systemen aus Sicht des deutschen Urheberrechts

Entgegnung aufdas Thesenpapier von

Till

Kreutzer, These 4 (2001

leipzig.de/-vgrass/semi-napster/braun-thesen.html>

GRUR

by

Co.: Rechtsfragen zu Filesharing-Netzen aus Sicht des deutschen Urheberrechts de lege lata

und de lege ferenda-Teil
"'

As was shown,

1964, 91, 92;

Til Kreutzer,

BGHZ 42,

118, 127;

(last visited

BGH NJW

),

-

<http://www.hgb-

6/5/2001);

BGHZ

17, 266,

290;

BGH

1984, 1106

Tauschboersen wie Napster oder Gnutella verletzen nicht das Urheberrecht,

<http://www.heise.de/tp/deutsch/inhaltyte/4857/l.html> (last modified 2/7/2001)
"

ld.\

see also Til Kreutzer, Napster, Gnutella

&

Co.: Rechtsfragen zu Filesharing-Netzen aus Sicht des

deutschen Urheberrechts de lege lata und de lege ferenda-Teil
^^

Infra, 69-77; see also Thorsten Braun,

Urheberrechts

-

2,

GRUR 2001

,

307, 308

et.

seq.

Rechtsfragen von Filesharing-Systemen aus Sicht des deutschen

Entgegnung aufdas Thesenpapier von

Till

Kreutzer, These 4 (2001), <http://www.hgb-

leipzig.de/~vgrass/semi-napster/braun-thesen.html> (last visited 6/5/2001)
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there

Rechtsverletzung

the users

room

certainly

is

is

employed

for

present.

its

on

liability

The

the

central entity

is

central

entity's

also causal for the infringements since

software, routing services and cataloguing functions in performing

P2P system,

the infringing act. Since the users' activities are the primary purpose of the

the systems today are designed for the

exchange of music and great numbers of musical

works and sound recordings are protected by copyright,
central entity's causal contribution

was outside

normal course of events. Causation as required by

Another argument

based

on

the

the

§

it

can hardly be argued that the

normal course of events.

97 UrhG

legality

of

is

by posting a notice warning users

transferring protected

It is

to the

works over the system.

is

the

copying

devices

that

is

could be

abilities""

that they will violate copyright

the

law when

"^^

true that the manufacturer (only) has the obligation to prevent infringements

best of her abilities.

obligation

It

present."^^

manufacturer's obligation to prevent illegal copying to the best of her
satisfied

unlawful

the

part;

is

Whether posting a simple warning alone

questionable, however.

satisfies

The problem remains unresolved and

this

will largely

depend on the extent of the abovementioned obligation. At the present time, the software
and services provided by an entity maintaining a centralized P2P system should not be
regarded as

illegal,

but liability could arise

possibly take to prevent

^'^/rf., at

"^

Cf.

its

if

the entity does not take

all

steps

network from being used for copyright infringement.

These 4 (2001)
p. 52

supra,

"*BGHZ

17, 266,

290;BGHGRUR

1964, 91, 92;

BGHZ42,

118,

127;BGHNJW

1984, 1106

it

can

59

Section 97

3.

UrhG and

OSPs could be

the Internet

-

OSP

unknown

German

in

under

liable for copyright infringement

concept of contributory or vicarious infringement as

is

before Directive 2000/3 1/EC

liability

it is

copyright legislation. There

§

97

UrhG

relevant in U.S. copyright law

is

no

legal requirement for the

by a

individual user to have infringed in order to prove (indirect) infringement

party. Section

97 UrhG applies to OSPs the same way

course, cases in which liability for an

did not infringe are rare,

part

luKDG

of the

liability

of

OSPs

if

OSP would

not purely theoretical.

Of

even though the individual user

TDG

{Teledienstgesetz) which

now

is

the

limits

performed by others under certain circumstances.'

The new European Directive 2000/3 1/EC
Both

arise

{Informations-und Kommunikationsdienstegesetz)

for illegal activities

third

applies to the individual user.

it

The

The

as well.

also mandates a limitation of such liability."^"

will be addressed in the context of several cases dealing with the

problem of

OSP

liability.^^'

Rechtsverletzung - Violation of exclusive rights

a.

For an
as described

user

OSP

to

be

liable, there

above regarding the
copyrighted

transfers

Rechtvserletzung occurs."

"""^

must also be a Rechtsverletzung (injury

liability

material

of the individual user."

over

Til Kreutzer, Napster, Gnutella

^^'

See

infra, pp.

1

16

et.

without

authorization,

&

Co.: Rechtsfragen zu Filesharing-Netzen aus Sicht des deutschen
2,

GRUR 2001, 307,

308

seq.

Full text available at <http://www.netlaw.de/gesetz/iukdg.htm> (last visited 6/5/2001)

^" Full text available

at

<http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/2000/en_300L0031.html> (last visited

(6/5/2001)
^^'

See infra, pp. 62 et. seq.
^^ Supra,
pp. 35-36
^^^

Internet

the individual

See supra,

p.

36

a

This does not mean that the individual user needs to infringe

Urheberrechts de lege lata and de lege ferenda-Teil
26()

the

Where

to the right)
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OSP

in order for the

made on
this

OSP

and the

actions,

its

to

be

user can successfully claim a justification for his

liable. If the

OSP may

cannot, the

technically

still

However,

servers in the course of the transfer.

be

copies are

liable, since

this situation will

be

rare. All

notwithstanding there will be a violation of the right to copy (§ 16 UrhG), a violation

of the right of electronic rendition (§ 15 (2) UrhG) and possibly a violation of the right to

first

b.

(§12 UrhG) where

publication

Rechtswidrigkeit

Again,

-

the

work was previously unpublished."^^

Unlawfulness

unlawfulness

presumption by proving a

is

presumed and an

justification.

private purposes under § 53

UrhG

An OSP

OSP would

have

rebut

to

could hardly claim to have copied for

since the purpose of the transitory copies

is

not one of

OSP's

the purposes specified in the provision but rather occurs incidentally during the

business procedures.

A

justification

under § 52

the

UrhG

is

equally unlikely since

OSPs

generally do not provide their services, including Internet access, for free as required by
the provision

c.

and could therefore not claim the justification.

Causation

For the

OSP

to

be liable for copyright infringement,

caused or contributed to the infringement.'^^
possible for users to act as their

own

On

the one hand

it

it

must have adequately

could be argued that

access providers and therefore an

OSP

absolutely necessary to access the Internet and infringe the copyright therein.
other hand this

^^^5M^ra, pp. 14-15
^^'
Cf. supra, p. 34

is

it

is

is

not

On

the

not only unrealistic (hardly any individual user has the financial or
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technical abilities to be his/her

were used

services

own

Where an OSP's

accessing the Internet and uploading or downloading copyrighted

in

material without authorization, the

OSP

provider), but also irrelevant.

OSP was

qua non for the infringement.

sine

had not provided the user with access to the

If the

would not

Internet, the infringement

have occurred. The services provided by the OSP, which constitute the causal action, are
not outside the scope of the normal course of events (inadequate) either. Causation in the

UrhG

sense required by the

is

present."

Fault

d.

As mentioned above,
but

is

it

necessary to prove fault

An OSP whose
that

it

fault is not a prerequisite for finding copyright infringement,

had no

of § 276

intent for this to

BGB

is

to

OSP

argued that the
copyright by

service

order to recover damages.

whose subscribers engage

happen and did not encourage

the law.

On

the other hand,

it

is

particular infringement. Intent

-

Cf.

OLG

Again, the standard

It

can be

-

there can be

not necessary for the

is

OSP

to

no

intent

have actual

present where the alleged infringer

result

-

was

not the actions of another, the

or of the facts that constitute infringement even though she does not

An OSP

used and are used

^^^

either.

argue

generally has no actual knowledge of any particular infringement of

aware of her actions being causal for a certain

know

it

be applied to determine whether intent was present or not.

without knowledge.

individual user

in infringing activity will

subscribers and therefore cannot have intent

its

knowledge of a

in

Munchen,

in

a

Urteil

certainly

manner

vom

knows

that

is

that the services

provided to subscribers can be

adequately causal for infringement. Whether this

08.03.2001. 29

U 3282/00, available at

<http://normative.zusammenhaenge.at/faelle/urhg_aol.html>

(last visited

6/5/2001)
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can be regarded as sufficient to constitute intent was not resolved clearly
yet

was addressed

it

shortly.'^^

It

was

infamous "CompuServe" decision

in the

The court

in that case

grossly negligent at least, but probably acted intentionally,

which users could post and exchange MIDI

Whether

music exchange
result

this finding

activities

shows

between

editorial control exercised

that offer music,

OSP's network

BBS, P2P

it

are vital not only to an

that

OSPs

which

OSP was

provided a forum
that

in

most MIDI

are generally negligent with regard to

their subscribers is unclear.

by

AOL

filesharing

either.'^^

The court came

OSP's business but

In the end,

it

is

(including the

TDG)

to

in light

64
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Munchen, Uneil vom 08.03.2001, 29

in the other scenarios

encompass

file

On

liability for activities that

reality.

still

has relevance

OSPs themselves

in the

of European Directive 31/2000/EC.

3282/00. available

<http://normative.zusammenhaenge.at/faelle/urhg_aol.html>

at

(last visited

context of

since the introduction of the

Infra, p.

U

(web pages

over the Internet).

Infra, p.

OLG

there

also to the functionality of the Internet itself

would ignore

posted by

and

AOL, and

This indicates that the court would

OSP

questionable whether intent

liability for material not

luKDG

it

to the

and other forms of data transfer employing the

would be overextended

This result would not be practical;

'''Id.

case",

that the

OSP knew

process of copying and/or transferring a

in the

the other hand, liability

"'

"AOL

found

when

because the

files

have found negligence or intent on the part of an

""

be discussed

mentioned, even though the forum was not monitored regularly by

was no

^^^

that will

were copyrighted and even advertised for the forum with the availability of current

titles.^^'

OSP

any decision,

also addressed in a slightly different context in the

will also be discussed in the following."^"

files

in

6/5/2001)

"
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TDG

The
itself.

The

provides limitations of liability for content not provided by an

relevant provision, § 5

clarifies that the standards

of

TDG,

liability for

differentiates

own

an OSP's

online environment than in the "real world" (§ 5 (1)

concerned

between three

situations.

and content to which the

OSP

TDG). As

far as foreign content is

merely provides access. Liability for the

OSP

foreign content can only arise where the

by

the

first

entirely (§ 5 (3)

TDG).

"^^

However, the

for content in general, in both criminal

§ 5

"(1

)

OSP

which an

TDG
and

OSP

kind of

has knowledge of the content and

technically able to prevent use of this content with reasonable effort (§ 5 (2)

Liability for foreign content to

first

content are no different in the

distinguishes between content created by others but provided

it

It

OSP

merely provides access

was designed
civil

is

is

TDG).

eliminated

to address "responsibility"

matters and there

is

considerable

Telekommunikationsdienstegesetz [TDG] [Telecommunications-services Statute):

Diensteanbieter sindfur eigene Inhalte, die sie zur Nutzung bereithalten, nach den allgemeinen Geset-

zen verantwortlich.
(2) Diensteanbieter sind fur fremde Inhalte, die sie zur

wenn

Nutzung bereithalten, nurdann verantwortlich,
ist, deren

von diesen Inhalten Kenntnis haben und es ihnen technisch moglich und zumutbar
Nutzung zu verhindem.
sie

(3) Diensteanbieter sind fUr fremde Inhalte, zu

denen

sie lediglich

den Zugang vermitteln, nicht

veranmortlich. Eine automatische und kurzzeitige Vorhaltung fremde r Inhalte
gilt als

aufGrund Nutzerabfrage

Zugangsvermittlung.

(4) Verpflichtungen zur

Sperrung der Nutzung rechtswidriger Inhalte nach den allgemeinen Gesetzen

wenn der Diensteanbieter unter Wahrung des Fernmeldegeheimnisses gemdfi §85 des
Telekommunikationsgesetzes von diesen inhalten Kenntnis erlangt und eine Sperrung technisch moglich
und zumutbar ist.

bleiben unberUhrt,

Translation provided by author:
for use

"(

1 )

Service providers are liable for their

own

content which they provide

by others under the law.

(2) Service providers are liable for foreign content,

have knowledge of

this

which they provide for use by others only when they

content and have the technical ability to prevent this content from being used with

reasonable effort.
(3) Service providers are not liable for foreign content to

and short- term presentation of such content

which they merely provide access. An automatic

to fulfill a user-request constitutes the provision of access in

this sense.

(4) Obligations

under the law to disable use or access to

the provider has

knowledge of

this

illegal

content are not affected by this provision

with reasonable effort while preserving the secrecy of telecommunication according to §85 of the

Telecommunications-statute."

if

content and the technical ability to prevent use or access to this content
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controversy about

applicability to copyright infringement cases."

its

OSP

most important cases dealing with

the

liability

In the following,

and the applicability of the

TDG

to

copyright issues will be discussed.

and the applicability of the

e.

Cases addressing provider

(1)

The "Mailbox" Case"^' (October 1995)

liability

The defendant maintained a "Mailbox Service""

pseudonym "Black Moon". Subscribers
download computer programs from
for

download,

to four of

which the

how many programs were
It is

however

would upload

actually

clear, that the

a

distribution of protected

said "mailbox".

LG Muenchen

Urteil

vom

U

Amtsgericht [AG]

works under

§ 106 UrhG."''''

&#821

3282/00. available

to the defendant's service.

1;

[Trial Court]

Nagold

-

pseudonyms such

as 'A'

and

It

reasoned that the defendant had

and even knew

his subscribers

29

U

3282/00

ZUM

2000, 418:

Urteil

vom

31.

(last visited

'B'. In

(last visited

he was

OLG Munchen,

-

Ds 25

Js 1348/94.

6/5/2001) ("Mailbox: Download"); The names of

Germany although the
some cases the parties'

trials are public. Parties are

identities are

in

^^^

roughly equivalent to a Bulletin Board Service [BBS].

is

that

6/5/2001)

Oktober 1995

author through the press,

This kind of service

by

at

parties to a trial are not disclosed in publications in

"^ § 106 UrhG

remains unclear

the defendant guilty of criminal copyright infringement

<http://www.netlaw.de/urteile/agnag_l.htm>
referred to by

It

to the "mailbox".

<http://normative.zusammenhaenge.at/faelle/urhg_aoi.html>

"

the

30 programs were available

least

downloaded by subscribers

Decision of March 8 2001

08.03.2001. 29

At

joint plaintiff held the copyright.

knowledge of the infringements committed by

-^'

computer under

defendant would not allow a download unless the subscriber

"new" program

The court found

his

service could access the former and

his

to

from

luKDG/TDG

known

to the

others they are not.

"Wer in anderen als den gesetzUch zugelassenen Faellen ohne Einwilligung des
Werk oder eine Bearbeitung oder Umgestaltung eines Werkes vervielfaeltigt, verbreitet

(1):

Berechtigten ein

oder oeffentlich wiedergibt wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu 3 Jahren oder mil Geldstrafe
"
(2) Der Versuch ist strafbar.
Translation provided by author: "(1)

work thereof without

the

by imprisonment of up

Whoever

authors permission

to 3 years or fme.

copies, distributes or publicly renders a

in

bestraft.

work or a derivative

cases other than those permitted by law will be punished

65

infringing himself as he had been charged with criminal copyright infringement before.

The

court specifically addressed that the defendant

download

traffic to the

infringements.

It

found

was capable of controlling upload and

"mailbox" and by requiring an upload for a download encouraged

it

to

be irrelevant that the defendant could not be proven to have

uploaded any material himself The court further stated
service

must secure copyrighted works on

his service against

This decision was not discussed excessively
stringent

is

and correct

the

download by

German

legal

'^

others.

community

since

it

of the facts and application of the law.

The "CompuServe Case"

(2)

A

famous, or rather infamous, case addressing responsibility and

liability

of

OSPs

770

Germany

in

in its analysis

among

of a "mailbox"

that the provider

the criminal case against

is

CompuServe."

Although

copyright issues but dealt with the criminal responsibility of the

CEO for providing

access to illegal material,

some

it

did not address

OSP CompuServe

interesting conclusions

and

its

may be drawn

from the decision.

The defendants were CompuServe Deutschland

GmbH

(hereinafter

CompuServe

Germany), the German branch of the American OSP, owned entirely by CompuServe,
Inc.,

(2)
"•^

and

its

CEO, Mr. Somms. Unknown

The attempt

AG

Nagold

is

-

punishable."

Urteil

vom

31.

Oktober 1995

<http://www.netlaw.de/urteile/agnag_l.htm>

-"

AG

Munchen

I.

173158/95. Urteil

persons had posted pornographic images"^^ and

Multimediarecht

vom

17.

[MMR]

November

-

Ds 25

Js 1348/94,

(last visited

6/5/2001) ("Mailbox: Download")

1998, 429, ovenurned by

LG Munchen

20 Ns 465

Js

1999, <http://www.netlaw.de/urteile/lgm_12.htm> (last visited

6/5/2001)
"*"

Including images of children being sexually abused. Pornographic images are not generally illegal, but

their distribution to persons

under the age of 18

Verbreitung pornographischer Schriften...(3)

is.

"§184 Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Criminal Code]

Wer pornographische

Schriften (§ 11 Abs. 3). die

Gewalttdtigkeiten. den sexuellen Mifibrauch von Kindern oder sexuelle

Tieren
1.

zum Gegenstand haben,

verbreitet.

Handlungen von Menschen mit

"

66

violent videogames,"^' that v^'ere illegal in

servers.

CompuServe Germany provided

Germany, on

the

American branch's news-

access to theses servers to the subscribers,

which exclusively contracted with the American corporation. After the German D.A.'s
office

had named 282 forums

disabled access to these.

in

which such images were present, CompuServe,

CompuServe Germany would

without 'cutting the wire' to the U.S. Three months
software to protect children from accessing these

German
that

it

not have been able to do so

to

after the

later,

sites,

was

access

prosecutors did not consider this sufficient and filed

had only restored access

Inc.

suit.

distribution of

restored."

CompuServe

such newsgroups that did not contain

"

The

alleged

illegal material,

oder sonst zugdnglich inacht...wird, wenn die pornographischen
zum Gegenstand haben, mil Freiheitsstrafe von drei
Monaten bis zufiinfJahren, sonst mil Freiheitsstrafe bis zu drei Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe bestraft...
Translation provided by author: "...(3) Who
2.

dffentlich ausstellt, anschlagt, vorfiihrt

Schriften den sexuellen Mifibrauch von Kindern

1. distributes,

2.

publicly displays, performs or otherwise

pornographic literature which has as

humans with

its

makes accessible

subject violence, sexual abuse of children or sexual activities of

animals... will be punished by imprisonment of three months to five years,

if

the

pornographic literature contains sexual abuse of children, otherwise by imprisonment of up to three years
or a fine."
*'

Games

that present a positive

image of fascism and or violence are

sold or distributed to persons under the age of 18.
§

I

The Strafgesetzbuch

legal in

Germany

but

may

not be

(criminal code, hereinafter StGB):

Gesetz ueber jugendgefaehrdende Schriften [GjS] [Statue on writings dangerous to the youth]:

"f /j

Kinder und Jugendliche sittlich zu gefdhrden, sind in eine Liste aufzunehmen.
Dazu zdhlen vor allem unsittliche, verrohend wirkende. zu Gewalttdtigkeit, Verbrechen, Rassenhafi
"
anreizende sowie den Krieg verherrlichende Schriften. Die Aufnahme ist bekanntzumachen...
§ 3 GjS: "Eine Schrift, deren Aufnahme in die Liste bekanntgemacht ist. darf nicht ...
2. an einem Ort, der Kindern und Jugendlichen zugdnglich ist oder von ihnen eingesehen werden kann,
Schriften, die geeignet sind.

"

oder sonst zugdnglich gemacht werden...
§ 21 GjS: "Wer eine Schrift ... 2. entgegen § 3 Abs. 1 Nr. 2 am dem dort bezeichneten Orten ausstellt.
anschlagt, vorfiihrt oder sonst zugdnglich macht, ...wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu einem Jahr oder mit
ausgestellt, angeschlagen, vorgefUhrt

Geldstrafe bestraft...
Translation provided by author: "§ IGjS (1): "Writings that could endanger children and youth morally are
to be included in a

Immoral writings, writings that incite or promote violence, crime and racism and
war are specifically considered to be such writings. The inclusion in the list must be

list.

writings that idolize
publicized..."

2. be displayed,
§ 3 GjS: "( ) A writing of which the inclusion in the list has been publicized may not.
performed or otherwise made accessible in a place that is accessible to children and youth or where these
.

I

could perceive
§ 21

.

it..."

GjS: "Whoever displays, performs or otherwise makes accessible a writing

in violation

of § 3 para.

1

Nr. 2 in one of the places described therein... will be punished by imprisonment of up to one year or a fine."

~
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but that they were unable to prevent users from posting such illegal content in other

newsgroups.

283

The court found

CEO

the

guilty.

reasoned that the original "crime", the

It

184 StGB,"^'' had been committed by CompuServe,

violation of §

access to the newsgroups containing the material and that

participated in the criminal act

enabled

German

CompuServe Germany had

by maintaining a permanent connection

TDG because

that

it

is

CompuServe Germany

a service provider rather than a

CompuServe,

relationship with

limitation in § 5 (2)

mere access provider. The court

TDG.

It

to disable access.

that

^^^

17.

the

did

not

was

also declined to apply the

technically possible for the

that therefore,

Germany
American

even though CompuServe

Inc.

liable;

it

saw the American company's

ability

"^^

had any obligation

as wrong.

It is

already questionable whether

to disable access to the

names of these contained clues about

concerned newsgroups,

illegal content.

It

must be considered

AG Munchen I, MMR 1998, 429, overturned by LG Munchen 20 Ns 465 Js 173158/95, Urteil vom
November 1999, <http://www.netlaw.de/urteile/lgm_12.htm> (last visited 6/5/2001) (access to

See

materials containing child pornography

"^ See supra,

p.

65, footnote

was not restored)

280

Munchen I, MMR 1998, 429. overturned by LG Munchen 20 Ns 465 Js 173158/95.
November 1999, <http://www.netlaw.de/urteile/lgm_12.htm> (last visited 6/5/2001)

^^^

have any

not disable access to the material without "cutting the cable" to the

The decision was widely regarded

if

it

The court found

to disable access as sufficient.

even

it

reasoned that CompuServe, Inc. and CompuServe

United States, CompuServe Germany was

CompuServe,

The court

Inc. subscribers.

had knowledge of the material and

Germany could

which

did not qualify for the limitation under

found CompuServe Germany to be a service provider since

company

to the U.S.

users to access the newsgroups.

The court held
§ 5 (3)

by providing

Inc.

AG

Urteil

vom

17.

68

that there

may have been

total disabling

the U.S.

called

plenty of legal content in these newsgroups and unconditional

of access would have been a violation of free speech both in

Germany and

down

a newsgroup

Whether there may have been a moral obligation

"alt.pictures.children.sex"

CompuServe Germany

notwithstanding, there

CompuServe,

or

grounds for such an obligation,

it

is

Inc. to

far

do

so.

to shut

was no

Yet even

obligation

legal

if

there

were

for

sufficient

fetched to transfer this responsibility and

obligation (and consequently the criminal responsibility) to the

Germany, who was indisputably technically unable

to exercise

CEO

of CompuServe

any control or influence

over the news-servers."^^ Furthermore, the decision must be criticized for
interpretation of the law, particularly of § 5 (2)

and

(3)

TDG."^^ The

TDG

its

flawed

was meant

to

provide a stable and secure set of boundaries for modern telecommunications-providers.
In pursuit of this goal, the liability of providers of such services

not meant to be liable

TDG

if

others abused technical

content. ~^^

This

even

is

contained

in

limited; they

were

means they provide. "^"^ Section 5

clearly eliminates liability for merely "opening the

illegal

was

the

doorway"

that

may

Amtliche Begruendung

(3)

lead to

(official

statement):

"[DJem Diensteanbieter, der fremde

Inhalte lediglich,

nehmen zu konnen, zum abrufenden Nutzer
Inhalte einzutreten.

'''

Er

soil nicht

ohne auf

durchleitet, obliegt es nicht,

Einflufi

fur diese

anders behandelt werden als ein Anbieter von

Id.

LG Munchen 20Ns465 Js 173158/95 (overturning AG Munchen I, MMR 1998, 429),
November 1999, <http://www.netlaw.de/urteile/lgm_12.htni> (last visited 6/5/2001)

^"

288

sie

g ^

JOG;

see supra,

p.

62, footnote

Urteil

vom

273

MMR

173158/95 (overturning AG Munchen I,
1998, 429), Urteil
17. November 1999, <http://www.netlaw.de/urteile/lgm_12.htm> (last visited 6/5/2001); Amtliche
Begruendung zum Regierungsentwurf des luKDG, Bundestags-Drucksache 13, 7385, (1996)

^^^

See

LG Munchen

20 Ns 465

Js

LG Munchen 20 Ns 465 Js 173158/95 (overturning AG Munchen 1, MMR 1998, 429),
November 1999, <http://www.netlaw.de/urteile/lgm_12.htm> (last visited 6/5/2001)

^*'

17.

Urteil

vom

vom

17.
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Telekommunikationsdienstleistungen.

Demi der

blofie

Zugangsvennittler

leistet

keinen eigenen Tatbeitrag.'"~

This and the language of § 5
that

CompuServe Germany was

TDG

itself

show

was wrong

that the court

Nowhere

not an access provider.

in

holding

in the statute is

it

required that an access provider must have a contractual relationship with the users, the

term access provider

is

not even mentioned in the statute."

merely enabled the German subscribers of CompuServe,

had subscribed

to;

it

was

a

would have strange consequences:
convinced his American superior

avoid criminal

liability

kic. to access the service

they

that

court also went too far in attributing

CEO

of the

of CompuServe Germany. This

German branch could

his behavior is illegal

to ignore the situation, the only

would have been

The court misapplies

§ 5

access to the content and thereby 'made

Germany, or

for the

American company. This

to the

TDG

way

in

not have

German

if

the

CEO

to

to "cut the line" to the States, terminate service

all

CompuServe Germany's own content by

unknown

CEO

If the

and ignore the contractual obligation
correct.

TDG. The

ability to disable access to the

American company chose

CompuServe Germany

mere conduit. Accordingly, the court should have found the

defendant not guilty because of § 5 (3)

CompuServe, Lie's

"

over when

appropriation

it it's

it

result

can hardly be

became

finds that the content

when CompuServe,

own', even though

subscribers."^^ This analysis ignores that the material

it

Inc. offered

had been posted by

was produced by

others,

posted by others and that none of these persons had any relationship with either

^''

Amtliche Begruendung zum Regierungsentwurf des Informations- und Kommunikationsdienstegesetz
[Statute on Information- and Communications-services], Bundestags-Drucksache 13, 7385,

[luKDG]

(1996); Translation provided by author:
content,

which

it

"It is

not within the responsibility of the provider to stand up for

merely provides access to for the user without being able to control the content.

He

shall

not be treated different from providers of other telecommunications services, because the 'mere conduit'

does not contribute to an
^^"

Cf.

TDG,

illegal act."

available at <http://www.netlaw.de/gesetz/tdg.html> (last visited 6/5/2001)
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CompuServe company
CompuServe,

Inc.,

other than their subscription. This cannot be sufficient to find that

which did not even have knowledge of the

regard these materials as

its

actual content,

wished to

own. For many of these reasons, the defendant appealed.

The Landgericht, which handled

the appeal, overturned the

trial

court's decision,

holding the defendant not guilty because of a lack of intent and because of the limitation
of liability under § 5 (3) TDG."^'*

It

based

its

decision on several arguments, including the

ones brought forward in the above criticism of the Amtsgericht's decision.
clarified that the

CEO

of CompuServe

CompuServe,

collusively with

Inc.

Germany could

not be considered to have acted

because he was obliged to follow CompuServe, Inc.'s

also recognizes that the defendant had

done

all

he could to convince CompuServe, Inc. to

disable access to the disputed sites but that he had no

corporation to act."^^ Furthermore, the court finds § 5 (3)

CompuServe Germany had no

the fact that

subscribers.

there

its

is

The

own

no

^^^

AG

^^^

LG Munchen

Munchen

means

TDG

to force the

mother-

be applicable in spite of

to

contractual relationship with

CompuServe

court sees no reason to restrict applicability of the provision to providers

subscribers, but rather relies on the language of the provision, stating that

liability for

content.

November

it

and consequently had no significant control over corporate actions. The court

directives,

with their

First,

providing access to foreign material, with or without knowledge of

The LandgerichVs decision was

I,

MMR

correct.

1998, 429

20 Ns 465

Js

1

73 58/95 (overturning
1

AG

Munchen

I,

MMR

1

998, 429), Urteil

1999, <http://www.netlaw.de/urteile/lgm_12.htm> (last visited 6/5/2001)

vom

1

7.
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The

(3)

"AOL decision"

The defendant
by

AOL

was

AOL Germany,

newsgroup

in

the largest

German producers of MIDI

which subscribers could exchange such

GETDOWN.MID, SAMBAD-l.MID

were

which the

plaintiff held the copyright,

subscribers to the defendant's service.

The

drive or floppy disk.

rights

a corporation

owned
The

Online, Inc., Dulles Virginia and Bertelsmann Online AG."^^

was one of

Bit"

in this case

under the

UrhG and

violations because

it

plaintiff

It

plaintiff "Hit

Among

had been posted

to the

files,

was

to

newsgroup by unknown

They could be downloaded and saved
this

a

the files available

and MACFREED.MID.-*^^ These

contended that

filed suit.

equal parts

The defendant offered

files.

files.

in

a violation of

its

to hard-

exclusive

argued that the plaintiff had contributed to the

had provided unmonitored memory

to subscribers

and thereby not

only facilitated but also induced the uploading and downloading of copyrighted material.

The

plaintiff further

subscribers

would

contended

violate others'

licensing agreements

The defendant on

that the defendant

had known

copyright because

it

that these activities

knew

that

the

of

likelihood of

between the copyright holder and the subscribers was minimal."^^

the other hand argued that she had not had positive

knowledge of the

infringements and could therefore not be held liable according to § 5 (2) TDG.'*^^

defendant further argued that

-""
^^^

its

it

had taken steps

to prevent infringements

The

by informing

Id.

LG

Uneil

Muenchen, Decision of March

vom

08.03.2001, 29

U

8 2001

&#821

3282/00, available

1;

29

U

<http://normative.zusammenhaenge.at/faelle/urhg_aol.html>
of plaintiffs and defendants are not included

3282/00,

ZUM 2000, 418; OLG Munchen,

at

in the

(last visited

6/5/2001); In

Germany

the

names

published decision. Parties and witnesses are identified

by letters such as "A" or "M". For the identity of the parties, see Martin Kretzschmer, Datenpakete im Netz
der Paragraphen - Bedeutet MPS das Ende der westUchen Eigentumsordnung? NZZ Online Netzstoff
4"^ 2000)
These files represent the songs "Get down", "Samba de Janeiro" and "Freedom".
See OLG Munchen, Uneil vom 08.03.2001. 29 U 3282/00, available at

2000, Neue Zuercher Zeitung (August
^'*
"''^

<http://normative.zusammenhaenge.at/faelle/urhg_aol.html>
^""

§ 5

TDG.

see supra 62, footnote 273

(last visited

6/5/2001)
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and warning subscribers against unauthorized copying. The

TDG

plaintiff

"only applies to content accessible on servers themselves

copyright

is

apparent from the content

The Landgericht found
under the

UrhG were

violated

complaint was directed
defendant. ^*^"

manufacturer granted in § 85

UrhG,

by making

The court found

when

the violation of

itself'.'

in favor

against

countered that § 5

of the plaintiff insofar as the plaintiffs rights

MIDI

the

files at issue accessible.

uploading of such

files,

the

found for the

court

the plaintiff held the right of the

that

UrhG and

the adjunctive

as well as the rights under § 73

economic

rights

Insofar as the

sound

carrier

under §§ 15-17

UrhG, which had been transferred

to

them by

witness "M". The decision further states that the defendant was liable under § 5 (2)

§

97 UrhG because granting access

rights to distribute

downloadable

to

files constitutes a violation

of the

and the right to reproduce. ^°"^ The court reasoned that the defendant

had limited intent {dolus eventualis) because the works concerned were
music, for which the

life

plus

70 years term was obviously not over, and

have been known to the defendant. The court recognized that § 5 (2)
"'Kenntnis"

TDG,

all

popular

that this should

TDG

(knowledge) of the (infringing) content. While acknowledging

requires

that

the

defendant had no actual knowledge of the content, the court decided that knowledge of
the content

and knowledge of a violation of

defendant should have
a violation of rights

known of the

was high and

be defenseless in situations like

^"'

LG

Uneil

Muenchen, Decision of March

vom

08.03.2001, 29

U

rights can be present separately,

violation of rights.

that the

reasoned that the probability of

discernible in the case, and that the rights-holder

this if

8 2001

would

"knowledge" meant only knowledge of the actual

&#821

3282/00. available

1

;

29

U

3282/00,

ZUM 2000, 418; OLG Munchen,

at

<http://normative.zusammenhaenge.at/faelle/urhg_aoI.html>
'"'Id.

It

and

(last visited

6/5/2001)

73

content.^"" Essentially the court found an obligation to monitor

titles

or

names

that are well

known and probably

equates knowledge with the possibility to

and screen for

contain infringing material.

know through

files

with

The court

use of "scouts" and an obligation

Trie

know through such

to

screening and monitoring.'

,

However, the court finds

'

this

obligation to be limited to content already posted, because screening before uploading of

material

is

impossible.

^°^

The defendant appealed, arguing
meaning of

§

that

MIDI

not sound carriers within the

files are

85 UrhG, that the plaintiff did not "record" an

performed a purely technical

and

act,

that the correct plaintiff

because the defendant merely provides a

no influence over the newsgroups or

dial

BBS

artistic

work but

rather

would have been AOL,

up connection hub/node for

AOL,

Inc.,

and has no contractual relationship with

Inc.

has

AOL,

Inc.'s subscribers.

The Oberlandesgericht, which handled
held that the defendant

(1)

5

UrhG and was

TDG. The

of §

85

was

liable

decision

§

97

(1)

first clarifies that

1

UrhG

MIDI

without any limitation of

files are

sound

they are devices for the

progressions of sounds and notes.

do not contain the sounds themselves but

like

MIDI

progression of sounds through various analog or digital

^'»

carriers within the

potentially

The court compared them

liability

repetitive

to records or

files

It

and 85

guilty of violating the plaintiffs rights under §§ 75 (2)

under

UrhG because

the appeal, found for the plaintiff."

under §

meaning

replay of

CDs which

also

allow the replay of a

"commands" embedded

in the

Id.

'"'Id
^"^

LG Muenchen, ZUM

2000, 696 =
"'^

OLG

CR 2000,

2000, 418 =

NJW 2000, 2214

with

commentary

in

NJW 2000, 2168 and GRUR

389

Miinchen, Urteil v
vom 08.03.2001, 29

U

3282/00, available

<http://normative.zusammenhaenge.at/faelle/urhg_aol.html>

at

(last visited

6/5/2001)
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sound

carrier.

also states that the creation of

It

justify protection

MIDI

a creative enough process to

files is

of the author under § 73 UrhG. Therefore the downloading and

uploading of these

files

were held

to

be reproductions of said sound carriers and

consequently a violation of the author's and the manufacturer's rights to reproduce the

work
,

•

•

in copies.

It

liability

was

309

further brought forward

mean only such
because

it

It

would be strange

TDG

luKDG, which was

at

the

same time

to

show

TDG

to

has knowledge of the

no

liability

when

its

^'°

The court

TDG, even though

the

inapplicability to copyright.

statutory

boundaries

the technological advances in

Amtliche Begruendung
in

for

The

TDG

the

modern

is

intellectual property

part of the

was a need

intellectual property,

compatible with
refers to the

behind the draft of the luKDG, which states
laws should be put off

until

a later date.

'''Id.
''''Id.

''"Id
" Amtliche Begruendung

for

communications

communications technology." The court

(official statement)

this

also analyzed the legislative

the result of a federal commission's findings that there

reasonable

any changes

it

to find

"illegal content" as "content" in § 5 (4)

environment to make the laws, including those on

that

when

to hold a provider liable

argument alone was not considered decisive.

and

to be inapplicable to

the copyright but not of the content. This, the court reasons, follows

from the mention of

uniform

eliminates any

content which allows for a determination of legality from the content

knows of

history of the

TDG

TDG

interpreted the term 'Inhalte' (contents) in § 5 (2)

content but not of the copyright and

provider

the defendant that § 5 (3)

on the part of the defendant. The court found § 5

copyright or related rights.

itself

by

zum Reg.Entwurf des luKDG, Bundestags-Drucksache

13,

7385, 16 (1996)

75

specifically until after the

World

of 1996.^'" The Amtliche Begruendung for the final version of the

the

WIPO

conference

may

yield

harmonization of intellectual property laws so
databases and their distributors.^'"^

The court

new

Internet

also states that

that the legislative

TDG

and of

had not meant

to

European

that

only covered the protection of

far

also considers that the

and the infamous "CompuServe case". In

and

results

a result of widespread public controversy about pornographic

in

luKDG

thought process about necessary adaptations of intellectual property laws was

incomplete, that the

the

[WIPO] conference

Intellectual Property Organization

light

of

TDG

was enacted

and violent content on the

this, the

court

was convinced

change any of the present copyright law by enacting

but rather wished to resolve the criminal liability for such content that

itself,

while putting changes of copyright law off until a later date."

The defendant

also

equivalent thereof through

claimed that

its

was not contained within the

it

could not have had knowledge or the

but in a text

newsgroup users warning about copyright

is illegal

'"^

"scouts" because the copyright notice for the

files

as

file,

and

violations.

that

The

it

MIDI

files

had posted notices

court

did

not

find

to

this

convincing, but rather held that such notices are insufficient to prevent copyright
violations

on the Internet because of the increased anonymity, especially since the

"defendant's reluctance to disclose the identities of the "uploaders" shows that these can

""^

See Martin Schaefer/Clemens Rasch/Thorsten Braun, Zur Verantwortlichkeit von Online-Diensten und

Zugangsvermittlern fuer fremde urheberrechtsverletzende Inhalte,

ZUM

1998, 451, 453

^'^

Amtliche Begruendung zum Regierungsentwurf des luKDG, BT-Drucksache

^'^

OLG

Miinchen, Urteil

vom

08.03.2001, 29

U

3282/00, available

13,

7385, 39 (1996)

at

<http://normative.zusammenhaenge.at/faelle/urhg_aol.html>

(last visited 6/5/2001), see also Arthur
Waldenberger, Teledienste, Mediendienste und die Verantwortlichkeit ihrer Anbieter,
1998, 124,
127; Martin Schaefer/Clemens Rasch/Thorsten Braun, Zur Verantwortlichkeit von Online-Diensten und

MMR

Zugangsvermittlern fuer fremde urheberrechtsverletzende Inhalte,

ZUM

1998, 451, 453
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count on such anonymity".'''

It

further found that the use of "scouts" to screen for

copyrighted material shows that the defendant was aware of copyright violations in

newsgroups and knew

that the notice posted

was

insufficient to prevent violations. Lastly

the court finds the use of "scouts" to be insufficient to determine

uploaded work

is

whether or not an

copyrighted.^'^

Conclusion regarding the applicability of the

f.

its

The decisive

TDG

to copyright issues

question, as the court recognized as,

whether or not the

is

TDG

should be applied in the context of copyright. The language of the statute does not
provide a simple answer. The definition of the term "content"
in finding

is

such an answer."

not defined in the

from §5 TDG, but
and mformation
criticized

TDG. Some have

suggested that

accordance with

§2(1) TDG,

in

in the

because

it

form of sounds, images and

that

TDG

service

beneficial to

them

it

would be unjust
providers

to certain areas

without

of the

OLG

Munchen,

Urteil

vom

08.03.2001, 29

U

one of the central points

has been recognized that the term

it

should be defined independently

as including only

text

.

^'^

However,

The

combinable data

view has been

this

criticism

is

mainly based

to let the industry-regulating provisions of the

limitation

law.'*'^

does not seem to contain any limitations as to

^"

it

would exclude computer programs.

on the argument
apply to

In scholarly discussion,

is

its

At

while

first sight,

limiting

the

provisions

the language of § 5

applicability. This perception

3282/00, available

<http://normative.zusammenhaenge.at/faelle/urhg_aoI.html>

TDG

would be

at

(last visited

6/5/2001)

'''Id.

Frank A. Koch, ZivilrechtlicheAnhieterhaftungfuerlnhalte
196; Arthur Waldenberger, Teledienste, Mediendiensle

in

Kominunikationsnetzen,

CR

1997, 193,

und die Verantwortlichkeit ihrer Anhieter,

MMR

1998, 124, 127
'^

Gerald Spindler, Haftungsrechtliche Grundprobleme derneuen Medien,

'''Id.

NJW

1997, 3193, 3195
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congruent with the legislative intention of creating a law to address the issue of
responsibility for content in the online environment in

under § 5

TDG

is

dependent on the service provider's knowledge of the content

From knowledge of

the proprietary situation of that content.

provider would not necessarily
the copyright

However,

entirety.

its

owner

is.

Yet

know whether

this is

in the

the content, a service

and who

copyright context.

It

would be

strange to create a dependency between the copyright and the content in this manner.

limitation of liability based

various levels of intent

liability

If

"

statements,

A

"

on knowledge necessarily coincides with the presence of

knowledge

is

would have

the object of such intent

reasonable applicability of § 5

TDG

proprietary situation of the content

is

~

intent {dolus eventualis or lesser dolus directus).

be limited to intentional actions as

to

is

-

not

itself,

that content is copyrighted at all

what matters most

liability

in

is

indicated

by the

official

to be the copyright in order to find a

copyright cases. Yet the knowledge of the

TDG, which

not addressed in § 5

indicates that

it

should not be applied to copyright cases. The focus on knowledge of the actual content
indicates strongly that § 5

itself,

only affects

not liability for legal content, which

reasons.'^''*

§ 5

TDG

TDG

Thorough

is

Cf.

OLG

may

content that

and of

not be reproduced due to proprietary

not applicable to copyright issues. This understanding

Munchen,

is illegal in

interpretation of the statutory language consequently indicates that

the legislative history, as discussed

"'

liability for

Urteil

vom

by the

08.03.2001, 29

U

court.

is

strongly backed

The enactment of

3282/00, available

the

by

new European

at

<http://normative.zusammenhaenge.at/faelle/urhg_aol.html>

(last visited

^^^

defined as knowledge of the likelihood of the

In

Germany dolus

illegal result

eventualis (limited intent)

is

commonly

6/5/2001)

of an action with or without a voluntative element. Dolus directus exists

requiring only certain

knowledge of

the result, the other

the result to happen. See generally Palandt/Heinrichs,

form of

BOB

Introduction to §249

(Sg'*"

^^'

Amtliche Begruendung zum Reg.Entwurf des luKDG, Bundestags-Drucksache

^^'

OLG

Munchen,

Urteil

vom

08.03.2001, 29

U

3282/(X), available at

<http://normative.zusammenhaenge.atyfaelle/urhg_aol.html>

in

two forms, one
want

intent requiring the acting party to

(last visited

6/5/2001)

13,

Ed. 2000)

7385, 39 (1996)

78

problem anyhow, but the court was correct

Directive

may

TDG

be inapplicable. This

to

obliterate the

is

backed even more by the

{Mediendienstestaatsvertrag), a uniform state law,

The

states

the

MdStV

is

TDG, which were

that

§5

copyright law. This

passed as related laws, shows that neither the state

is in

complete accord with the historical materials which indicate the

inapplicable in copyright cases."

in finding the

'^

many

case

on how

this

Unfortunately this leaves the question about the presence of intent in
scenarios unresolved and there

dilemma could be

resolved.

provision similar to §5

TDG

will

Directive or the

is

A

no clear indication

UrhG

or the

BGB

possible solution could indeed be the enactment of a

TDG. Whether

or not a regulation of copyright liability similar to

be enacted, or whether

WIPO

in the

it

already has been mandated by the European

treaties is a different question that will

be addressed

in the

following.

*" See <http://www.netlaw.de/gesetz/mdstv.html>

vom

08.03.2001, 29

6/5/2001)
^^''

See supra,

^'

The congruence between

same, as was stated by the court as well. In the end, the court was correct

the §5

TDG.

nor the federal legislature intended for these statutes to be applied to

legislatures

TDG to be

MdStV

5

§

virtually identical with

have no legislative power concerning copyright."

and the

fact

in finding the

p. 3

U

(last visited

6/5/2001); see also

OLG

Miinchen, Urteil

3282/00, <http://normative.zusammenhaenge.at/faelle/urhg_aol.html>

(last visited
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The impact of the

4.

The

a.

WIPO

treaties

and European Union Directive 2000/3 1/EC

WIPO treaties^"^

At the end of 1996

community agreed upon two

the international

reaction to the changes brought about

by

digital

communications technology. Concerning

the issue at hand, especially electronic publishing, the

the

WIPO

Copyright Treaty (WCT).^"^ The

Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT).

U.S.

'

complemented by

is

Although both

Millennium Copyright Act'" and the

Digital

harmonization of copyright

is

WCT

most relevant of these

treaties is

the

WIPO

treaties are not in force

they have already had a significant influence on national legislation; for example

yet,^^'

the

treaties as a

WCT

that the

in the

information

clarifies that the act

in the

What

is

relevant in this context

of making copyrighted material available online

the exclusive right of the author or copyright

of the reproduction right

society.^'*''

EU-Directive on the

draft

owner."^'*'*

An

agreement on the exact scope

online environment could not be reached. However, a

statement was issued, that the reproduction right

is

to

be fully valid in the digital

environment, and that the storage of protected subject matter

^^^

Amtliche Begruendung zum Reg.Entwurf des luKDG, Bundestags-Drucksache

^^*

Available

in full text

is

in

13,

digital

format in

7385, 39 (1996)

version at <http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ip/index.html> (last visited 6/5/2001)

36 I.L.M. 65 (1997), see also Diplomatic Conference on certain Copyright and neighboring rights
December 2 to 20, 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty adopted by the Diplomatic Conference

questions, Geneva,

on December 20, 1996;

full text at

<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ip/copyright/copyright.html> (last visited

6/5/2001)
''"Id.

"' See

(As of February 1, 2001, 22 States have ratified the WCT, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997) and 20 the
36 I.L.M. 76 (1997). Both treaties require 30 instruments of ratification or accession)
"^ See Infra, p. 98
id.

WPPT
'''

Common

OJ EC No. C 344 of December 2000,
See also the European Parliament
on the Council common position for adopting a directive on the harmonisation of
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the Information Society (9512/1/2000 - C5-0520/2000
1997/0359(COD)) of 14 February 2001, <http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/de/com/dat/1999/de_599PC0250.html> (last visited 6/5/2001). An audiovisual performances treaty
Position,

1

1

;

legislative resolution

failed in

-

December 2000.

See Thomas Dreier,

ICSU Press

-

New

on copyright and databases and its impact on society, Second Joint
Conference on Electronic Publishing in Science UNESCO House, Paris,

legislation

UNESCO Expert
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media

electronic

is

a reproduction under Article 9 of the Berne Convention.^^^ There

also an agreement that

(including

merely providing the physical

communication

the

communication relevant

of

in the context

WCT itself.^^^

the three-step test contained in the

environment. The

test

not

amount

to

a

It

should be noted that the

TRIPS agreement

WCT

applicable in the online

allows states to enact limitations and exceptions to the exclusive

rights granted in certain cases

exploitation of the

should

of copyright because such would not be within the

meaning of the Berne Convention or the

makes

allowing a communication

facilities

works)

protected

was

when such

limitations

work and do not unreasonably

do not

interfere with the

normal

interfere with the author's legitimate

Since the treaties are the result of international efforts toward harmonization,

interests.

they only provide a rough framework in need to be filled in detail by national legislation.

One

issue that needs to be

worked out and

legislation is the online offering

This

is

is

already addressed in

of copyrighted material

in digital

some

national

format to the public.

undisputedly an act covered by copyright, and consequently requires the copyright

owner's authorization. Under which circumstances intermediaries should be

exempt from

liability for

copyright infringement, the very topic of this thesis,

liable or

is less

clear

and the subject of debate.

^^^

WCT statement "Concerning Article

1(4)

The reproduction

right, as set

out in Article 9 of the Berne

Convention, and the exceptions permitted thereunder, fully apply in the digital enviroimient,

m digital

the use of

works

electronic

medium

in particular to

understood that the storage of a protected work in digital form in an
constitutes a reproduction within the meaning of Article 9 of the Berne Convention.",
form.

It is

See 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997) and <http://www.wipo. int/treaties/ip/copyright/statements.html#3>

(last visited

6/5/2001)
^^^

See,

Thomas

ICSU Press

-

Dreier,

New legislation

on copyright and databases and its impact on society, Second Joint
Conference on Electronic Publishing in Science UNESCO House, Paris,

UNESCO Expert

Wednesday, 21 February 2001 <http://www.sub.unigoettingen.de/gdz/tecup/TDreport.pdf>
,

6/5/2001), 50 etseq.

(last visited

The European Union has made an
to breathe life into the

WIPO

treaties

effort to legislate

WIPO treaties

as well.'

'

It

the details necessary

by enacting Directive 2000/3 1/EC, which

dealt with in the following. In the U.S., the Digital

of the

some of

Millenium Copyright Act

is

will be

the result

will be addressed at the appropriate pomt.

Directive 2000/3 1/EC"^

b.

On

June

8,

2000

the

European Parliament and Council passed Directive

2000/3 1/EC of the European Communities "on certain legal aspects of information
society services, in particular electronic

directive

is

according to

in

its

force and requires the

provisions.

The

directive

commerce,

member
is

in

states

specifically

the Internal Market"."

to

amend

meant

their

national laws

to

"[c]ontribute to the proper functioning of the internal market

movement of information

The

society services between the

by ensuring the

member

free

states"

and

"approximate[s]... certain national provisions on information society services
relating to the internal market, the establishment of service providers,

communications, electronic contracts, the

liability

commercial

of intermediaries, codes of

conduct, out-of-court dispute settlements, court actions and cooperation between

member

See
^^*

states".'^'*^

id.

Full text available at <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/2000/en_300L0031.html> (last visited

6/5/2001)
"'^

Official Journal

ONLINE (May 4""
5/5/2001)

L

178, 17/07/2000, p. 0001-0016, See also Christiane Schulzki-Haddouti,

2000) <http://Internet.spiegel.de/netzwelt/politik/0,1518,74909,00.html>

SPIEGEL

(last visited

82

Service Provider liability according to the Directive

(1)

§4 of the directive specifically addresses the issue of intermediary service
provider

liability.

The term "service provider"

defined as any natural or legal person

is

providing "information society services", which in turn

as

amended by

to say,

and

at the

meant

for remuneration, at a distance,

by

service, that

electronic

as can

be deducted fi^om the language

is

means

individual request of a recipient of that service." Direcdve 98/34/EC

encompass OSPs,

to

defined in directive 98/34/EC

any information society

directive QSMS/EC.^"": "2. service,

any service normally provided

is

was

in the preamble:

"...information society services also include services consisting of the transmission via a

communication network,

in

providing access to a communication network or in hosting

information provided by a recipient of the service.
definition. Both, the

preamble

the services provided

by an

to

definition remains to be determined.

at the center

There has been no change

98/34/EC and the definition

OSP.^'*^

service can be understood as to

"^"^^

in

to that

98/48/EC, clearly include

Whether P2P providers are also included

The above

encompass

in the

definition of an information society

at least centralized

P2P networks. The

entities

of these systems provide a service, namely software and, as for example

in

the case of Napster, cataloguing and search functions at the individual request of their

users

by

electronic means,

namely the

Internet.

Even though they do not provide

service for "remuneration", they can be said to be included in the definition since

it

this

does

not require remuneration as a decisive element but rather states that such services are

^'**^

Council Directive 2000/31 /EC, Article

lex/en/lif/dat/2000/en_300L0031.html>
^'*'

Council Directive 98/48/EC, Article 2

lex/de/lif/dat/1998/398L0048.html>
^"^

Preamble

to

1.1.

and

1.2., full text

(last visited

(a), (b), full text

(last visited

available at <http://europa.eu.int/eur-

6/5/2001)
available at <http://europa.eu.int/eur-

6/5/2001)

Council Directive 98/34/EC, Nr. (18), full text available
(last visited 6/5/2001)

lex/de/lif/dat/1998/de_398L0034.html>

at <http://europa.eu.int/eur-
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generally not provided for free.

On

the other hand, decentralized

provide software to enable users to share
that definition,

because software

is

rather a product and because there

provider.

seems

It

that

only

peer to peer, should be outside the scope of

not a service in the traditional understanding but

is

that centralized

files

P2P systems

no central entity

that could

P2P systems can be included

be called a service
in the Directive's

definition of "information society service provider" while decentralized networks are

clearly outside the definition's scope for lack of

The standards
was passed
the

will not

Member

(a)

any form of "service provider".

for liability, in countries other than

Germany, before the Directive

be addressed for reasons of practicality, since these standards vary

in

States.^'*'*

"Mere conduit" Section

§

4 Article

4 Article
12

1

2 of Directive 2000/3

concerns the

liability

1

/EC

of service providers

for

their

transmission of information through their communication networks at the request of their

users.

This encompasses providing Internet access, the opportunity to upload and

download

data, including copyrighted

music

files,

from the language of the provision. The member
so that a service provider's liability

is

and email services as becomes clear

states are required to

amend

their

laws

eliminated if the provider complies with a set of

conditions:

^'^

See also, Christiane Schulzki-Haddouti,

SPIEGEL ONLINE (May 4*^ 2000)

<http://Intemet.spiegel.de/netzwelt/politik/0,1518,74909,00.html> (last visited 5/5/2001)
^**

To illustrate this one may compare the natural law based copyright laws of Germany or France with the
completely different, non-natural law based copyright law of the United Kingdom. The difference still
remains on a national level and

environment due

in other fields than the liability

to the principle

regulate issues that are

more

of service providers in the online

of subsidiarity, according to which the European Legislature will not

efficiently regulated

on

a national level.
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"l.[s]hall ensure that the service provider is not Hable...on condition that the

provider:

(a)

does not

(b)

does not select the receiver

(c)

does not select or modify the information contained in the transmission.

2.

The

initiate the transmission;

acts

of the transmission; and

[sic! recipient]

of transmission and provision of access referred to

in

paragraph

1

include the automatic, intermediate and transient storage of the information

transmitted

insofar

as

this

takes

the

for

sole

purpose of carrying out the

transmission in the communication network, and provided that the information
not stored for any period longer than

3.

is

is

reasonably necessary for the transmission.

This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court... in accordance with

Member

States' legal systems,

of requiring the service provider

to terminate or

prevent an infringement."

These requirements are generally easy
requested

by

A central

P2P

even

less

meet

for an

a subscriber are normally carried out in the

entity should

measures

come

law accessible

to control the transmissions

yet, so the application

national laws,

OSPs cannot be

is

OSP, since

the transmissions

manner required

automatically.

within the scope of the safe harbor as well, since

interconnect directly without the central

amended

to

P2P

between

its

it

has

members because they

entity as an intermediary.

There

is

no case

and functionality of the Directive, or rather the

hard to determine.

On

the

one hand,

it

could be argued that

held liable for copyright infringements committed by individual users

using the OSPs' networks as a conduit. For example, if a subscriber to an OSP's service

downloads a copyrighted piece of music from a website or

BBS

not maintained by the

85

OSP, from another
the

OSP

from any other source not controlled by the OSP,

user's hard-drive or

should be exempt from

liability;

even though the individual user would be

German copyright law

for copyright infringement under the current

the other

hand Article 12 of the Directive eliminates

transmitted".^'*^ This

language could be interpreted like §5

for content that is illegal in

It

remains to be seen

states will

amend

how

and of itself, not legal content

in

TDG

to address

is

liability for

However, the similarity

"information" and

an activity and the content copied

that Article 12

of the Directive

is

is

information

only

to § 5

liability for "activities".

how

TDG

is

is

the

member

striking

and

a difference

Copyright infringement

not illegal in and of itself Consequently,

akin to § 5

liability

that is illegally transmitted.^'*^

the language of Article 14 of the Directive ftirther suggests, that there

between

On

cases.

liability "for the

the Directive will be applied in practice and

their national laws.

most

liable

TDG and should not be applied to

it

seems

copyright

infringement.

(b)

Caching - Article

1

3

of Directive 2000/3 1 /EC

Article 13 extends the limitation

"making more

on

efficient the information's

under similar conditions as Article

liability to

"caching" or other means of

onward transmission

to other recipients..."

12. Article 13 requires that "...(a) the

provider does

not modify the information" This requirement already contained in Article 12 should be

easy to

frilfill

modify the

See supra,
^"^

for service providers since the storage

latter.

p.

This condition

be intended to ensure that the original information

53

Council Directive 2000/3 1/EC, Art. 12

lex/en/lif/dat/2000/en_300L0031.html>
^*^

may

of information generally does not

See supra, pp. 73-77

I,

full text

(last visited

available at <http://europa.eu.int/eur-

6/5/2001)
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is

not changed in order to claim that

it

was not

"(b) the provider complies with conditions

infringing. Article

on access

1

3 further requires that

to the information"

and "complies

with rules regarding the updating of the information, specified in a manner widely
recognized by the industry". Again, these are conditions, which are found in the
as well.^"*^

The next condition

for the

exemption from

liability is that the

DMCA

provider "does

not interfere with the lawful use of technology, widely recognized and used by the

industry, to obtain data

on the use of the information".

Finally, a service provider is required to

remove or

"[a]ct expeditiously to

upon obtaining

actual

to disable access to the information

knowledge of the

it

has stored

fact that the information at the initial

source of the transmission has been removed from the network, or access to

been disabled or

that a court or

it

has

an administrative authority has ordered such

removal or disablement."

These conditions make clear

that a provider

must not grant access

not legally accessible to users for one reason or the other;

it

to information that is

refers to privacy issues as

well as to criminal liability and copyright infringements and should be simple to comply
with.

Again, there

is

no

sufficient practical

interpretation of the conditions

clear that an

OSP

is

exempt from

even though the individual user
Article

the courts or their actual functionality.

liability as

may well be

long as

liable

it

is

never passed through the

However,

under German copyright

entities'

it

P2P

entities

law."''*^

because the

netoworks and consequently not

This part of the Directive directly corresponds to 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (b) (West Supp. 2000); see infra,

pp. 98 et seq.

is

complies with the requirements,

13 of the Directive cannot apply to central

material transmitted

^*^

by

experience yet to determine the exact
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"cached." Just like Article

Hosting - Article

1

web

is

also limited in the context

It is

must meet certain conditions

[t]he

provider does

circumstances from which
(b) the provider,

not

Smce

to

a recipient of the service".

come within

Again the

the scope of the liability

have actual knowledge of

remove or

for

damages,

is

information

illegal activity or

illegal

activity

or

not aware of facts or

is

apparent; or

upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness,

acts expeditiously

to disable access to the information.".^^^

The language of these requirements
little

by

required that

information and, as regards claims

to

of "hosting", which

page, Bulletin Board or any other "information society" hosting service that

service provider

"(a)

an infringement."

to terminate or prevent

"consists of the storage of information provided

limitation.

States'

4 of Directive 2000/3 1 /EC

Service provider liability

includes

Member

does not preclude the

13

from "requiring the service provider

authorities

(c)

Article

12,

is

rather straightforward and there should be

confusion as to what a provider must do to take advantage of the safe harbor.^^'
this provision also addresses liability for "illegal activity",

it

should apply to

copyright infringement even if Article 12 of the Directive should not. Unfortunately, if

Article 12

is

not applied to copyright infringement, a gap would be

See supra, p. 53
"° Council Directive 2000/31 /EC,

The similanty

to the

the regulations

Art. 14, full text available at <http://europa.eu.int/eur-

lex/en/lif7dat/2000/en_300L0031.html>
^''

left in

(last visited

6/5/2001)

DMCA is apparent, even though Art.

"^ Council Directive 31/2000/EC, Art.
lex/en/lif/dat/2000/en_300L0031.html>

14

is

shorter and a bit less complicated.

14, full text available at <http://europa.eu.int/eur(last visited

6/5/2001)

because Article 14 of the Directive only addresses

regarding service provider

liability,

hosting, not transmission.

remains to be seen

Regarding central

The

entities at the core

how

this

gap will be

filled.

of centralized P2P networks, Article 14 of

some importance regarding cataloguing

the Directive has

the users.

It

actual transmissions, carried out

or listing services provided to

by the users themselves cannot come

within the scope of a provision regulating "hosting". However, if a central entity provides

lists

of users'

come

chat

files,

rooms and

the like, this could be considered hosting and should

within the scope of the provision. Accordingly, central

to take

P2P

entities

should be able

advantage of the safe harbor. Whether they will actually be able to do

considering

general

their

copyrighted material,

is

so,

knowledge of ongoing filesharing including sharing of

questionable and largely depends on the solutions found

by

national legislatures in implementing the Directive's mandates.

No

(d)

Obligation to Monitor

Finally, Article 15

"[M]ember

-

1

5

of Directive 2000/3 1 /EC

of the Directive 2000/31 /EC

States shall not

the information

Art.

clarifies that

impose a general obligation on providers...

which they transmit or

store,

to

monitor

nor a general obligation actively to

seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity."

Outlook

(2)

It

various

^" See

remains to be seen

member

infra, pp.

169

states but

et.

it

how

Directive 2000/31 /EC will be implemented

clearly

mandates a limitation of

seq. for the author's suggestions

liability

for

by

OSPs

the

in

89

accordance with the Agreement reached regarding the
the

WIPO

treaties'

mandate

to preserve

"hosting"'''''*

while implementing

and protect the rights of the copyright holders

the online environment.^'^'' Unfortunately,

it

is

unclear whether

adequately addresses the

it

issue of liability for transmission in Article 12. This will again largely

implementation
centralized

P2P

member

the

in

states.

Regarding the

in

liability

depend on the

of central entities in

systems, the issue remains as clouded as before, even though Article 14

should cover apply to some of these

entities' activities.

C. Conclusion as to the present state of the

German

law:

Before the introduction of European Directive 2000/31 /EC, the law in Germany,
while relatively clear on the questions regarding the
(including the users of decentralized

or centralized

P2P

liability to

CompuServe case and
certainty that courts

the

was sound and

the

same mistakes

AOL court that the TDG

as the

CompuServe

OSP

was no

trial

court

should not be applied to copyright

accord with the legislative intentions and

mark about

large question

users

not resolved the problem of

case had found reasonable solutions,"*^^ there

would not make

in

of individual

a satisfactory extent. While the appellate decisions in the

AOL

had made. The finding of the
cases

P2P networks), had

liability

the standards to be applied

in

goals,'^"^^

determining

yet

it

left

liability

a

for

"foreign" content that violates copyright; especially regarding the question of intent or

Cf.

supra,

Thomas

Dreier,

UNESCO

New

legislation

on copyright and databases and

its

impact on society. Second

UNESCO House,
Wednesday, 21 February 2001, <http://www.sub.unigoettingen.de/gdz/tecup/TDreport.pdf> (last
visited 6/5/2001), 50 etseq.
'^^
Cf. supra, pp. 77-79 and see infra, pp. 169 et.seq. for the author's suggestions

Joint

ICSU

Press

-

Paris,

^^^

Supra, pp. 69, 75
^" Supra,
pp. 75-77

Expert Conference on Electronic Publishing

in

Science
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negligence on the part of OSPs.^^^ The problem of

liability

of central

entities at the core

of centralized P2P systems was and remains unresolved as well.

These holes

in the

law can

now be

closed in enacting national law in accordance

with Directive 2000/3 1/EC, which provides a wide range of
regulated in detail

by

the national legislative.

It

liability limitations to

remains to be seen

how Germany

will

adapt her laws to adhere to the relatively indefinite standards set forth in the Directive.

more
is

^'*

detailed and thorough regulation of the liability for transmission

not

Supra,

illegal

p.

77

but

was

illegally

transmitted

or

copied

is

of information

to

be

hoped

be

A

that

for.

CHAPTER n: COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Copyright protection in the U.S.

-

general overview

Copyright in the United States

However,

in

with a look

is

governed by the Copyright Statute of 1976.^^^

any discussion of copyright law in the United States
at

"The Congress

it is

necessary to

the intellectual property clause in the Constitution, Art.

shall

have power

to

I

start

Clause

§ 8

promote the progress of science and useful

arts,

8:

by

securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries."

Philosophical and historical background

1

What
uncertain. ^^^

of science,

the Framers had in

mind when they adopted

The language of the clause seems

i.e.

learning, for the public welfare,

to place

this provision in

1787

heavy emphasis on the promotion

by providing the author with an economic

incentive to create. This language suggests that this

was regarded

as the primary purpose

of the provision.^^' However, the notion of author's rights was not unknown
Framers
rights

either, as

of authors.

can be seen
If there is

in the

no

is

to the

use of the words "to secure" in conjunction with the

right beforehand,

how

can

it

of a different use of language? The ambiguity

be secured.

Or

is this

merely the

result

the result

of the same ambiguity and uncertainty about the purpose of copyright

^'^
^^°
'''

in the clause is

Copyrights 17 U.S.C. (1994)
Craig Joyce, William Party, Marshall Leaffer, Peter Jaszi: Copyright Law, 19 (5* Ed. 2000)
Id.

91

probably

92

England.

363

protection

in

appropriate

at this point.^^"*

Therefore

hi England, the printing press

like in continental

Europe,

copyright law. The

new technology

it

a

brief look

was introduced

practically

marked

in

it

among

publishers and

The beginnings of copyright law

hi

1534

it

was prohibited

for

anyone

without the approval of royal censors and a license, hi 1556

created; mainly for political reasons. ^^^

Company" was bestowed with
continued until 1694

renewed.

The

when

The newly created

Id. at 19, citing

"Stationers'

the sole right to print and publish books. ^^^ This

monopoly

the Licensing Act of 1662 lapsed for the last time and

Stationers'

Company

lobbied for a

Barbara A. Ringer,

Two Hundred

The

result

was

Years of American Copyright Law,

in

Jaszi:

Copyright Law, 15

(5'*'

they

the Statute of

Two Hundred

Years of English and Amencan Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law 117, 126 (Am. Bar Ass'n
"^ Craig Joyce, William Party, Marshall Leaffer, Peter Jaszi: Copyright Law, 20 (5* Ed. 2000)
^" L. Ray Patterson, A response to Mr. Y'Barbo 's reply, 5 J. Intell. Prop. L., 235 (1997)

^" Craig Joyce, William Party, Marshall Leaffer, Peter

was not

new Licensing Act because

feared competition and wished to secure their monopoly.

ed.,

1977)

Ed. 2000)

^^Id.atie
^^^

Robert P. Merges, Peter S Menell, Mark A. Lemley: Intellectual Property in the New Technological
Age, 345 (2000), citing Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Revolution in Early Modem Europe
(Cambridge 1993)
^*^
Robert P. Merges, Peter S Menell, Mark A. Lemley: Intellectual Property in the New Technological
Age, 345-346 (2000) (stating that the "Stationers" were trusted by the crown not to publish dissident or

Company was intended as a form of censorship)
Craig Joyce, William Party, Marshall Leaffer, Peter Jaszi: Copyright Law, 19 (5* Ed. 2000)

heretical material, in effect the creation of the Stationers
^^'

in

"copyright" (more a privilege) was granted by the crown. ^^^ hi 1557 a publishing

monopoly was

^^~

is

provided the means to spread heretic and

England consequently were censorship provisions,

first

history

the begirming of the development of

^^^
anti-royal texts with greater ease than ever before.

the

copyright

1476 by William Claxton.^^^ Just

not only created competition

booksellers but also worried the crown, since

to publish printed material

English

at

^™ Robert P. Merges, Peter S Menell, Mark A. Lemley:
Age, 346 (2000)

Intellectual Property in the

New Technological

93

Anne, passed

in

1710.^^'

For the

first

time in English copyright history, the Statute

granted rights to the authors themselves, not only to the publishers.

The

Statute contained

a system of formal requirements for protection such as registration, notice and deposit.

The term of
author.^^^

this right

The

was

Stationers'

limited to 14 years, renewable for another 14 years

Company backed

this

new development, even though

by

it

the

broke

with their monopoly. The argument that the public would be served by securing the rights

of the authors

first

appeared in

It

provided to the Stationers a seemingly

The notion of a perpetual

"public-spirited" argument.

much

this context.

like the droit d'auteur'^^

came up

in

natural or

Donaldson

v.

common law copynght

Beckett,

when

a publisher

argued that the author had had such a perpetual copyright before the introduction of the
Statute of Anne and that the statute merely served to protect that right. ^^^

and

in the U.S. the notion

of a perpetual copyright was dismissed,

Both

in

at least for

England

published

works."^

The development of copyright law
in

many ways. Even

in the

United States shows

before the adoption of the copyright clause,

its

English heritage

all

former colonies

except for Delaware had passed copyright laws that mostly contained the English

approach taken

in the Statute

of Anne.

^''^

"' Craig Joyce, William Party, Marshall Leaffer, Peter Jaszi: Copyright Law, 19

(5^^ Ed. 2000); Robert P.
Merges, Peter S Menell, Mark A. Lemley: Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age, 346 (2000)
"^ Robert P. Merges, Peter S Menell, Mark A. Lemley: Intellectual Property in the New Technological

Age, 346 (2000)
"^ Craig Joyce, William Party, Marshall Leaffer, Peter Jaszi, Copyright Law, 17-18 (5* Ed. 2000)
^''*
Of course the continental European copyright is not perpetual. See supra, p. 28
"' Donaldson v. Beckett, 2 Bro. P.C. 129, 1 Eng. Rep. 837, 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257
(1774)
^^^

Haimo Schack, Urheber- und Urhebervertragsrecht, 50 (1997); see also for the U.S., Wheaton v. Peters,
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, (1834) (The Supreme Court court regarded a reward to the author as secondary in
relation to the utilitanan mtentions behind copyright.)
^^'

Robert P. Merges, Peter S Menell, Mark A. Lemley: Intellectual Property in the New Technological
Age, 346 (2000); L. Ray Patterson, A response to Mr. Y'Barbo 's reply, 5. J. Intell. Prop. L., 235 (1997)
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The copyright clause

itself

shows

that the

primary purpose of copyright

is

not

understood to be the protection of the author or his "intellectual" property but rather the
protection of the public domain, the promotion of learning and the protection of public

Copyright

access to copyrighted works.

right

is

generally not understood as a propnetary

of the author resulting from natural law theory, but as a privilege granted

to the

author (This understanding seems to be diminishing due to globalization-induced efforts
to achieve uniformity in copyright legislation^^^).

author's property in the true

The creation/work

is

not considered the

meaning of the word. The author merely benefits from the

grant of a limited statutory monopoly.

This approach

is

intended to create an mcentive
301

for the author to create thereby

promoting the "progress of science" (learning).

This

notion mirrors the preamble to the Statute of Anne^^^, which must be regarded as

its

source.''^"'

Even though U.S. copyright law has changed
the copyright clause and has lately taken a course

significantly since the adoption of

away from

approach and towards moral rights and natural law theory,

it

the statutory

seems

original philosophy behind copyright protection in the United States

or statutory

monopoly approach;

it

is still

fair to

was

monopoly

say that the

the utilitarian,

the predominant one.^^"*

"* L. Ray Patterson, A response to Mr. Y'Barbo 's reply, 5 J. Intell. Prop. L., 235, 237-242
(1997)
"' Craig Joyce, William Party, Marshall Leaffer, Peter Jaszi: Copyright Law, 27-28 (5* Ed. 2000)
'*°

Robert P. Merges, Peter S Menell, Mark A. Lemley: Intellectual Property in the New Technological
Age, 346 (2000)
^*'
Craig Joyce, William Party, Marshall Leaffer, Peter Jaszi: Copyright Law, 19 (5* Ed. 2000)
8 Anne,

c.

19 (1710):

in the authors or

"An Act

for the

encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of printed books

purchasers of such copies, during the times therein mentioned."

^" L.Ray Patterson, A response to Mr. Y'Barbo 's reply, 5 J. Intell. Prop. L., 235, 237-240
(1997)
^^*
Robert P. Merges, Peter S Menell, Mark A. Lemley: Intellectual Property in the New Technological
Age, 35 1 (2000), citing Alfred Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Posession, 5
Ohio St. L.J. 517 (1990); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Georgetown L.J. 287,
350-353 (1988); Immanuel Kant, Of the Injustice of Counterfeiting Books, 1 Essays and Treatises on
Moral, Political and Various Philosophical Subjects 225, 229-230 (Richardson Ed. 1798); Benjamin
Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright, 79 (1967)
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The Copyright

2.

Statute of

1

976

Congress exercised the power granted
the

first

in the copyright clause in

1790 and enacted

U.S. copyright statute which resembled the Statute of Anne.^^^ The original

scope of the

act, limited to

amendments

to

books, was expanded by a number of court decisions and

include prints, musical compositions, dramatic works, photographs,

sculptures and artistic works. ^^^

new

before a completely

statute

The Act was revised and amended
was enacted

in

in

1831 and 1870

1909 which broadened the scope of

copyright further by encompassing "all writings" and extending the term to 28 years and
a second term of the

same

An

duration.

entirely

new

U.S. copyright law significantly, was enacted in 1976.

statute,

It

which changed the face of

has been

amended various times

since then, but continues to be the copyright law of the United States.

It

will

be discussed

in detail in the following.

TOO

Requirements

a.

for protection

-

subject matter of copyright

(1)

Original works of authorship (17 U.S.C. § 102)

(a)

To be

that

it

protected

by copyright law

a

work must be de minimis

It

need not be entirely novel, yet some interpretative choices

^^^

Robert P. Merges, Peter S Menell, Mark A. Lemley: Intellectual Property
Age, 347 (2000)
^*^

means

must not be a copy of a preexisting work but rather a distinguishable variation from

existing works.

^**

original. This

in the

in

New Technological

see also Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (chromolithographs)
Craig Joyce, William Patry, Marshall Leaffer, Peter Jaszi: Copyright Law, 20 (5* Ed. 2000); Robert P.

Id.;

in the New Technological Age, 347 (2000)
17 U.S.C. § 102 (a): "Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they

Merges, Peter S Menell, Mark A. Lemley: Intellectual Property
^**

can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device. Works of authorship include the following catgories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works,
including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and
other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works." (1994)
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arrangement, selection or coordination must have been

requirement of

artistic merit, aesthetics

or the hke.^^^

made by

the author. There

Very few works lack the

is

no

creativity

pass this de minimis threshold.^^^ Musical works, like they are concerned here, are

to

original in this sense if they are not copies of prior

standard,

which

matter because

will usually

it

lacks originality,

offline

environment

(b)

A

after

problem may

Supreme Court,
however,

is

functional at

(2)

case. If a musical

it

is

work

is

satisfy the

de minimis

not copyrightable subject

of no concern to infringement in the online or the

all.

arise

works certainly require labor
102.^^' Since the

be the

works and

where the work
in their creation

is

functional or mechanical.

they

may

While such

not be creative in the sense of §

"sweat of the brow" justification for copyright has been rejected by the
the test can only be that set out

by the

originality requirement.^^" This

not relevant in the context of this thesis since musical works are rarely

all.

The problem

will therefore not

be discussed

further.

The idea/expression dichotomy

The copyright

no protection

statute offers

for ideas

themselves but only for the

concrete expressions thereof in order to prevent copyright from inhibiting other authors

from employing ideas from prior works

in creating their

own.^^^ Protection of ideas

^^^

Robert P. Merges, Peter S Menell, Mark A. Lemley: Intellectual Property in the New Technological
Age, 354 (2000), See also Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-252 (1903)
^'°

Robert

P.

Merges, Peter S Menell, Mark A. Lemley; Intellectual Property

in the

New Technological

Age, 351 (2000)
'"
^'^

Id.

Telephone Service, 499 U.S. 340 (1991)
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, ( 1 879) (". .But there is a clear distinction between the book,
the art which it is intended to illustrate.")
Feist Publications v. Rural

^'^

.

as such,

and
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would destroy

the basis of creation.

^^"^

In the context

of

this thesis this point

has Uttle

relevance since the works affected by online copying and transfers are almost exclusively

copyrighted and musical works rarely,

if ever, are

purely an idea or even just the only

possible expression of an idea.

Fixation in a tangible

(3)

medium of expression
fixed in a tangible mediimi in order to be

The expression of an idea must be
^^^
This condition
protected under the statute.

It is

work

sufficient if the

which

is

fixed in a

medium of

fixation

is

used.^^^

down

may seem

it

at first

glance:

or later developed" from

or whether

questions

is

it

is

dnve of

makes no difference what form, manner or

any sound

whether saving a musical work

at issue

its

nature.

since the question

is

carrier,

be

it

The only problem

a computer.

too transitory in

difficult

problems

in the area

Musical works are fixed as soon as they are

as sheet music, recorded onto

a cassette or the hard

extent

It

While there may be several

fixation, these are not relevant here.

some

strict as

"can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated, either directly or

it

written

not as

medium "now known

with the aid of a machine or device". "'^^

of

is

in a

computer's

However, even

whether certain

the master tape, a

that

RAM

may

CD,

be relevant to

constitutes fixation

this will not

be decisive

to the

activities are sufficient to find

contributory or vicarious infiingement of copyright. If there

is

no

fixation, there

is

no

copyright and accordingly, the questions asked here would not arise in that case.

^^^
^'*

See, L.

Ray

17U.S.C.

^"'nU.S.C.
^'^

Robert

P.

Patterson,

A response

to

Mr. Y'Barbo

's

reply, 5 Intel] Prop. L.

235 (1997)

§ 102 (a) (1994)
§

102(a)

Merges, Peter S Menell, Mark A. Lemley: Intellectual Property in the

New Technological

Age, 364 (2000)
^^^

Id. at

2000)

405, see also Craig Joyce, William Party, Marshall Leaffer, Peter Jaszi: Copyright Law, 74 (5* Ed.
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b.

Scope of protection - §§

(1)

The exclusive

(a)

The exclusive

phonorecords)
in

this

is

the

context.

rights

106A

106^^^,

and limitations

rights

of the copyright holder

of the copyright owner to reproduce the work in copies (or

right

most fundamental

right granted

Reproduction under

§

106

is

by the

not

statute

limited

and the most relevant

to

exact

copying but

encompasses "substantially similar" reproductions by any means "now known or

which

from

developed,...

communicated,

the

work can be perceived, reproduced

either directly or with the aid

of a machine or

device."**

or

The copyright holder

otherwise

This definition

includes copying via the Internet, as will be seen in the relevant case law, as

(b)

later

well.'*^'

also has the exclusive right "to distribute copies... of the

copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease,
or lending."''^^ Distribution normally requires the physical transfer of ownership. '*°^ hi the

online environment however, instead of a transfer of possession of a physical object, the

digital transfer

of

files

is

the standard.

'^^'^

The ITTF White Paper had suggested

'" 17 U.S.C.
§ 106: "Subject to sections 107 through 1 18, the owner of copyright under
exclusive nght to do and authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copynghted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or

phonorecords of the copyrighted work

to the public

by

this title

that

has the

sale or other transfer

of

ownership, or by rental, lease or lending;

of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes and motion pictures
and other audiovisual works, to perform the copynghted work publicly; and
(4) in the case

(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic,

and choreographic works, pantomimes and

pictorial, graphic

or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to
display the copyrighted
"""

in the
""'

work publicly."

17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106 (1); see Robert P. Merges, Peter S Menell,

New Technological

See

part,

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,

and rem

'd,

Mark A. Lemley:

Intellectual Property

Age, 433 (2000)

239 F.3d 1004, 1014

1

14 F.Supp. 2d 896, 912 (N.D.Cal. 2000) aff'd in part, rev

(9^^ Cir.

2001); see infra, pp. 102

et.

'd in

seq.

'•''M7 U.S.C. § 106(3), (4)
*°^

Thomas

158(1996)
*""
Id

J.

Smedinghoff,

ed.,

Online Law-The Spa's legal guide to doing business on the Internet, 155,
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of copyrighted works are a form of

digital transmissions

transmission copyright

was not enacted with

the

DMCA however.'*^^

The

of copyrighted works caused considerable insecurity about whether the

works could be regarded

as a distribution before the

WIPO

This kind of

distribution.'*^^

treaties.'*^^

digital transfer

digital transfer

The

WPPT

of

affords

protection to producers and performers of "phonograms," or sound recordings, including

the

right

distribute

to

distribution

- a

including "the

public

may

them."^°^

works

their

the

in

of communication

"right

making

form of phonograms, including

to the public"

available to the public...

works

access these works from a place and

The

was implemented

treaty

as Title

I

in

at

digital

by "wire or wireless means",

such a

way

that

members of the

a time individually chosen

of the

DMCA,

but § 106

by

was not

changed or modified. '^^^ The transfers of copyrighted musical works and sound recordings
are infringements of the distribution right as

acknowledged by the courts

410

Further rights granted to the copyright holder include the right to prepare

(c)

derivative works, the right to perform certain types of

certain types of

will not

works

be discussed

publicly.'*"

These

works and the

right to display

rights are largely irrelevant to this thesis

and

ftirther.

405 jj-j-p.
-pj^g
"'^^

Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights (1995)
Craig Joyce, William Party, Marshall Leaffer, Peter Jaszi: Copyright Law, 496 (5* Ed. 2000)

Id.;
''"^

For references to the

World

treaties,

see supra,

p.

77

Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1997, art.
2(b), reprinted 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997), Arts. 7 & 8. (The Treaty also recognizes the following rights for
performers: 1) a moral right to be "identified as the performer of his performances" (Art. 5); 2) the right to
control the broadcasting and communication of their unfixed performances (Art. 6); 3) the right of rental
(Art. 9);

Intellectual Property Organization:

and 4) the nght

basically afforded the

to

same

make

their

works available

Producers of phonograms
compare supra, p. 77
Copyright Law, 496 (5* Ed. 2000)

to the public (Art. 10).

*^ Craig Joyce, William Party, Marshall Leaffer, Peter Jaszi:
"'^
See
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 1 14 F.Supp. 2d 896, 912 (N.D.Cal. 2000) aff'd
part, and rem 'd, 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9*^ Cir 2001)

A&M

are

rights as performers in Articles 11-14),

in part,

rev'd in
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Limitations to the copyright holder's rights

(2)

The

rights granted to the copyright holder are limited

by "sections 107 through

118" of the copyright act and must be "read in conjunction with these provisions'
limitations include the temporal limitation of 70 years post

mortem

auctoris,

"

The

which

serves to enhance and protect the public domain, thereby serving the "promotion of

science."

The most important
doctrine",

now

limitation in the context of this thesis

codified in § 107.'*'^

Under

this doctrine

it

is

is

the "fair use

permissible for an individual

reproduce a work in copies "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,

to

teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or

primary purpose of the

fair

use doctrine

to the general public, thereby

so,

which also serves the

seen,

the doctrine has

is to

increase the

research."'*''*

amount of information

The

available

encouraging learning and creating more opportunity to do

constitutional goal of the "promotion

great relevance

for

of science. "^'^ As will be

the question of online

infringement by

individual users and consequently also for the question of indirect liability for those

infringements by

3.

OSP
The

28, 1998.

increasing

*^^

"'^

OSPs and

liability

other entities.

before and after the

DMCA

Digital Millenium Copyright Act

It

was

See 17U.S.C. §§106, 106(A)
H.R. No. 94-1476, p. 61, Sept.
17 U.S.C. §107

'""

17 U.S.C. §107

signed into law on October

specifically designed to address copyright issues arising

importance of the Internet. The

"'^

(DMCA) was

3,

DMCA

contains

1976; compare 17 U.S.C. §§107-1 18

detailed

due

to the

Safe Harbor

101

Provision in

its

Title

II,

now

512 of the copyright

§

statute."*'^

These safe harbors were

included to limit the liability of "Online Service Providers" (OSPs)."*'^ This term
defined

broadly to

include

"Internet

is

Access Providers" (lAPs), "Internet Service

Providers" (ISPs) or any other entity that provides services "such as Internet access,
email, chat-room and

entity's business

web page

hosting", even if these activities are incidental to the

and not the primary part thereof"*'^ This limitation of

liability is

intended to maintain the functionality of the Internet by establishing relatively clear

boundaries within which there

Before the
Infi-astructure

DMCA

Task Force

no

is

threat

of monetary

was introduced
(hereinafter:

the

liability for OSPs.'*'^

so-called

White Paper (Information

ITTF), Intellectual Property and the National

Information Infi-astructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property
Rights) had been prepared by the ITTF. This Task Force had been created by the Clinton

Administration to examine the necessity of changes in the law to address the rise of new

communications technology, especially the
available in September 1995.'*^^

Internet,

and

its

report

The White Paper addressed copyright

became publicly

issues

among

other

things and suggested that the standards for vicarious and contributory liability for

copyright infiingement should not be changed because of the emergence of
technology.

The Working Group thought

"''

See, Campbell

"'"

17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West Supp. 2000)

""

Mark D. Robins,

v.

Acuff-Rose Music,

premature to reduce

NO.

Computer Law.

17 U.S.C. §
Lemley, Intellectual Property

in the

of any service

of online storage services and

(1999)
512 (k)(l) (West Supp. 2000); See also Robert P. Merges, Peter
6/7

liability

510 U.S. 569 (1994)

Digital Millenium Copyright Act defenses for Providers

information location tools, 16
"'*

Inc.,

it

new

1 1

new Technological Age, 975

S.

Menell,

Mark A.

(2000); All types of providers will be

OSPs in the following.
Mark D. Robins, Digital Millenium Copyright Act defenses for Providers of online storage services and
information location tools, 16 NO. 6/7 Computer Law. 1 1 (1999)
*^^
John Carmichael, In Support of the White Paper: Why Online Service Providers should not receive
referred to as

'"'

Immunity from traditional notions of vicarious and contributory
Loy. L.A. L.J. 759, 761-763 (1996)

liability for

copyright infringement, 16

102

environment because

online

provider in the

it

would

stifle

the

"development of

marketplace tools". The White Paper regards service providers as a type of "electronic
publisher". Consequently,

it

describes a reduction of liability as an unfair advantage, the

The main arguments

refusal to take responsibility.'*^'

brought forward in the White Paper are that
subscribers

in

infringement

cases

and

OSPs could

that

against a limitation of liability

seek indemnification from their

they are

in

a

better

position

to

infringements than the copyright holders. Furthermore, the White Paper considers

to

of holding

OSPs

strictly liable for

online infringements committed

-"

defective or dangerous,

the

manufacturer

strictly

is

liable

strict liability faction

for infringements

because their services foreseeably lead

While

this

argument by analogy

argues,

may seem

is

intriguing,

it is

foreseeably

under products

by analogy, OSPs should be

standards and, the

Proponents

by subscribers have

argued an analogy to manufacturers that launch a product. If a product

liability

strictly liable

to copyright infringements.'*^^

flawed. In

tort,

a manufacturer

held strictly liable for products that are inherently defective or dangerous."*^"* The

"product" provided by an

it

OSPs

be an "intermediary" dealing in copyright-protected works. Therefore, the White Paper

argues, they should not be treated different from any other intermediaries.

is

stop

is

OSP

is

not defective at

It

is

not "unsafe in

its

intended use";

committed by customers of the OSPs

rather the intentional misconduct

infringements.

all, it is

that cause

not the product, like a defective car, that causes injury but the

behavior of the user -

if a car is

used

in

committing a crime, the manufacturer should

'^'

IITF: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, 137-138 (1995); See also John
Carmichael, In Support of the White Paper: Why Online Service Providers should not receive Immunity
from traditional notions of vicarious and contributory liability for copyright infringement, 16 Loy. L.A.
L.J. 759, 761-763(1996)
*" IITF: The Report of the Working Group on
^^^

Mark

Intellectual Property Rights, 130, 131-132,

133-135 (1995)

C. Morril, Sarah E. Eaton, Protecting Copyrights On-Line: Copyright Liability for On-Line

Service Providers, 8

NO.

4

J.

Proprietary Rts. 2,3-5 (1996)
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surely not be liable for the injuries caused

intentional act

there

that

is

by
no

by

a party other than the manufacturer breaks the chain of causation and

liability

for

act

this

and the consequences on the side of the

manufacturer.^^^ Consequently, the analogy to

OSPs

provide grounds for holding

Paper nevertheless asserts

OSPs

OSPs should be

that

means

commit online infringement

shaky

at best. First

drives,

CD writers

strictly liable

of

all,

this

the

flat fee,

to

sale

modems,

disk drives,

in

Sony

v.

more so than
activity.'*^^

the

OSPs which only

This issue

is

like the sale

of other [staple]
is

articles

See.

"" See
*^*

See,

exactly what

of commerce, does

widely used for legitimate...

purposes"''^^ or even just "capable of substanfial non-infiinging uses."'*^'

424

CD

Universal City Studios (hereinafter: Sony)"*^^:

not constitute contributory infiingement if the product

OSPs

is

commit online infringements should be

independent from any infringing

of copying equipment,

provided by

reasoning

this

reasoning as well; they benefit from the infiingements through

Supreme Court resolved

"The

However,

the manufacturers of computers,

the sale of this equipment to infringers, arguably

receive a

The White

held (strictly) liable for reasons of

in the first place."*^^

and other devices necessary

under

and cannot

from subscriber induced infringements and provide the

because

profit

strict liability in tort is false

liable for subscriber infringements.

'fairness'

to

the crime. Tort theory teaches that an

are clearly capable of uses that

The

do not infiinge copyright

services

in the least;

William L. Prosser, Handbook of the law on Torts, 659-660 (4* Ed. 1971)
667

id. at

Timothy

L. Skelton, Internet

Copyright Infringement and Service Providers: The case for a

negotiated rulemaking alternative, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 219, 268-269 (1998)
427

jj^p. j^^ Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, 117-118 (1995)
See Timothy L. Skelton, Internet Copyright Infringement and Service Providers: The case for a
negotiated rulemaking alternative, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 219, 269-270 (1998)
^^^
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) - Copyright owners had sued the
manufacturer of VCRs for contributory copyright infringement. The Supreme Court found that the practice
of "time-shifting" where a consumer records a TV show to watch it at a later time was a substantially noninfiinging use that qualified the
"^^

Sony Corp.

v.

VCR as a staple article of commerce.

Universal City Studios,

Inc.,

464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984)
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the majority of uses

Under Sony,

non-infringing.

is

strict liability for

OSPs

is

not a

could be. If the analogy between manufacturers and

possibility,

however convenient

this

OSPs

be applied

cannot be applied without also applying the Sony

rule,

of commerce,

like

is to

at all,

clearly provides a release from liability for staple articles

which

Internet access, or

onlme

Even though

the

services.

White Paper led

OSP

liability in

released."*

distinction

is

^

to

two cases

To

to initiatives for legislation,"*^"* its suggestions

in the

fully

that

OSP/ISP

comprehend

the cases and the

liability

publicly perform a

442
Timothy

after the

DMCA's

White Paper

provisions, a clear

be made between direct copyright infringement on the one hand and

before the

of the copyright holder's exclusive

*''

interestingly, the

either but rather created limitations

other.'*"'^

DMCA - Direct infringement ?

Liability for direct copyright infringement arises

*^^

Even more

were decided within two months

vicarious and contributory infringement on the

a.

DMCA.

White Paper's suggestions

courts did not follow the

was

433

what eventually became the law

are not

for

it

work or

rights: the rights to

where a party

itself violates

one

reproduce, distribute, display and

the right to prepare derivative works."*

^

Id. at

See.

L. Skelton, Internet

Copyright Infringement and Service Providers: The case for a

negotiated rulemaking alternative, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 219, 210-21 \ (1998)
433
'"
434

See

id. at

270

of the White Paper: Why Online Service Providers should not receive
Immunity from traditional notions of vicarious and contributory liability for copyright infringement, 16
Loy. L.A. L.J. 759, 761-763 (1996)
*^'
Frank Music Corp., No. 93 Civ. 8153 (S.D.N.Y.; the case was settled); Religious Technology Center v.
Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
"" See ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ, Inc., 239 F. 3d 619, 622 C.A. 4 (Md.) 2001
"^^

See. John Carmichael, In Support

17U.S.C.

§

106

105

In the context of OSP liability, the reproduction right

the

most

relevant. This

is

easily explained

by

and the distribution

right are

the fact that transmissions over the Internet

necessarily involve at least partial copying of the material to be transferred and constitute

a form of distribution

Cubby

(1)

may

Cubby) does not revolve around copyright

this case (hereinafter:

provide some insights about the general issue of

activities

OSP

the material available to a large public.

CompuServe (October 1991)

V.

Although
it

by making

and

is

considered a "watershed" decision because

liability for third party conduct.'*^^

that subscribers

had posted

copyright issues

is

to

in a chat

be found

the distinction

"distributor" of defamatory statements:

A

while a distributor can only be held liable
statements. This distinction

infringement in

found

*^^

copyright.'*'*'

is

liability for subscriber

first

addressed the issue of

for

defamatory statements

CompuServe.'*'*^

publisher of such statements

if

it

to

is strictly liable

had knowledge or reason

court did not hold

The analogy

between the "publisher" and the

similar to the distinction

The

it

CompuServe was sued

room maintained by

in

OSP

issues,

between

CompuServe

direct

to

know of the

and contributory

strictly liable

but rather

that:

See Playboy Enterprises,

MAPHIA, 857

F.

Inc. v. Frena,

839

F.

Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Sega Enterprises, Ltd.

Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Sega Enterprises

v.

MAPHIA, 948

Netcom On-Line Communications,

F.

v.

Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal.

Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.
Webbworld, Inc., 968 F.Supp. 1 171 (N.D. Tex. 1997); MarobieFL, Inc. V. National Association of Fire Equipment Distributors, 983 F.Supp. 1 167 (N.D. III. 1997);
Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, 982 F.Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997)
""'^
See Timothy L. Skelton, Internet Copyright Infringement and Service Providers: The Case for a
Negotiated Rulemaking Alternative, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 219, 244 (1998)
"^^
Cubby V. CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N. Y. 1991)
**^
See, Timothy L. Skelton, Internet Copyright Infringement and Service Providers: The Case for a
Negotiated Rulemaking Alternative, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 219 (1998)

1996); Religious Technology Center

Cal. 1995);

Playboy Enterprises,

v.

Inc. v.
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"[CJompuServe has no more
public library,

CompuServe

book

to

editorial control

newsstand, and

store, or

First

court

it

room

would be

any other

guarantees have long been

a distributor,

to

for

CompuServe could

know of the

statements.

The

court went the other

way and

because Prodigy had "held

the

OSP
OSP

v.

Prodigy^^

liable for

a subcontractor rather than

and

its

and therefore

members

and because Prodigy exercised

using technological measures and

manpower

to

and

difficulties

Oakmont), the

strictly liable

as controlling the

this control

by actively

monitor the BBS' and delete

This decision shows that the result in

entirely; a hint at the controversy

(hereinafter:

defamatory statements posted on the

as a publisher

itself out to the public

bulletin boards"

content.'''*^

was operated by

Oakmont

held the

OSP's network. The court saw

its...

itself

directly.'*'*^

In another defamation case,

**^

it

feasible for

found that CompuServe did not have knowledge of the statements,

by CompuServe

offensive

As

had had knowledge or reason

especially since the chat

content of

would be no more

Amendment

recognized as protecting distributors..."^^

if

it

examine every publication... than

distributor [emphasis added]...

only be liable

over such a publication than does a

Cubby cannot be

surrounding the

illegal or

relied

issue.'*'*^

Cubby V. CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), quoting Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co.,
745 F. 2d 123, 139 (2d Cir. 1984, cert. Denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985)
^^ Cubby V. CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. 135, 140, n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
***
Stratton Oakmont. Inc. v. Prodigy Services, Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. May 24 1995)
**^
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services, Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. May 24 1995)
**^
Cf. Timothy L. Skelton, Internet Copyright Infringement and Service Providers: The Case for a
Negotiated Rulemaking Alternative, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 219, 246 (1998)
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Playboy Enterprises

(2)

DMCA

Before the

Frena (December 1993)

v.

was

introduced, an ISP

1993 in Playboy Enterprises

infringement in

was held

v.

Frena

liable for direct copyright

The

Frena).

(hereinafter:

defendant hosted a bulletin board service (BBS) on which he posted his

own

original

photographs. Subscribers to his service were permitted to browse and download these

images onto

which the

their

computers and could also post images themselves. Several images,

plaintiff held the copyright,

were posted on the

them."*"*^

subscribers.

The

BBS

once

He even removed them from

defendant had not posted any of these images.

he had become aware of

BBS by

The court considered

to

this irrelevant

the

and found the

defendant's activities to be infringements of the plaintiffs copyright anyway:

"[I]t

does not matter that Defendant...

infringement. Intent to infringe

Intent or

knowledge

infringer

is liable

The

is

may have been unaware of the

copyright

not needed to find copyright infringement.

not an element of infringement, and thus even an innocent

is

for infringement."^'*^

court correctly states that neither intent nor

knowledge

are elements of

copyright infringement.'*^^ However, the court ignores that the Internet cannot operate

without "passive" reproduction and distribution of material, copyrighted or not. The
automatic operations performed by the OSP, or more accurately

**''

Playboy Enterprises,

Enterprises, Inc. v.

uploaded

to a

BBS by

networks,

at the

839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Similarly, in Playboy
968 F.Supp. 1171,1 174-1 175 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (holding web site
copyright infringement by selling access to copyrighted images that had been

Inc. v. Frena,

Webbworld,

operator liable for direct

its

Inc..

others), see also infra, p. 105.

"^^

Playboy Enterprises,

'*'"

Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright Infringement. Enterprise

Liability.

And

the First

Inc. v. Frena,

839

F.

Amendment, 88 Geo.

Supp. 1552, 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1993)

L.

J.

1833, 1842 (2000), citing

Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198-199 (1931); Shapiro, Bernstein
Cir. 1964); Singer v. Citibank N.A.,

& Co.

No. 91 Civ. 4453, 1993

v.

WL

Buck

v.

Jewell-La Salle Realty

H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308

177801, 5 (S.D.N.Y.

May

(2"''

21, 1993)
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request

users'

distributed

inherent to

are

by an OSP

hitemet's structure/^'

the

in the course

every copy

If

made and

of fulfilhng a user's request were to constitute

copyright infringement, the scope of Habihty ensuing would be practically limitless. For

example,

liability

would not be

rather extend to an

limited to the

unknown number of

sent fi-om

copy of the

New York

to

file sent.

Boston,

it

copy of the email

subscriber's request, but

file.

Data

is

OSPs whose

not transferred directly from the

make

at

Suppose an email containing infiingmg matenal

is

could theoretically pass through computers in Seattle,

Houston and Athens before reaching
partial

its

through a muhitude of computers, each of which

to the users but travels

least a partial

reacting to

other computer users and other

networks were involved in the transfer of the

OSP

OSP

its

in process."*^^

destination. All these

Under Frena,

computers made a copy or

the owners of these computers

would

be liable for copyright infiingement. This seems not only curious, but simply wrong,
since

none of the persons involved had anything

the fact that their computers

to

do with the infiingement except

were automatically used

in the process

analogy outside the online environment could be extending
Service for transporting infiinging material.

does not

make any

The only

liability to the

difference

is that

copies of the letters transported, which

considering that copying

is

one of the author's exclusive

context, these copies are only

made because

of transmission.

rights'*^'*.

An

U.S. Postal

the Postal Service

may seem
However,

the "transport" of files

for

significant,

in the online

would be impossible

Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise

And the First Amendment, 88 Geo. L. J. 1833, 1842 (2000); See also Timothy L. Skelton, Internet
Copyright Infringement and Service Providers: The Case for a negotiated rulemaking alternative, 35 San
Diego L. Rev. 219, 219-242 (1998)
*^^
Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise
Liability,

And the

Amendment, 88 Geo.

L. J. 1833, 1842 (2000)
Copyright Infringement and Service Providers: The Case for a negotiated
rulemaking alternative, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 219, 229-234 (1998)

Liability,
'*"

Timothy

First

L. Skelton, Internet

"'"nU.S.C.

§

106
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without them, just Uke transporting
transportation. If the Postal Service

recipient for

some

letters

had

hypothetical reason,

to

it

would be impossible without means of

copy

would

order to forward them to the

letters in

certainly not be in anybody's interest to

hold the Postal Service liable for copyright infringement. Such

liability is far

beyond the

scope of copyright protection as intended by the Copyright Statute or the constitutional

Copyright Clause.
to processes

It

would ultimately

and actions

inhibit

technology because

vital to the Internet's functionality

slow down the introduction of any innovation related to
"promotion of

science"''^^

(i.e.

it

would extend

and thereby

this

at

liability

the very least

kind of technology. The

learning) has no benefit from inhibiting technology.

Furthermore, the mere automatic transfer of infringing material arguably has no direct

economic impact. Yet copyright
economic

interests to ensure

public benefit.

(3)

is

intended,

other things, to protect the author's

an incentive to create, thereby promoting learning for the

'*^^

Religious Technology Center

Not

among

v.

Netcom (November 1995)

surprisingly, other courts did not follow the decision in Frena. In Religious

Technology Center

v.

Netcom), the court held

Netcom On-Line Communication
that

Netcom, the ISP involved

Services,

in the case,

direct copyright infringement in a situation strikingly similar to the

Scientology

affiliate

Inc.

(hereinafter:

was not

one

liable for

in Frena.'*^^

The

Religious Technology Center had filed suit against the operator of a

BBS, Tom Klemesrud,

his subscriber

Dennis Erlich and the ISP Netcom

for direct

*" U.S. Const, art.
" ...to promote the progress
of science... "; see also L. Ray Patterson, A
1, § 8, cl. 8:
response to Mr. Y'Barbo 's reply, 5 J. Intell Prop. L., 235 (1997)
4S6
Craig Joyce, William Patry, Marshall Leaffer, Peter Jaszi, Copyright Law, 19-20 (5*^ Ed. 2000)
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vicarious and contributory copyright infringement. Eriich, a critic of Scientology, had

posted excerpts from Scientology
the copyright, in a

the

BBS

literature, to

which Religious Technology Center held

newsgroup on Netcom's Usenet server using Klemesrud's BBS. From

the posting

was

sent to be posted

on Netcom's Usenet

the postings throughout the entire Usenet system.

Netcom

server,

which then spread

did not exercise any direct

control over this automatic process. Scientology requested the removal of the material to

which

it

held

the

copyright

and sued the Klemesrud and Netcom for copyright

infringement after they had refiised to comply, and had demanded that Scientology prove

its

copyright.

was not

'^^^

Religious Technology Center contended that, ahhough Netcom's server

the point of origin of the allegedly infringing material,

and vicarious infringement and argued

liable for direct, contributory

decision in Frena.

The court

Netcom should be
in part

held

based on the

clearly rejected the approach taken in Frena for the reasons

stated above:

"[P]laintiff s theory

would

to its natural extreme,

in liability for

create

would lead

many
to

separate acts of infringement and, carried

unreasonable

liability.

.

.

It

would

also resuh

every single Usenet server in the worldwide link of computers

transmitting Erlich's message to every other computer. These parties,

liable

under plaintiffs theory, do no more than operate... a system that

essential if

Usenet messages are to be widely distributed. There

construe the Act to

*"

who

Religious Technology Center

make

v.

all

of these parties infringers.

Netcom On-Line Communication

is

no need

'"^^^

Services, Inc.,

907

F.

Supp. 1361

(N.D. Cal. 1995)
"'^

Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361
(N.D. Cal. 1995); see also Elizabeth McNamara, Online Service Provider Liability under the Digital
Millenium Copyright Act, 17 Fall Comm. Law. 5, 5-6
'*''

Religious Technology Center
1369-1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995)

v.

Netcom On-Line Communication

Services, Inc.,

907

F.

Supp. 1361,

are

is

to

Ill

Not only

is

there

no need

to

construe the statute that broadly,

some

contradict the very purpose of U.S. copyright to

extent.

it

seems

to

Three of the (arguably)

constitutional purposes of copyright, the protection of the public domain, the promotion

of learning and the "right"
extension of

can hardly be brought in sync with such an

Copyright protection against any automatic act of transmission

liability.

would ultimately

to access'*^^,

limit access to protected

and unprotected works and

shift the

proof from the copyright owner to the alleged infringer. As the Netcom court

"[WJhere the infringing subscriber
does not make sense

whose

parties

to

is

is

be some element of volition or causation which
to create a

While the
copyright really

Causation

may

is

first

a

copy by a

is

two arguments

it

"^^'

a strict liability statute, there should

still

lacking where a defendant's system

is

are convincing, the last

strict liability statute,

there

indeed be required even under

denied that the OSP/ISP's service

is

is

is

no need

for

strict liability,

one seems flawed.

an element of

but

it

is

is

sine qua non

for the

would not and could not occur without

intermediary.

While the provider's automatic

activity

the

is

If

volition.'*^^

entirely dependent

causation in these cases or not.

infiingement

"**'

act,

third party."^^^

on the definition of causation whether there

^'^

same

nothing more than setting up and

necessary for fiinctioning of the Internet.

also held that: "although copyright

merely used

stated:

adopt a rule that could lead to the liability of countless

role in the infringement

operating a system that

The court

clearly directly liable for the

is

burden of

It

cannot be

infringement, since the

OSP/ISP

certainly not

acting

an

as

intended to

See Craig Joyce, William Patry, Marshall Leaffer, Peter Jaszi, Copyright Law, 19-20 (5* Ed. 2000)
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,

1372-1373 (N.D.Cal. 1995)
at 1370

*"W.

LAW LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF

GFr^^^"^'
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contribute to infringements,

causation

is

it

is

a contributory cause for the infringement and hence

present even though voHtion

is not.

Since

strict

habihty and a requirement of

an element of voHtion are something of an oxymoron, the court's argument

Even though

the

resuh

Netcom

in

is

correct,

the

court

rehes

is

inaccurate.

on some flawed

argumentation. Yet, this does not render the decision as such any less valuable and

correct.

It

subject

its

clarifies that a

"system that 'incidentally makes temporary copies' should not

operator to liability for copyright infringement" because the operator does not

cause or induce the infringement.'*^'*

(4)

Sega

V.

MAPHIA (December

1996)

Other courts have followed the decision

MAPHIA^^^
provided the

(hereinafter: Sega), the

MAPHIA BBS

be uploaded. Subscribers

BBS

for users

to the

BBS

operator

"*"

Netcom.

It

Chad Sherman

MAPHIA

in

to facilitate the

cartridges.'*^^

VNLR

1

to

Sega were involved

Ltd.

v.

"Brujo Digital")

which games could
site

and were

copying of games from

The court

in

Sega followed

in the infringement to a

much

argued that while the defendant "solicited others to

See James A. Henderson, Aaron D. Twerski, Intent and Recklessness

Restating Law, 54

(a.k.a.

of the Sega gaming console,

Sega compatible read-only-memory game

greater extent than

Sega Enterprises.

could also download games form the

encouraged to use hardware sold by

Netcom, even though the defendants

in Netcom.'*^^ In

in Tort:

The Practcal Craft of

133 (19xx)

*^ Timothy L. Skelton, Internet Copyright Infringement and Service Providers: The Case
for a negotiated
rulemaking alternative, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 219, 252 (1998), quoting Religious Technology Center v.
Netcom OnLine Communications, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995); This holding will be of
great importance in the context of vicarious and contributory infringement, infra, pp. 116 et. seq.
**'
See Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Association of Fire Equipment Distributors, 983 F.Supp. 1 167, 1 178
(N.D. 111. 1997); Sega Enterprises v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 931-932 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
^"^

*"
*^^

948 F.Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
927-929
Id. at 932
Id. at

1
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upload games... Sega has not shown that [defendant] himself uploaded or downloaded the
files

or

caused

directly

such

uploading or downloading".'*^^

recognizes that concerning direct copyright infringement,

knew

[defendant]

them

to

do

his

so."^^°

BBS

users

it

The court

correctly

"has no bearing... whether

were infringing on Sega's copyright, or encouraged

Consequently, the court held that the defendant in Sega was not liable

for direct copyright infringement, but that the defendant's activities should rather

analyzed under contributory or vicarious infringement standards.'*
the defendant

was held

liable for copyright infringement,

By

be

those standards,

even though there had been no

direct infringement.'*^^

The Sega

court's quotations from

Netcom show

same reasons and consequently decided

to follow

that

it

discounted Frena for the

Netcom. '*^^ The decision correctly

recognizes that direct infringement requires direct involvement.
infringer did not infringe herself, there can only

be

Where

the

alleged

liability for contributory or vicarious

infringement. Whether the Sega court reached the correct decision regarding these forms

of liability will be addressed

later.'*^''

'''Id.
''^'

Id.;

See also 932, Footnote 5 (The court explicitly mentions that its decision is consistent with an earlier
same case, where Sega was granted injunctive relief because it had shown that someone was

decision in the

mfringing

was

its

copyright.

The

earlier decision did not

make

a specific conclusion as to whether the defendant

liable for direct copyright infringement or contributory or vicarious

MAPHIA, 857 F.Supp. 679, 686 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
Enterprises, Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F.Supp. 923, 936 (N.D. Cal.

mfringement. See Sega

Enterprises, Ltd. v.

*" Sega
''^

"''

Id. at

932

Infra, p.

1 1

1996)
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Playboy

(5)

v.

Webbworld (June

The defendants

Playboy

in

1997)'^^^

v.

Webbworld

Webbworld) operated

(hereinafter:

a

commercial adult website. The images were collected from adult-oriented newsgroups by
a

program

that

automatically

scanned

adult

for

images

Webbworld's servers while deleting any accompanying
site

were allowed

to access

text.

and download these images for a

and

copied

them onto

Subscribers to Webbworld's

flat

monthly

fee.'*''^

Playboy

sued for direct and vicarious copyright infringement after having discovered
copyrighted images from

its

magazine on the

The court found Webbworld

site.

holding that "the evidence unequivocally shows that

liable

Webbworld

reproduced, distributed and displayed [Playboy's] protected images.

argued on the basis of the Netcom decision that

subscnbers and adult onented newsgroups.
that

478

it

weighed the

fact that

who

Webbworld

directly

electronically

'"*^^

Webbworld

merely served as a conduit between

The court

rejected this argument, reasoning

Webbworld, unlike Netcom, did not provide access

sold adult images to persons

many

to the

Usenet system but rather

already had access to the system.

actively sought the images and copied

The

court also

them

for its OAvn

commercial purposes heavily against Webbworld. Furthermore, the decision compares

who may choose

Webbworld

to

Webbworld

[had] the ability to choose

named

a shop-owner

"" Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld,
(N.D. Tex. 1991); Playboy Enterpnses, Inc.
477

Playboy Enterprises,
Playboy Enterprises,

15-16
*^*

Inc. V.
Inc. v.

(N.D. Tex. 1997)

Mat

*'''/^. at

sell.

newsgroup sources. Clearly a newsgroup

"alt.sex.playboy" might instantly be perceived as problematic from the standpoint

of federal copyright law."^^^ hi finding

476

its

the sources of the products to

16

17-18

this,

and

that

Webbworld developed and launched

No. 3-96-CV-3222-H, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 21264
Webbworld, Inc., 968 F.Supp. 1171, (N.D. Tex. 1997)
Webbworld, Inc., 968 F.Supp. 1171, 1174-1 175 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
Webbworld, Inc., No. 3-96-CV-3222-H, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 21264,
Inc.,

v.

at

115

the scanning software without considering a system for oversight, the court rejected

Webbworld's argument

that

it

had no control over the 'automatic' operations of

its

scanning software.

The decision comes

to

a reasonable result,

considering that

copy images from newsgroups knowing

actively seek out and

that

Webbworld

did

many of these would

be copyrighted and being ignorant towards these copyrights and any form of oversight or
control of

Netcom
was

scanning software. However, the court

its

was

situation

different because

certainly a passive conduit but

subscribers at

Webbworld

all,

it

in

reasoning that the

fritemet access".

Netcom

BBS

did not provide hitemet access to the

but rather provided a Usenet

Webbworld

mistaken

Netcom only "provided

news

feed.'*^^

correct and can be distinguished from

is

passive whereas

(6)

is

Nonetheless, the decision in

Netcom because Netcom was

actively caused the infiingements;

it

was no a

conduit."*^'

Evaluation of the decisions regarding direct infiingement

It

seems the decisions

in

Netcom and Sega

are not only

more reasonable than

the

Frena decision, but are also more compatible with the Constitution. The Copyright Clause

names

the promotion of science (e.g.

copyright in the

this goal."*^^

It

first

learning) as one of the reasons for creating

place and clearly serves to protect the public domain in pursuit of

could well be argued that the Internet promotes learning and accessibility

of materials for the promotion of learning. The Internet also widens the public domain

**°

in

Timothy L. Skeltoa Internet Copyright Infringement and Service Providers: The Case for a negotiated
rulemaking alternative. 35 San Diego L. Rev. 219, 256-257 (1998)
*''

Id

*^^

U.S. Const, art. 1, §8 cl. 8: "Congress shall have Power... To Promote the Progress of Science... by
securing for limited Times, to Authors... the exclusive Right to their... Writings... "; See Craig Joyce,
William Patry, Marshall Leaffer, Peter Jaszi, Copyright Law, 19-20 (5*^ Ed. 2000); L.Ray Patterson, A
,

response

to

Mr. Y'Barbo

's

reply, 5 Intell Prop. L.

235 (1997)
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the sense that materials are

made

accessible in a

way and

format previously not available.

Extending OSP-liability for copyright infringement to such an extent as the Frena
decision would, could practically disable the Internet, thereby limiting opportunity for

questionable whether a decision that could limit learning in such a drastic

learning.'*^"' It is

way

as Frena

is

fully compatible with the constitutional

standards of interpretation

b.

OSP/ISP
The

liability

DMCA

it

Copyright Clause and the

sets forth regarding the copyrights

under the

eliminates

laws passed under

it.

DMCA - No Direct Infringement
OSPs

(monetary)

for

liability

copyright

direct

infringement for their passive transmission, re-transmission and temporary storage of
infringing material on their network.

This language covers exactly the situations

addressed in the cases above with regard to direct infringement.

To avoid

liability,

the ISP

must comply with a few basic requirements

stated in 17

U.S.C. §512(a):

"[A]

service

provider

shall

not

be

by reason of

liable...

the

provider's

transmitting, routing, or providing connections for, material through a system or

network controlled or operated by or
intermediate

for the service provider, or

and transient storage of

that

transmitting, routing, or providing connections,

(1) the transmission

of the material was

material

in

the

by reason of

course

if-

initiated

by or

at the direction

of a person

other than the service provider;

*^^

See Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright Infringement,
And the First Amendment, 88 Geo. L. J. 1833, 1842 (2000)

Enterprise Liability,
'*'

17 U.S.C. A. § 512 (a) (West Supp. 2000)

of such
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(2) the transmission, routing, provision

of connections, or storage

carried out

is

through an automatic technical process without selection of the material by the
service provider;

(3) the service provider

does not select the recipients of the material except as an

automatic response to the request of another person;

(4)

no copy of the material made by the service provider

intermediate or transient storage

manner

is

in the course

of such

maintained on the system or network in a

ordinarily accessible to anyone other than anticipated recipients for a

longer period than

is

reasonably necessary for the transmission, routing, or

provision of connections; and

(5) the material is transmitted

through the system or network without modification

of its content."

It

is

from the use of the conjunction "and"

clear

requirements listed

cover

all

lust

be met conjunctively

If,

for

image

to a bulletin board, the "transmission

other

than

the

"automatically",

service

AOL

and the copy made by

provider",

the

be safe from

liability.'*^^

by an OSP/ISP

the activities typically performed

providing Internet access and services:

*^^

to

in the statute, that all the

in the

normal course of

example, a subscriber to

of the material" was
image

travels

The conditions

AOL

"initiated

through

uploads an

by

a person

AOL's network

does not "select the recipients" or modify the image transmitted

AOL

in order to carry out the user's request will generally not
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Stored for longer "than reasonably necessary'"*^^. In this example,

AOL

would be well

within the scope of the safe harbor concerning direct infringement.

17 U.S.C. § 512 (a) clarifies that

infringement

if

OSPs

are not

they merely perform the operations

Internet and their services fiinctional

liable

for direct copyright

commonly necessary

keep the

and running. To take advantage of the safe harbor,

an ISP must further "adopt policies for termination of subscribers
infringers" and

to

"implement technical measures

that

who

are repeat

have been developed by industry
JOT

consensus

and

are

used

by content providers

to

protect

their

These

work.

requirements should be easy to meet for any OSP. The requirement not to store such
material for a longer time than reasonably necessary will be easy to

has been clarified what amount of time

is

OSP/ISP vicarious/contributory

c.

Liability

for

comply with once

it

reasonable in his sense.

liability

contributory copyright

before the

DMCA

infringement

arises

where a party has

"induced, caused or materially contributed to an infringing activity of a third party while

having knowledge of the infringement or

at least

reason to

question regarding this standard in the online environment
a party should be considered to have

The

DMCA,

knowledge or reason

know of

is

to

The

it".

central

under which circumstances

know of the

although not directly mentioning the question, provides

some

infringement.

answers.''^^

486

What

487

Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise

Liability.
"^^

period of time

And the

First

is

to

be considered "reasonable"

Amendment, 88 Geo.

L.

J.

in this

sense

is

yet to be determined.

1833, 1883 (2000)

464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984); Gershwin Publishing Corp. v.
443 F. 2d 1 159, 1 162 (2"'' Cir. 1971)
'
Mark D. Robins, Digital Millenium Copyright Act defenses for Providers of online storage services and
information location tools, 16 NO. 6/7 Computer Law. 11,13 (1999)
See Sony Corp.

Columbia
"*

Artists

v.

Universal City Studios,

Management,

Inc.,

Inc.,
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for

Liability

standard.

Such habihty

the

in

impaired.

"'^^^

is

determined by a different

incurred where "the right and abihty to supervise coalesce with

is

an obvious and direct financial
even

copyright infringement

vicarious

interest in the exploitation

of the copyrighted materials -

absence of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly
This type of

liability is

DMCA

addressed in the

is

being

as well, as can be seen in

the mention of "direct fmacial benefit" in 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c) (1) (B).

(1)

Vicarious liability

Concerning vicarious

liability,

it

has been generally accepted that "dance-hall

proprietors" are liable for copyright infiingements committed

landlords are not liable for copyright infiingements committed

reasoning behind this rule

do not

profit fi^om

landlord, while

is that

by

their tenants.'*^'

The

landlords rent out space for a fixed fee and consequently

any copyright infiingement committed by the tenant. Therefore, a

maybe having

the right and ability to supervise the tenant, has

financial interest in a tenant's infiinging acts unless the rental fee

commercial

by performers, while

activities.''^^

The

no

depends on the tenant's

constellation in the "dance hall" cases

was

different.

These

usually involved a venue for musical performances having hired a musician to play

copyrighted musical works without obtaining a

^^^
'

Shapiro, Bernstein

& Co. v.

license.'*^"'

H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307

(2"''

Even though

the musicians or

1963)

Cir.

Yea Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise
And the First Amendment, 88 Geo. L. J. 1833, 1844 (2000), citing Sony Corporation of America

Alfred C.

Liability,

Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 438 (1984); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d
Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F 2d 304, 306-308; Banff
259, 262, 263 (9* Cir. 1996); Shapiro. Bernstein

V.

&

869 F. Supp. 1 103, 1 108-1 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Polygram International Pub., Inc. v.
Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F.Supp. 1314, at 1324-1325 (D.Mass. 1994)
''^^
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom OnLine Communications, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D.
Ltd. V. Limited, Inc.,

Cal. 1995)
"'^

See Dreamland Balh-oom,

Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein

hall vicariously liable for hiring

McGee's

Co.,

432

F.

an orchestra

that

& Co.,

36

F.

2d 354

played infringing music);

(7*^ Cir.

1929) (holding dance

KECA Music,

Inc. v.

Dingus

Supp. 72 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (cocktail lounge held liable for performance of infringing

120

music suppliers were hired as independent contractors, the courts

found

in these cases

vicarious habihty, because the defendants had both the "right and abihty to supervise" the
hired musicians' performance and prevent infringements, and they also "had a direct

financial benefit"

from the infringements

context, the question consequently

proprietors".'*^^

Netcom'*^^,

court

the

fees.''^'*

In the online

whether OSPs resemble landlords or "dance-hall

is

OSPs resemble

Religious Technology Center

hi

form of admissions

The two major cases concerning vicarious

question and held that

(a)

in the

liability

of OSPs addressed

landlords rather than "dance-hall proprietors".'*^^

v.

Netcom (November 1995)

assumed

the

critic's

postings

to

be

infringements and analyzed the vicarious liability issue under this premise.

while Netcom (the
network,

it

had no

OSP) may have had

in

Netcom found

like the relationship

fee for the

OSP's

copyright

It

held that

the ability to supervise postings sent through

direct financial interest

point, the court addressed the distinction

The court

and was therefore not vicariously

liable.

At

its

this

between landlords and "dance-hall proprietors".

that the relationship

between an

OSP

and

its

subscribers

between landlord and tenant since the subscribers usually pay a

services.**^^

this

Accordingly, the

OSP

had no

direct financial benefit

is

flat

from

works by hired musicians); Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Racing and Breeding Association,
554 F. 2d 1213 (l" Cir. 1977) (racetrack held vicariously liable for hirmg supplier of infringing music for
customers); Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F 2d 1 159 (2"'' Cir.
1971); Fonovisa Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F. 3d 259 (9"' Cir. 1996)
See Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright Infringement,
Enterprise Liabilitw And the First Amendment, 88 Geo. L. J. 1833, 1845 (2000), citing Fonovisa Inc. v.
Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F. 3d 259, 262 (9*^ Cir. 1996)
'"^
Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise
Liability. And the First Amendment, 88 Geo. L. J. 1833, 1844 (2000)
"'*'
Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Association of Fire Equipment Distributors, 983 F.Supp. 1 167, 1 178 (N.D.
111. 1997); Sega Enterpnses v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 931-932 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
Supra,
"^^

p.

107

Religious Technology Center

Cal. 1995)

v.

Netcom OnLine Communications,

Inc.,

907

F.

Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D.
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infringements committed by the subscriber, even though the abiUty and right to supervise
are present. Consequently, the court found

Fonovisa

(b)

no HabiHty for vicarious infringement.

Cherry Auction (January 1996)

v.

This case (hereinafter: Fonovisa) did not involve the Internet or other online

communications but has been quoted by subsequent fritemet-related decisions on the
issue of contributory and vicarious liability. ^^^ Fonovisa contended that Cherry Auction

was

liable as a vicarious

and contributory infringer because

it

organized and operated

"swap meets" where pirated music was exchanged on several occasions, but

The Ninth

Circuit handled Fonovisa's appeal^°^

District

Court.^°'

Auction

liable for vicarious infringement.

The court found

that

lost in

and held Cherry

Cherry Auction had had

the right and ability to supervise the infringing activities and had also directly benefited

from the infringements (Shapiro, Bernstein

-Test).

It

reasoned that Cherry Auction had

the right and ability to supervise because required concessionaires to sign agreements

requiring

them

adhere to certain rules, patrolled the venues of the auctions and

to

controlled both promotion of and access to the events.^^^

Cherry Auction had a direct
financial benefits

which flow

interest in the infringements

from admissions

directly

fees,

The court
because

it

ftirther stated that

gained "substantial

concession stand sales and parking fees,

from customers who want

to

buy

counterfeit recordings.

^°°

all

of

."^^^
.

Timothy L. Skelton, Internet Copyright Infringement and Service Providers: The Case for a negotiated
rulemaking alternative, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 219, 252-253 (1998)
501
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492 (E.D. Cal. 1994)
502
'"^
'•^

Fonovisa, Inc.
Id. at

Id. at

262
263

v.

Cherry Auction,

Inc.,

76

F.

3d 259

(9*^ Cir.

1996)
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Ninth

The

Circuit

Cherry

held

also

Auction

liable

contributory

for

infringement. ^°^ This will be addressed in the discussion of contributory infringement.

Marobie-FL

(c)

NAFED (November

v.

1997)

Another case dealing with the issue of OSPs' vicarious
infringement

(NAFED)

Marobie-FL,

is

Inc.

a

The

(hereinafter: Marobie).^^^

web

plaintiff in this case held the copyright in clip art

Marobie sued

download.

vicarious

^^^
for the fire service industry.

maintained on the network of

NN) on which

(hereinafter:

direct,

site

copyright

National Association of Fire Equipment Distributors

v.

which was used by and had been developed

owned

liability for

plaintiffs

NAFED

its

copyrighted

ISP,

The defendant

Northwest Nexus,

images

were

for direct copyright infringement

and

Inc.

available

its

ISP

for

NN

for

and contributory infringement. Both parties moved for summary

judgement.^^^

The

difference between the factual scenario in this case and in

obvious: While

NN

behavior of

subscriber's customer.

customer,

its

NN

had a

was sued

for

its

subscriber's behavior,

that

'°^
'"^

264
983 F.Supp.

for the

NAFED;

it

this

provided more than a

to

be

liable,

NN

was

closer to the infringer

Id. at

/^. at

their

1

1

167 (N.D.

Ill

1997)

171; Clip art are computer generated simplified images sold to consumers to be incorporated into

own computer

generated works, often used in publications like newsletters, see generally, Timothy L.

Skelton, Internet Copyright Infringement

San Diego

and Service Providers: The Case for a negotiated rulemaking

257 (1998).
'°*
Marobie, 983 F.Supp. 1167, 1171-1172 (N.D. Ill 1997)
^°'Mat 1172

alternative. 35

''Ud.

I

quite

while Netcom had only provided a gateway and

had been too distant from the infiingement

^""^

Netcom was sued

is

While Netcom had no relationship with

direct formal relationship with

mere "gateway".^ '° Marobie argued

Netcom

L. Rev. 219,
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because of the formal relationship with
but storing the infringing

files

on

its

NAFED,

providing more than just Internet access

held liable.^" The court however, followed Netcom.

room
than

under Netcom, noting that

for direct liability

Netcom

NN

had, but that

plaintiffs works,

much

like the

NN

network. Therefore, Marobie argued,

It first

NN did

should be

clarified that there

was no

indeed provide more services

"only provided the means to copy, distribute or display

owner of a public copying machine." The court held

because the lack of actual engagement in infringing

activities

by NN,

that

could not be

it

directly liable.^'^

The court goes on
there

by

was no

NAFED

and control.

to hold that there

direct financial interest

and

that there

was

was no vicarious infringement.

on NN's side due

result in

flawed argumentation in
Internet access to the

that

to the flat fee paid for its services

a triable issue of fact concerning the ability to supervise

Marobie

parts.

BBS

is

consistent with

The court

fails to

subscribers at

all.

Netcom and

recognize that

it

whether or not

based on

is

Netcom

relies

are applicable

on an inaccurate

addressed the issue of contributory infringement. Instead of asking

NN

NN's

it

This factual mistake does not taint the

and valid nonetheless. Unfortunately, the Marobie court also

when

correct,

Netcom had not provided

argumentation, however, since the arguments brought forward in

regarding

found

^'^

While the

standard

It

had knowledge of the inftingements

ability

to

control

it

finds a triable issue of fact

and supervise, a question

that

only relevant

is
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^'^

Marobie-FL,

Ill

1997)

'''Id.

First

Amendment, 88 Geo.

Inc. v. National Association

L. J. 1833, 1847 (2000)
of Fire Equipment Distributors, 983 F.Supp.

1

167,

1

179 (N.D.

124

concerning vicarious
decision

wrong

in

This mistake

liability.^'"*

its

resuh,

addressed in a motion for

unfortunate but does not render the

is

considering that contributory infringement was only

summary judgment.

Evaluation of the cases

(d)

The

results in both

the problem of

hard to see

OSP

how

benefit

directly

Netcom and Marobie

within the scope of their factual constellations.

liability

a provider

from

who

an

is

paid a

flat rate for its

even

is

no

do not

indirectly, since they

It is

indeed

services could be considered to

committed by

infringement

subscriber's customers. Suffice to say that there

in these cases, not

present a viable and practical solution to

either

subscriber

its

or

direct financial benefit to the

profit

from a subscriber's

site

its

OSP

being

popular due to the availability of infringing material, for example. The question whether
the

to

OSP

has "the right and ability to supervise"

answer. The decisions in Marobie and

understanding of vicarious

liability for

its

subscriber's activity

Netcom

illustrate a trend

OSPs. According

to this

is

slightly harder

towards a narrow

narrow understanding, a

provider cannot be said to have the "ability and right to supervise" because she could

have theoretically detected and prevented copyright infringements.^'^ Certainly an
has the right to monitor the

sites

possible not only to monitor

down

all

it

hosts

on

its

network and certainly

it

is

theoretically

those sites but also to prevent infringements

or disabling potentially infringing

sites.

OSP

by taking

Accordingly, the narrow understanding of

the "ability" standard mentioned above could be contested.

"'*

However,

it

is

practically

Timothy L. Skeltoa Internet Copyright Infringement and Service Providers: The Case for a negotiated
rulemaking alternative, 35 San Diego L. Rev. 219, 258-259 (1998)
Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise
Liability,

And the First Amendment,

88 Geo. L.

J.

1833, 1849 (2000)
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impossible for an

OSP

to

do

so.

For one, there

Of

subscribers for the provider to supervise.

imply

"ability" does not necessarily

there

is

The law should not

possible, but such

reality

OSPs

mean more

narrow interpretation of the

require the impossible since

this

it

is

liability,

where

will only

it

practically feasible.

It

be

may be

technically

is

it

laws that are incongruent with technological

of the issue and

and show a

way

practicality.

The

decisions in

out of the dilemma by their

1^'

Amendment concerns could

arise if

OSPs

disabled access

simply because the material posted could possibly be infringing. What

To avoid

that

"ability to supervise".

Furthermore, serious
to sites

to

societal perception

Marobie and Netcom acknowledge

made

than the remote and purely

"able" to supervise, because

dogmatisms would lead

and development,

content posted by

course the argument could be

accepted and followed if the behavior required by

dogmatically correct to consider

much

practicality. Yet, if vicarious liability arises

the "ability to supervise", this must

theoretical possibility.

simply too

is

providers would be likely to take

down any

site that is

if

it is

not?

even remotely

"suspicious" of containing infringing material. This seems problematic in light of the
subscribers' free speech rights.

Taking
have "gotten

(2)

it

into account all the above, the courts in

1

to

right" concerning liability for vicarious infringements.

Contributory Liability
Liability for contributory infringement

the

Marobie and Netcom seem

DMCA.

The question of

liability

was

came down

a problematic issue for

to the question

OSPs

before

of knowledge of an

^
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infringement or reason to

know of

since the services provided

it,

by

the

OSP

are

contributory in practically any case of copyright infringement over the Internet.

(a)

Fonovisa

As

v.

Cherry Auction (January 1996)

discussed above, the Ninth Circuit found Cherry Auction vicariously liable for

copyright infringements by sale of counterfeit recordings

at its

swap meets. The court

also held Cherry Auction liable for contributory infringement because Cherry Auction

"with knowledge of the infringing
to the infringing

activity, induce[d], cause[d] or materially contribute[d]

conduct of another".^'^ The Ninth Circuit had no doubt about Cherry

Auction's knowledge of the infringing

meets had been

activities, especially since the

"raided" by the local sheriffs department before, and held that "providing the site and

facilities' for the

(b)

Sega

V.

infringements established contributory

MAPHIA (December

The Sega

liability.^'

1996)

court addressed the issue of contributory infringement.^'^ While

followed Netcom in dismissing

liability for direct

infringing activity

is

site

^'^

for

contributory

infringement

Supra, pp. 98 et. seq.
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction,

see Gershwin Publishing Corp.

v.

under

facilities for

However, the

Netcom 's

higher

which "substantial participation"

3d 259, 264 (9* Cir. 1996) (applying the 'Gershwin test'),
Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F. 2d 1 159, 1 162 (2°'* Cir.
Inc.,

76

F.

1971)
*'*

and

sufficient to establish contributory liability."

court did not adopt this standard as decisive, but rather also considered

standard

had

infringement, the decision mentions

Fonovisa^^^ concerning contributory infringement: "providing the

known

it

Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F. 3d 259, 264 (9* Cir. 1996)
'" Sega Enterprises v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 932-936 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
"° Fonovisa. Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262, 263 (9* Cir. 1996)

is
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necessary to find

Neither standard was adopted specifically, since the

liability.^^^

defendant in Sega would have been liable under both.^^^
infringements and not only provided the

site

MAPHIA

and hardware

clearly

knew of

the

that facilitated infringements,

but also encouraged these. Furthermore, the hardware was necessary to commit the acts

of infringement

in

the

place.

first

After having established a case of contributory

infringement, the Sega court dismissed the defendants fair use defense and found liability

for contributory infiingement

disregard

of Sega's

committed by the

of Sega's

copyright,

BBS

the

subscribers

of the defendant's blatant

copyright.^^'* In light

substantial

by providing

contribution

to

infringements

the

the site and the hardware necessary to

reproduce the works, the court seems to have been correct. The scenario could be
considered a model case for contributory infringement in the online environment.

(c)

Playboy

v.

Hardenburgh (November 1997)

Another one of the relatively few cases addressing the issue
Enterprises,

operated a

Inc.

BBS

Russ Hardenburgh

v.

(hereinafter:

from which subscribers could download

were also encouraged

to

upload

files,

Playboy

Hardenburgh

Hardenburgh).
files,

is

mostly adult images, and

including adult images and other

files.

Uploaded

images were screened for pornographic and copyrighted content, yet Playboy Enterprises
found 412 photographs to which
the

it

held the copyright on the

BBS. The

court found that

defendant had "constructive knowledge" of the infiingements because he had

encouraged users

to

upload adult images while knowing of Playboy's publication. The

"' Id. at 264

"^ Religious Technology Center

v.

Netcom On-Line Communication

1382(N.D. Cal. 1995)
"^ Sega Enterprises v. MAPHIA, 948

F.

Services, Inc.,

Supp. 923, 933 (N.D. Cal. 1996)

907

F.

Supp. 1361,
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court further stated that

unaware

that copies

it

was "...disingenuous

for

Defendants

were

to assert that they

of photographs from Playboy magazine were likely to find

their

way

onto the BBS."^^^

This decision and the reasoning behind

upon

BBS

their

BBS' and remove

if interpreted as

imposing

operators a duty to not only screen, but specifically seek infiinging material on

it.^^^

however. Suffice to say that

make

seem harsh

it

it

The reading of Hardenburgh need not be

that

broad

who

only specifically imposes such a duty on providers

their services specific to a genre

the adult content in Hardenburgh.

It

of content

may be

that is

economically valuable - such as

possible to read the decision even

more

narrowly. Since Hardenburgh's employees screened the uploads for infiinging content,

they should have had knowledge of the infiinging materials. Without regard to whether
the narrowest interpretation of the decision

is

possible, the broad reading of the case faces

some challenges of mcompatibility with copyright
to

monitor for infringement

"Sony" case

may be

in conflict

for example. In Sony, the issue

contributory infringement because

shows "off the

air".

Imposing on OSPs a duty

doctrine.

with the decision in the well-known

was whether Sony could be held

Sony Betamax VCRs were used

The Supreme Court found

contributory infiingement because

VCRs

are

that

liable for

to record television

Sony was not

liable

for

"capable of substantial noninfiinging

""

Id. at 933-936
"* Playboy Enterprises
"* /J. at 514
*^'

Mark D. Robins,

Inc. v.

Hardenburgh, 982 F.Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997)

Digital Millenium Copyright Act defenses for Providers of online storage services

information location tools, 16

NO.

6/7

Computer Law.

11,

13-14 (1999); Paul D. Amrozowicz,

Science and Technology Worlds collide: Copyright issues on the Internet, 8 1

J.

Pat.

and
When Law,

& Trademark Off.

Society 81, 109 (1999); David N. Weiskopf, The risks of copyright infringement on the Internet:
practitioner's guide, 33 U.S.F.L. Rev. 1, 29
n. 132 (1998)

A

&

^^*

See Mark D. Robins, Digital Millenium Copyright Act defenses for Providers of online storage services
and information location tools, 16 NO. 6/7 Computer Law. 1 1, 13-14 (1999)
"' Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, (1984)
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uses".^^°

An OSP

provides a service that

infringe copyright.^"^'

A

certainly capable of

is

many

general duty to monitor Internet "traffic"

uses that do not

would not only be
money:

impractical, but expensive and could ultimately be paid for at a higher price than

the fiinctionality of the Internet itself This result

seems inconsistent with the decision

Whether the Sony decision

Sony, even though there are significant factual differences.
in

is

point

infringement

"knowingly

the

in

is

context

notwithstanding,

could be

it

argued that contributory

a form of enterprise tort and can therefore only be

participates".^"'^

OSPs do know

in

imposed on a party

that

happen, yet they generally

that infringements

have no knowledge of individual specific infringements.
Finally,

the

specifically relied

the large

1*'

Amendment comes

would

it.^^'*

almost impossible for an

data flowing through

its

free

In

Cubby, the court

speech to hold that due to

the provider could not be considered to

infringement until receiving notice of

it is

play as well.

on the V^ Amendment's protection of

amount of information,

context since

into

A

similar analysis

OSP

to

know of

seems appropriate

the

in this

monitor the tremendous amounts of

system and the danger of unintentional free speech impediments

arise.^^^

"°

Id. at 456 (1984); There were other important issue sin the case, such as fair use, but the "substantial
non-infringing use " test is the central point here.
531

seems fair to say that the majority of uses are non-infringing.
For example, while a VCR is generally not used to make multiple copies because of quality losses and
cost, whereas copies on the Internet cost close to nothing and there is almost no loss of quality.
It

532

Accordingly multiple copies are the norm on the

web

Internet.

Furthermore, the transfer of these copies over the

gives each recipient a copy of the material while the original owner keeps his/her copy, which

distinguishes the situation from lending of copied material in the "real world". Finally, material

accessible and available for copying to an

anonymous mass of persons on

the

web whereas

is

made

videotapes are

away to strangers.
Mark D. Robins, Digital Millenium Copyright Act defenses for Providers of online storage services
and information location tools, 16 NO. 6/7 Computer Law. 11,14 (1999), citing Screen Gems-Columbia
rarely given
^^

See,

Music, Inc. V. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F.Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
"" See id. at 14, citing Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F.Supp. 135, 139-142 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
"^
Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright Infringement,

Cf

Enterprise Liability,

And the First Amendment,

88 Geo. L.

J.

1833, 1881 et seq. (2000)
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Obviously, before the

was

the issue of habihty for contributory infringement

from resolved; differing standards were applied and there was no secure way

far

determine whether

OSP

d.

liability existed

liability

under the

or not.

DMCA - vicarious and contributory infringements

Concerning these forms of

DMCA

is

to

DMCA provisions

The

(1 )

DMCA,

more complicated than

liability for "indirect"

it

is

infringement of copyright, the

concerning direct infringement

liability:

Safe

harbors are provided for situations that involve the temporary storage of infringing

material

Such

on an OSP's computers induced by a subscriber and

"system chaching".^^^

which may include browsing the web or email, are resolved

situations,

manner

for

as direct infringement. This can be

in the

same

deduced from the mention of temporary

storage in 17 U.S.C. § 512 (a) and the language of 17 U.S.C. § 512 (b)."^

In addition, the

DMCA

involve subscriber-induced

computers. This
situations the

"(A)

may

OSP

contains a safe harbor provision regarding situations that

long-term storage of infringing material on the OSP's

occur in the course of hosting

can avoid

liability if

web

pages, for example.^^^ In these

she complies with a set of detailed requirements:

[d]oes not have no actual knowledge of the infringing material or

(i)

activities;

(ii)

in

the

absence

of such

actual

knowledge,

circumstances from which the infringing activity

is

is

not

aware of

facts

apparent; or

"
"^ 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 512 (a) (West Supp. 2000): "...transient storage...
"^ Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise
Liability. And the First Amendment, 88 Geo. L. J. 1833, 1881 (2000)

or
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(iii)

upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness,

or disable access

to,

acts expeditiously to

remove,

the material;

(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing

activity,...

activity;

and

upon

(C)

[where] the service provider has the right and ability to control such

notification

of claimed infiingement...

remove, or disable access

to,

the material that

the subject of the infiinging acdvity."

The

claimed to be infiinging or

must be met

fi^om the use

to avoid liability.

^'^^

be

to

^

rather complicated language of these paragraphs needs to be analyzed

As can be seen

closely.

is

responds expedifiously to

of the conjuncfion "and",

Furthermore, the

OSP

needs

all

more

three requirements

to designate

an agent for

the receipt of notice of copyright infiingement and follow a previously established

method

for handling the complaints received through this agent.

must not know of the infringing
the scope of the safe harbor

not claim

clearly

this,

On

"*

Id. at

- (A)

(i)

and

(ii).

The defendant

in

activities that

come

Netcom could have

OSP

within

for example, could

all

along and he

were induced and encouraged by

know of

clearly claimed not to

the

542

1881-1882 (2000); Other grounds for nonliability are explicitly not excluded by the

U.S.C.A. § 512 (g) (4) (West Supp. 2000))
"' 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (c) (West Supp. 2000) (information residing on systems
^''^

Sega

since his activities were geared towards infiingement

the other hand,

infringements.

clear that the

activity or the underlying facts in order to

had knowledge of the infiinging

him.^'*'

It is

at direction

DMCA.

(17

of users)

Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise

Liability,

And the First Amendment, 88 Geo.

^'"

SM/7ra, pp. 110-111, 124

^*^

Supra,

^pv-

107, 118

L.

J.

1833, 1882 (2000)
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Yet even knowledge does not preclude a provider from the benefits of the
provisions, if

makes

it

it

remove the infringing material from

acts to

impossible to access

-

infringing material a soon as he

(A)

where she

is

case, since

(C).^'*^

OSP must

most providers charge

But when

is

from
an

statute requires this in

two

Frena, for example, removed the

and consequently would have come

not directly benefit financially from the infringement

-

(B).^'*^

flat rates for their

This will generally not be the

services and there cannot be any

required to remove material or disable access to

situations: First, if

come within

to

material must also be

the infiingement through

at least

infringements.^'*^

OSP

must remove the material

it

computers or

^"^^

able to control the infringing activity

direct financial profit

liability,

and

became aware of

within the scope of the safe harbor.

Furthermore, the

(iii)

its

its

an

OSP becomes

it?

The

aware of infringement,

it

the scope of the safe harbor. Second, to avoid

removed when an OSP receives formal

statutory notice

of

designated agent. In this case, there need not be proof of the

infiingement as shown by the statutory language.^"*^

It

is

clarified in the statute that

notices of alleged infringement that do not satisfy the statutory requirements do not create

"knowledge or awareness" of the infiingement
serves to ensure that notice

'"^

is

given in the required form. The

See Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider

Enterprise Liability,

in the statutory sense.

And the First Amendment,

Liability^

OSP

This clarification

however, must

in turn

For Subscriber Copyright Infringement,

88 Geo. L.

J.

1833, 1882-1884 (2000) (finding this

reminiscent of the concept of contributory liability for copyright infringement)
'""Supra, p. 104
'"'

See Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright Infringement,
And the First Amendment, 88 Geo. L. J. 1833, 1882 (2000) (finding this reminiscent of
vicarious liability - no direct financial benefit)

Enterprise Liability,

Supra,
'"'

p.

122

C

(West Supp. 2000) ("...claimed infringement..."); see also Alfred C. Yen,
For Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, And the
First Amendment, 88 Geo. L. J. 1833, 1884 (2000)
"* 17 U.S.C.A. 512 (c)
§
(3) (B) (i) (West Supp. 2000)
17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (d)

(3)

Internet Service Provider Liability
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notify the complaining party that

subscriber

whose

The

alleged infringer in turn

Upon

notice

was

receipt

may

insufficient.^"*^

of such response, the

the original complaining party.^^'

must also notify the

respond to the OSP's designated agent

the statute^^^ and thereby oppose the

that the allegedly infringing material will

It

was removed.

(allegedly) infringing material

manner prescribed by
material.

its

OS? must

be restored

in a

OSP's removal of

the

forward the response and a notice

in ten to fourteen business days, to

The complaining party may then

file

"an action seeking

OS?

a court order to restrain the subscriber" from infringing If she does so, the

is

required to keep the material off the web.^^' If however, the complaining party does not

respond, the

OS?

is

required to restore the removed material in "not less than ten, nor

more than fourteen business

days".^^^

Concerning the problems

some

solutions.

whether there
provider

is

is

It

rejects

that

any duty

were present before the

to police or

"reason to know".^^'* This

is

shown by

within the scope of the safe harbor unless

is

the

Act

offers

monitor as the standard to determine

clearly

circumstances from which the infringing activity

DMCA,

it

the provision that the

is

"aware of

facts

or

apparent".^^^

^'^

17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (c) (3) (B) (ii) (West Supp. 2000)
"" 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 512 (c) (2) and §512 (g) (3) (West Supp. 2000)
submission under U.S. jurisdiction)

(this includes the

requirement of

"' 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 512 (g) (2) (C) (West Supp. 2000)
"^ 17 U.S.C.A. 512
§
(g) (2) (C) (West Supp. 2000)
"' 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 512 (g) (2) (C) (West Supp. 2000)
^^*
See Mark D. Robins, Digital Millenium Copyright Act defenses for Providers of online storage services
and information location tools, 16 NO. 6/7 Computer Law. 11,15 (1999)
"^ 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 512 (West Supp. 2000)
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Practical Application of the Safe Harbors

(2)

On

February

Communities,

6,

Scan, Inc. (hereinafter

sells the

RemarQ)

it

images on

newsgroups

ALS)

that not

RemarQ

ALS

Scan, Inc.

CD-ROMs

and videotapes.

and provides access

only contain

ALS' name

RemarQ Communities,
to

RemarQ

including

in their titles but also contain

The postings

in these

site. It

also

Inc. (hereinafter

newsgroups,

various

and "alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.als" were posted by subscribers
sent

RemarQ

a corporation creating and marketing "adult" photographs

is

postings that infringe ALS'... copyrights".^^^

ALS

v.

DMCA safe harbor provisions.^^^ ALS

displays on the Internet to paying subscribers to their

OSP

an

is

v.

2001, the Fourth Circuit decided

case that revolved around the

Inc., a

and videos, which

- ALS

two

"hundreds of

newsgroups,

"alt.als"

RemarQ's

service.

to

a letter stating:

"[B]oth of these newsgroups... were created for the sole purpose of violating
copyrights

our...

all... copyrighted

and

images...

images and enable the
letter.

You

tradename.

Your

illegal

These

newsgroups

contain

virtually

servers provide access to these illegally posted

transmission of these... This

are hereby ordered to cease carrying these

a cease and desist

is

newsgroups within twenty

four (24) hours upon receipt of this correspondence. ."^^^
.

RemarQ

refused to comply, but indicated that

it

infiinging images, if these were specifically identified

reached and

ALS

was

willing to

DMCA,

Title

II,

claiming that

single

by ALS. No compromise was

filed suit alleging copyright infiingement, unfair

and violation of the

remove

RemarQ had

competition claims

actual

knowledge of the

infringements and "steadfastly refrised to remove or block access to the material".

556

ALS

Scan, Inc.

"' /^.,620

v.

RemarQ Communities,

Inc.,

239

F.

3d 619 C.A. 4 (Md.) 2001

ALS
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further claimed that

motion

contending that

dismiss,

to

had put RemarQ on

it

RemarQ was

requirements,

ALS

OSP

an

failed to

and willing

comply with

RemarQ 's

512

(c) (3) (A),

ALS

it

The

identified

district court

direct

for

notice

copyright

provided access to a newsgroup containing infringing

had indeed

accordance with 17 U.S.C.

failed to give notice in

RemarQ was

wherefore

specifically

liability

fihng a

DMCA

the

claim. ^^°

ALS'

holding that there was no

favor,

infringement "merely because
material" and that

remove

to

infringing material and because of this had a defense to

ruled in

RemarQ responded by

notice.^^^

§

within the safe harbor regarding any liability for

infhngement.^^^

The Fourth
"overruled" by the

Circuit reversed and remanded.

DMCA

the court only addressed

focuses on whether

district court

it

The Fourth

that

notice

was

had found the notice

identify the infringing

argued

that the

§

512

requirements and that

to

it

(3)

DMCA.

"list

(A)

it

did not

safe harbor.

RemarQ

to locate

notice to be sufficient in

only requires

"substantial"

all

specifically allows for "representative" lists

RemarQ Communities,
RemarQ Communities,

USPQ

2d 1996 (4* Cir. Md. 2001)
3d 619, 622 C.A. 4 (Md.) 2001
'" 17 U.S.C.A. §512 (c)
(3) (A) (ii), (ill) (West Supp. 2000)
'**
ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communiries, Inc., 239 F. 3d 619, 625-626 C.A. 4 (Md.) 2001
Scan, Inc.

v.

Scan, Inc.

v.

Inc.,

57

Inc.,

239

F.

and disable

of works

'""Id.

ALS
ALS

"did not

It

compliance with the

"'M621
"'

it

respects. ^^

"*/rf.,620-621

'"

The

comply with two of

of [infringing] works" and that

in sufficient detail to enable

ALS'

In doing so, the court

RemarQ of its

be insufficient because

Circuit found

(c)

the

sufficient to deprive

did not contain a

works

Frena was

clarified that

Act codified the Netcom decision. Accordingly,

ALS' claims brought under

ALS'

the six requirements;

them."^^^

and

first

It

in cases

136

where multiple copyrights

The court found

are involved.^^^

copyright holder to identify every individual

that

ALS

work

in

it

burden the

to overly

such cases and consequently held

"substantially" complied with the notice requirement

by providing information

that

two

"(1) [IJdentified

sites created for the sole

copyrighted works, (2) asserted that virtually

its

copyrighted material and (3) referred

RemarQ

could find pictures of

ALS

ALS

purpose of publishing
all

the images at the

RemarQ

to

two

Scan's

sites

were

two web addresses where

Scan's models and obtain

ALS

Scan's

copyright information."^^^

The Fourth

Circuit's decision needs to be

examined

closely, as

standard for interpreting the requirements in § 512 (c) (3) (A).
correct in quoting the

House Report and agreeing

"[D]MCA was
and

to

The

it

could set the

court

is

certainly

that the

enacted both to preserve copyright enforcement on the Internet

provide immunity to service providers from copyright infringement

liability for 'passive', 'automatic' actions in

which a service provider's system

engages through a technological

initiated

process

by another without

the

knowledge of the service provider."^^^

The Fourth

Circuit goes

on

to declare that the safe

given to "innocent" service providers,

i.e.

harbor immunity

'"

Id.

is

notified

by

the copyright holder.

is

In all this, the court

625

'""Id.
'*^

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-796,

'^^

ALS

Scan, Inc.

v.

at

72 (1998)

RemarQ Communities,

Inc.,

239

F.

only to be

such providers that have no actual or

constructive knowledge of the infringements, and that "innocence"

provider

is

3d 619, 625 C.A. 4 (Md.) 2001

lost

is

when

correct.

the

The
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question of the case circles around the requirements for the notice however, and here the
decision can be questioned.

requirements

is

It

is

certainly true, that substantial compliance with the

from the words of the

sufficient; this is clear

and serves

statute

preserve a balance between the interests involved. If the requirements were too

to

strict,

copyright holders would have to go to undue lengths to protect their rights, while too

formal requirements would

little

make

noninfringing material removed. Yet,

it

it

is

too simple for copyright holders to have

questionable whether a copyright holder can be

said to have ftilfilled the requirements substantially

to its

web

own

directories.

A

representative

address that contains such a

representative

between the

list.

list

On

list is

list,

the other hand

it

dedicated to posting images to which

correct in letting

ALS'

web

only supplies

addresses

be contained in the notice. Arguably, a

seems narrow-minded

and a web address where

itself

it

does not amount to the actual inclusion of a

containing the infringing material contained

was

to

where

ALS

it

to

make

the distinction

can be found. In ALS, the

ALS' name and were obviously

held the copyright. Considering

sites

primarily

this, the

court

notice be sufficient without the specific identification of

images or even a representative

list,

especially since the images to

which

ALS

held the

copyright were discernible as such due to the copyright notice. However, where there

no copyright

notice,

where the infringing

sites are

is

not dedicated to infringing activity, not

as easily identifiable or only contain small quantities of infringing material, the situation

should be evaluated on

its

own

merits. Hence, although the decision in

reasonable interpretation of the notice requirements for the case
necessarily be considered as a general standard.

I

at

hand,

ALS
it

finds a

should not
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Peer-to-peer networks and indirect liability

4.

The question whether or not

P2P networks has
centralized

there

is

room

for indirect liability in the context

so far only been addressed in the already

P2P network

Napster. ^^^ However, the

of

famous case against the

more problematic decentralized P2P

systems, like Gnutella or Freenet^''^, are already widely available. There are important

The

differences between centralized and decentralized systems, as mentioned earlier.

problems arising due

to decentralized

systems will be addressed after an analysis of the

Napster case.

A &M V. Napster

a.

(2000)

Napster, Inc. (hereinafter: Napster) operates a website from which subscribers can

download

a piece of file-sharing software at

no cost

the Napster network and share music files in the

logged onto the system (peer to
"screen

name" but does not

information

is

MP3

format directly with other users

Napster requires users to register under a

included in the registration, this information

The software includes

is

no longer available

to the

a browser, a search engine that

users search other users' hard drives for the music they wish to download, a chat

room and

^''^

them, that allows them to log on to

require the inclusion of any biographical data. If biographical

Napster servers after registration.

lets

peer).^^'^

to

a so-called "hotlist" fiinction with which users can use to compile a

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,

1

of other

14 F.Supp.2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,

and rem 'd 239 F.3d 1004 (9*^ Cir. 2001)
"" See Damien A. Riehl, Peer-To-Peer Distribution Systems:
Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna?, 27

list

WMLR

Will Napster, Gnutella

and Freenet Create a

1761 (2001) (describing the architecture of these systems)

"' Supra,
p. 53
^^'

Damien A.

Riehl, Peer-To-Peer Distribution Systems:

WMLR

Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna-^, 27
'"
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,

A&M

part,

and rem

'd

239 F.3d 1004 (9*

Cir.

1

Mil

Napster, Gnutella

and Freenet Create a

1761, 1766-1769 (2001)

14 F.Supp.2d 896, 905 (N.D. Cal. 2000), ajfd in part, rev

2001)

'd in
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The software may

users.

a "user library". There

also be used to create directories that allow users to share files in

is

no requirement

to share files,

however.

No

files fi^om

ever saved to or pass through the actual Napster servers. Rather, once a user
to Napster, the

browser part of the

free software interacts

user sets the browser to allow downloads,
the respective user library and

become

all

MP3

file

available for

MP3

format.

anew every time

The user

libraries are deleted

a user logs on.

names

are automatically listed in

download by other Napster users

MP3

files

title

Via the search engine or the

directly

files are in the

every time a user logs off and created
"hotlist" function

Napster software, users can access the content of other users'

download the desired

logged on

with Napster's software. If a

logged on to the network after the Napster software has verified that the
proper

is

users are

MP3

of the

libraries

and

from those users' hard drives. ^^'* The content of the

requested by a user does not pass through Napster's network, but

over the Internet from the host user (the user making the

files available for

the requesting user. Napster's ftmction in this process

is

is

transferred

download)

to

providing the software that

enables users to engage in such peer-to-peer transfers of data and thereby obtaining the IP

address of the host user. The Napster software

names

in the user libraries

necessary to access the uploaded

file

to obtain the routing data that is required to transfer the

The userbase of Napster

files.

'^''

and

is

is

extensive; approximately

1

million users are logged

Napster users are assigned to certain clusters of servers, so that they can only access the hard drives of
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 1 14 F.Supp.2d 896 (N.D. Cal.
same server cluster. See

A&M

users in the

2000),

afd in part,

rev

Napster und Gnutella

-

and rem

(9'*' Cir.
'd. 239 F.3d 1004
2001); see also Frederike Hanel,
Probleme bei der Obertragung von MP3-Dateien nach deutschem Urheberrecht,

'd in part,

JurPC Web-Dok. 245/2000, Abs. 34-35 (2000), <http://www.jurpc.de/aufsatz/20000245.htm>

(last visited

6/5/2001)
^'^

See id.; see also Damien A. Riehl, Peer-To-Peer Distribution Systems: Will Napster, Gnutella and
1761, 1768
Freenet Create a Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna?, 27

WMLR
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onto the network

at

exchanged between

any given time and so

far close to

Napster

(1)

in the sense

December

filed a

§

music

files

have been

and vicarious copyright

for contributory

^^^

1999.

motion for summary judgment claiming

to

be a "service provider"

of being a mere "passive conduit" for user transactions under §512(k)(l)(A)

of the copyright
of

.4 billion

users.

its

The Recording Industry sued Napster
infringement in

1

statute

and

that

its liability

The provision defines

512.

should therefore be limited by the safe harbor

"service

provider"

as

"an

entity

offering

the

transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications,

between or among points specified by

a user,

of material of the user's choosing, without

modification to the content of the material as sent or received."^^^

The

plaintiffs

argued that § 512(a) should not apply because the material

exchanged by Napsters users did not go "through" the Napster servers, but was rather

"^ Damien A. Riehl, Peer-To-Peer Distribution Systems: Will Napster, Gnutella and Freenet Create a
Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna?, 27

WMLR

1761, 1767 (2001), see also Steven Bonisteel, Napster

Subscription? Not Anytime Soon, Experts Say, Newsbytes (Oct.

3,

By

2000), at

WL

<http://www.newsbytes.com/pubNews/00/1561 15.html> (last visited 6/1/2001), available at 2000
27300967; Charles C. Mann, As Judgment Day Looms, Napster Offers Users an Even More Diabolically
Satisfying Experience, Inside.com (Oct. 30, 2000) <http:// w^ww. inside.
com/story/Story_Cached/0,2770,13276_9_12&uscore;l,00.html>
^^

Specifically

Inc.,

MCA Records,

Inc., Atlantic

Recording Corporation, Island Records,

Capitol Records, Inc., La Face Records,
Inc., Elektra

(last visited

6/5/2001)

A&M Records, Inc., Geffen Records, Inc., Interscope Records,

Entertainment Group,

Inc.,

Inc.,

Sony Music Entertainment,

Motown

Records,

Inc.,

BMG Music d/b/a The RCA Records Label, Universal Records,
Ansta Records,

Inc., Sire

Records Group,

Inc.,

Polygram Records,

Amenca, Inc., Warner Brothers Records, Inc.; Plaintiffs also alleged violations of the
California Civil Code Section 980 (a)(2) and unfair competition; these claims will not be discussed. Jerry
Leiber, Mike Stolle and Frank Music, Inc. filed suit on January 7, 2000; Napster was also sued by the band
Metallica, Metallica v. Napster Inc., No. 00-0391, complaint fded (CD. Cal., Apr. 13, 2000), and rapper
Andre Young ("Dr. Dre"), Young v. Napster Inc., No. 00-04366, complaint filed (CD. Cal., Apr. 25,
Inc.,

Virgin Records

2000); see Christopher Jones, Metallica Rips Napster, Wired

News

at

http://www.wired.eom/news/prmt/0, 1294,35670-,00.html (last modified 4/13/2000)
"* A &
573136, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183, 2000
"' 17 U.S.C.A. 512 (k)(l)(A) (West Supp. 2000)

M

WL

§
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^^^
transmitted directly between the individual users' computers.

§5 16(d), which covers search engines, more appropriately

The court

rejected Napster's

"safe

harbor"

fits

was

It

Napsters

argument.

It

also argued that

activities.

ruled that Napster

neglected to prevent infringements in accordance with § 512(i) and had had actual or
least constructive

knowledge of infringing

activities

of

its

users wherefore

it is

at

excluded

from the safe harbor.

The

(2)

plaintiffs filed a

no

there could be

motion for a preliminary injunction. Napster contended

liability for indirect

that

infringement because this would require that

Napster users directly infringe the copyright, which, according to Napster, they did not
COT

because of the
services

it

fair

Napster further brought forward that the software and

use doctrine.

provides were staple articles of

non-infringing uses, wherefore

The

District Court

it

Judge Marylin Patel found that the

The court addressed

the context of 'probable success

or vicarious infringement

A&M

'*'

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,

and rem
'^^

'd.

239 F.3d 1004

A & M Records,

Records, Inc.

v.

at

^*'/^. at

'"'Id.

900-901

912

Napster, Inc., No.
(9'*'

Cir.

1

Cir.

1

C

motion

and vicarious

likely to

liability in

Judge Patel recognizes that contributory

direct infringement

99-05183, 2000

by a

third party (the

WL 573136, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. 2000)

14 F.Supp.2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev

No.

C

99-05183, 2000

'd in

part.

WL 573136, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2000); A&M

14 F.Supp 2d, 896, 919 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev

2001)

were

for a preliminary injunction

the issue of contributory

merits'.

plaintiffs

2001)

Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,

Napster,

239F.3d 1004 (9*

*"W.

v.

on the

plaintiffs'

by Napster require

'*"

Records, Inc.

as such capable of substantial

could not be held liable under the rule in Sony.^^'*

succeed on the merits and granted the
against Napster.

commerce and

'd in

part,

and rem

'd.
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Napster users)^^^. The court states that prima facie evidence estabhshes that the

of Napster users amount

to direct infringement

up- and downloading music

music contained
for

in these files

users, the court

its

files

because virtually

and because evidence showed

was copyrighted. As

of them engage

all

that

activities

in

more than 80% of the
Napster alleged

to the fair use defense

examines the case under the four non-exhaustive factors of section

107 of the copyright act after finding that the use was not transformative because the

MP3

"repackaging" of copyrighted music in
understandings.^^^

The four

format "adds no

factors of fair use analyzed

new

by the court

are:

"(1) [t]he purpose and character of the use, including whether such use

commercial nature or

is

and

aesthetics, insights

for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature

is

of a

of the

copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted

work

as a whole;

and (4) the effect of the use upon the

potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.'

The court

finds that all four factors cut in favor of the plaintiffs.

use was commercial, even though Napster has not

do not usually

from the

directly reap profits

finding of commercial

files

See

rev

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
part,

'd in

Studios, Inc.,
^*^

d.

(1994) and
588

**'

and rem 'd. 239 F.3d 1004 (9*
464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984)

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,

and rem

239 F.3d 1004 (9*

they download.

1

1

was not

argued that the

a profit to date and Napster users

use on the "vast scale of Napster use

individuals" because of which the downloading

^^^

made

It

The

court based

its

among anonymous

a "personal use in the fraditional

14 F.Supp.2d 896, 911-912 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part,

Cir.

2001 ), citing Sony Corp. of America

v.

Universal City

14 F.Supp 2d, 896, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev

'd in part,

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579
MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)

Cir. 2001), citing

UMG Recordings, Inc. v.

17U.S.C. §107(1994)

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,

in part,

and rem

'd

239 F.3d 1004

(9'*'

1

14 F.Supp.2d 896, 912-913 (N.D. Cal. 2000), ajfdinpart. rev'd

Cir.

2001)
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on

sense."^^° Judge Patel goes

would

ordinarily have to

to state that

buy" and therefore "[r]eap economic advantages from Napster

use."^^' Private use is dismissed

be said

to

requester.

engage

when

distributing that

file

to

an anonymous

"^^^

The court
fair

based on the scale of the use and because users "cannot

a personal use

in

Napster users "get for free something they

further finds the second^^^ and third factors to cut against a finding of

use because the musical works and sound recordings

and because the downloading of

"undisputed[ly]

files

.

.

.

at

issue are creative in nature

involves copying the entirety of

the copyrighted work."^^'*

The

fourth factor

allegedly "reduces

CD

is

found

sales

weigh against

to

among

fair

use as well because Napster use

college students... [and] raises barriers to plaintiffs'

entry into the market for the digital downloading of music.

Napster argued the
distribution

in this

of an

artist's

uses of "sampling, space shifting and the authorized

work," basing the argument on the Sony decision. ^^^ Sampling

sense was understood as the users' downloading mjsic from Napster to determine

whether they would

"^

fair

"^^^

like to

purchase

it

or not. "Space shifting"

means

the transfer of a

Sega Enterprises Ltd. V. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 678 (N.D.Cal. 1994) and American
v. Texcao, Inc., 60 F. 3d 913, 922 (2"*^ Cir. 1994)
"'
Records, Inc. v. Napster, 1 14 F.Supp 2d, 896, 913 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd in part, rev 'd in part,
and rem 'd 239 F.3d 1004 (9* Cir. 2001), citing Sega, Ltd. V. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 687 (N.D. Cal.
Id., citing

Geophysical Union

A&M

1994) (holding that copying to save expenses of purchasing the copied item

commercial and weighs
60 F. 3d 913, 922 (2"'' Cir.
1994) (holding that for-profit enterprise that made copies of scholarly articles for research reaped mdirect
economic advantage from this and was hence engaging in commercial use.
''^
Records, Inc. v. Napster, 1 14 F.Supp 2d, 896, 912-913 (N.D. Cal. 2000), ajf'd in part, rev 'd in
against a finding of fair use);

American Geophysical Union

v.

Texaco,

is

Inc.,

A&M

part,

*"

and rem

Id. at

'd.

239 F.3d 1004

913, citmg

Enterprises Ltd. V.

839
"*

F.

(9*^ Cir.

Harper&Row

MAPHIA, 857

F.

Supp. 679, 687 (N.D.Cal. 1994); Playboy Enterprises, Inc.

v.

Frena,

Supp. 1552, 1558 (M.D.Fla. 1993)

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,

part,

2001)

Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985); Sega

and rem

'"'/</. at

'd,

913-914

239 F.3d 1004 (9*

Cir.

1

14 F.Supp.2d 896, 913 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev

2001)

'd in
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legally obtained

work from one storage medium

user's computers to another.

The authorized

"New

place through Napster's so-called

from one of a

to another, specifically

distribution

of

artists

works, which took

Program", a program designed to give

Artists

musicians without a label the opportunity to expand their fan-base and level of
recognition by allowing the download of their

The court did not
to

"sampling"

it

find

work on

any of these uses satisfying

file,

which she can

distribute to

buying the music; even obliterating the need
SOS

VCR

Sony was not applied

users recorded "a

to

in Napster's favor

The record companies do charge

downloadable formats. ^°° Furthermore,

many

pay

due

work which he has been

charge,"^^^ wherefore "time shifting" in the

use.

for a finding

of

As

fair use.

held that this was not a personal use because the user obtains for free a

permanent copy of the

own.

the Napster network.

others, instead

for material the user wishes to

to the differences in the facts:

invited to witness in

Sony scenario can
music,

for

VCR

its

While

entirety free of

easily be regarded as fair

whether

in

CD

format

or

in

users are unlikely to distribute recorded

material to millions of other persons free of charge. ^°'

The

court goes on to state that

sampling adversely affects the potential market for the works.

on the "Jay Survey", prepared by the

of ordinarily

plaintiffs,

This finding was based

according to which "the more songs

Napster users download, the more likely they are to reveal that such use reduces their

596

Id. at
597

913, citing Sony Corp. of America

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,

in part,

^^^Id

and rem

at

'd.

239 F.3d 1004 (9*

"' Sony Corp. of America
in part,

^^

Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984)

v.

14 F.Supp.2d 896, 913-917 (N.D. Cal. 2000), ajfd in part, rev'd

Cir.

2001)

913-914

^ See A&M Records,
*°'

1

v.

Universal City Studios,

Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,

1

and rem 'd 239 F.3d 1004 (9* Cir. 2001)
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City

Id., citing

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,

part,

Inc.,

and rem

'd

239 F.3d 1004

(9'*'

Cu".

1

464 U.S. 417, 449-450 (1984)

14 F.Supp.2d 896, 913 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd
Studios, Inc.,

464 U.S. 417, 449-450 (1984)

14 F.Supp.2d 896, 914 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in

2001)

)
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music buying."^°^ Napster on the other hand, contended
music

sales.

^^'^

The

court,

however, dismissed the report

this

unrehable and went on to state that "potential enhancement

would not

tip the fair

of.

.

.

sales

"^°^

1999).^^^

The

to licensing fees or access

if

that

"space-shifting"

of Napster and

"space shifting were a

commerce

**"

Id., citing

See

hic, 180 F. 3d 1072, 1079

it

and the
(9'*"

no

Cir.

further

between "space shifting" and "time

was not

fair use.^°^

the

primary (and not even a

The court did not

doctrine."^'^

by Sony

to

find Napster "capable of

come

within the scope of the

Another argument the court brings up

application of the article of commerce doctrine

*°^

AHRA

that consequently the doctrine did not preclude liability,

substantial non-infiinging uses" as required

"staple article of

of commerce

inapplicable and therefore gave

is

further dismissed the analogy

by finding

significant)^^^ use

even

It

AHRA

article

especially considering the

liability,

Diamond Multimedia Systems,

court stated that the

consideration. ^^^

shifting"

v.

sampling

to

Napster further argued that "space-shifting" was analogous to

doctrine" precluded a finding of

RIAA

due

use analysis... in favor of defendant," because "[pjositive impact

"time shifting", as discussed in Sony, and that therefore the "staple

decision in

increased

contention was based on as

on sales" does not negate the copyright holder's "[ejntitlement
to derivative markets.

sampUng even

that

is that

to

deny

Napster "exercises ongoing control

Jay report, Tbl 4

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
and rem

239 F.3d 1004 (9*

1

14 F.Supp.2d 896, 914 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev

'd

2001
*°'
Records, Inc. v. Napster, 1 14 F.Supp 2d, 896, 914 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part.
and rem 'd. 239 F.3d 1004 (9* Cir. 2001), citing Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, 126 F. 3d 70,
81 (2"'' Cir. 1997); DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F. 2d 24, 28 (2"'' Cir. 1982);
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
in part,

'd

Cir.

A&M

UMG

^ A&M Records,
and rem

'd.

Inc. v. Napster,

239 F.3d 1004 (9*

Cir.

1

14 F.Supp 2d, 896, 915 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev

2001)

607

Id.
608
609

Id &t9\6
Id
Id., citing

Sony Corp. of America

v.

Universal City Studios,

Inc.,

464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984)

'd in

part.

146

over

its

service" while

Sony had not done more than

finds that the authorized promotion

(the

"new

artist

of

artists

program") does not weigh

there

is

after suit

direct infiingement

by

by

not represented

in Napster's favor.

not a substantial part of Napster's services in the

have been developed only

VCRs.

sell the

first

It

611

The

the record companies

states that the

place and that secondly

had been brought. "^'^ In

court also

total,

program

is

seems

to

it

the court finds that

the users because the engage in unauthorized copying of

protected material and canot claim the benefit of the fair use doctrine.^'

The court goes on
to

to find that

Napster had knowledge, or

know, of the infiingements and willingly

for contributory infiingement.^''*

internal Napster

It

facilitated these,

at the

thereby making itself liable

to

remain ignorant of users'

and IP addresses 'since they are exchanging pirated music'" and

making

least reason

bases the finding of knowledge on the fact that

documents "mention[s] the need

[Napster] are not just

very

state

real

names

that

"[w]e

pirated music available, but also pushing demand."^'^

Furthermore, Napster executives with experience in the record industry themselves had

downloaded music

fi^om the

network and had enough knowledge of intellectual property

laws to sue the band "The Offspring" for trademark infringement.^'^ All This, the court
finds,

^"

shows

that

Napster was not only aware of the infiinging activities but that these

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster.

1 14 F.Supp 2d, 896, 916-917 (N.D. Cal. 2000), ajf'd in part, rev'd in
239 F.3d 1004 (9* Cir. 2001), citing Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 438 (1984) and A&M Records, Inc. v. General Audio Video Cassettes, Inc., 948 F.
Supp. 1449,1456-1457 (CD. Cal. 1996) (finding Sony inapplicable to tape seller who acted as a contact
between his customers and the suppliers of material for counterfeiting); RCA Records, Inc. v. All-Fast Sys.,
Inc., 594 F. Supp. 335, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
'*'Records, Inc. v. Napster, 1 14 F.Supp 2d, 896, 917 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part,
and rem 'd 239 F.3d 1004 (9* Cir. 2001)
613
Id
614
Id. at 918 et. seq.
^"M at 918
^'VJ. at 918-919

part,

and rem

A&M

d,
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were also a central point
infringements

to

is

be sufficient

in Napster's business plan.^''' Since

not necessary for a finding of contributory

knowledge or

to establish

activities

on Napster's

argument

that

Napster

part.^'^

is

at

least

liability,

reason to

Netcom

files

the

it

provided the means

with ease and thereby facilitated the infringements.

vicarious infringement, the court also found in favor of the plaintiffs

to

and has a direct financial

it

Netcom based on

decisions, the court also finds that

because Napster allegedly had the "right and ability

that

the infringing

not an Internet Service Provider.^'^

Napster materially contributed to the infringements because

As

specific

the court finds this

know of

dismissed Napster's reliance on

It

Citing Fonovisa, Sega and even

necessary to exchange

knowledge of

may be

interest in

such

"infeasible" to supervise

capability of doing so

was

to supervise the infringing activity

Even though

activities."^^'

all

Napster use,

it

the court recognized

found that the mere theoretical

sufficient with regard to the first requirement

of a finding of

vicarious infringement and fiirther found Napster's statements about "blocking users

about

whom

The

court

users,

even

rightsholders complain" as an admission of such capability.^^^

also finds that Napster directly profits

though Napster,

Inc.

from the infringing

activities

of

its

has not generated any revenues to date However, because the size of

617

Id.
*'^

Id.,ciung Gershwin, 443 F. 2d at

1

*"

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,

14

and rem
""

'd

239 F.3d 1004

{9^^ Cir.

1

162

F.Supp 2d, 896, 919 (N.D. Cal. 2000), ajf'd

in part, rev 'd in part.

2001)

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,

1

14 F. Supp.

2d 896, 918

et.

seq. (N.D. Cal. 2000), ajf'd in part.

rev 'd in part, and rem 'd 239 F.3d 1004 (9*^ Cir. 2001)
"' Id. at 920-921, citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F. 3d 259, 262 (9* Cir.
1996) (quoting

Gershwin, 443 F. 2d at
"^
Records, Inc.

A&M

part,

and rem

'd

1

v.

162)
Napster, Inc.,

239 F.3d 1004 (9*

Cir.

1

14 F. Supp.

2001)

2d 896, 921 (N.D.

Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev 'd in
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the user base

Napster's capital and increases

is

way or another

be abridged by an injunction because
^^'^

market value to be liquidated

some

specified in Napster's business plans at

In defense Napster claimed that

material.

its

its

it

users'

and

its

in

one

point in time.

own

right to free

speech would

merely offers a directory and not copyrighted

Directories have indeed enjoyed the protection of free speech, as the District

Court recognizes. ^^^ Yet, the court explains, "free speech concerns 'are protected by and
coextensive with the

fair

use doctrine'" and therefore free speech does not give Napster a

valid defense, since the court had already determined that fair use did not apply.^^^

Napster also raised the copyright misuse defense, arguing that the record industry
sought to expand their monopoly over the distribution of music onto the electronic

market on the

Internet, thereby violating antitrust laws.

stating that antitrust violations

action.

The

court dismisses this defense,

"do not afford a valid defense against an infringement

,627

Napster further contended that the record companies had waived their entitlement
to protection

"^

because they "hastened the proliferation of MP3

files

on the

Internet and...

Bob Music v. Stubbs, 851 F. Supp. 475, 480 (S.D. Ga. 1994); Walden
C.H.W., Inc., 1996 WL 254654, at 5 (D. Kan. 1996); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hobi, Inc.,
1993 WL 404152, at 3 (M.D. La. 1993), afTd 20 F. 3d 1 171 (5*^ Cir. 1994); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry
Auction, Inc., 76 F. 3d 259, 263-264 (9* Cir. 1996)
""
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 1 14 F. Supp. 2d 896, 923 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
in part, rev 'd in
Id. at

Music,

920-921, citing Major

Inc. V.

A&M

part,

"'

and rem

afd

'd

239 F.3d 1004

A&M Records, Inc.
and rem

v.

(9'^ Cir.

Napster, Inc.,

239 F.3d 1004

(9** Cir.

2001)
1

14 F. Supp. 2d 896, 923 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff^d in part, rev

Community Phonebook,

'd in

582
439 U.S. 966 (1978)
"* A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 1 14 F. Supp. 2d 896, 923 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
aff'd in part, rev d in
part, and rem 'd, 239 F.3d 1004 (9'*' Cu". 2001), citing Nihon Keizai Shibum, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data,
Inc., 166 F. 3d 65, 74 (2"** Cir. 1999); Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications,
Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1382 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
"^ A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 1 14 F.Supp 2d, 896, 923 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
and rem 'd, 239 F.3d 1004 (9* Cir. 2001), citing 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on

part,
F.

'd.

2d 706, 710-711

Copyright § 13.09

(3'''

2001), citing Princeton

Cir.), cert, denied,

[a], at

13-268 (2000)

Inc. v. Bate,

149

"^^^
The court did not find
plan to enter the market for digital downloading themselves.

this

persuading but held that the plaintiffs had not waived their right by proliferating the

MP3, because

spread of

downloading ventures."

they "did [no] more than seek partners for their commercial

629

Napster appealed to the 9* Circuit Court of Appeals, which granted the motion

(3)

just hours before the original injunction

the

its

9'^

Circuit focused

was

to

be enforced. ^^^ During the oral argument

on whether Napster has the

ability to identify copyrighted files

network and whether Napster has the obligation

being accessed by users.^^' The court asked,

to

among

somehow block

those

on

files fi"om

other things: "[H]ow are they

expected to have knowledge of what comes out of some kid's computer in Hackensack,
N.J.,

and

is

transmitted to Guam?"^^^

The Ninth

the District Court's injunction, however.

DMCA,

concerning the application of the
addressed

at trial.^

^

The

Circuit Court required

injunction

which the Ninth Circuit held would be

was found

be changed

to

agreed with the court's findings except

to

be necessary but overbroad and the

to require the plaintiffs to identify th infiinging

634

works

628

it

It

Circuit only required small changes to

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
and rem

in part,
629

Id. at

'd.

239 F.3d 1004

(9'*'

1

14 F. Supp. 2d 896, 923-924 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd

Cir.

2001)

924

WL

"°A&MRecords,

Inc. V.Napster, Inc., 2001
1 15033 (9"' Cir. 2001)
"' Lee Gomes, Napster Case Judges Grill Industry Side, Wall St. J., Oct.
3, 2000,
^^^

P.J. Huffstutter,

2000,

at

Napster Buys

Some Time as Judges Consider Appeal

CI

"^ A«S:M Records, Inc.
"'/J. at 1025, 1026

v.

at

A3

Copyright, L.A. Times, Oct.

Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9* Cir. 2001)

3,
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Evaluation

(4)

The decision must be

criticized in several points.

not individual users can claim fair use

While there can be

little

files.^^^

that

The

court discussed whether or

some flawed argumentation.

length but relies on

doubt as to the second and third factors of the

weighing against a finding of
questioned.

at

The

fair

use, the

use analysis

commercial nature of such use must be

court recognizes that users do not reap profits fi^om their copying of

This alone should speak against finding the use to be commercial. The argument,

because users save the cost of purchasing the music

becomes commercial,

is

questionable.

American Geophysical Union

v.

The court

Texaco^

^,

conventional formats the use

in

heavily on the decision in

relies

decision that must be criticized itself for

flawed argumentation. Research scientists working for Texaco,
archived articles form scientific journals.

On

appeal, the

be "archival", not necessarily "commercial" and held
fair

fair

Inc.

had copied and

Second Circuit found the sue

that therefore the fisrt factor

to

of the

use analysis weighed in favor of the publishers."^ However, the court found that the

use would have an adverse effect on the potential market for the articles and weighed the
fourth factor against

Texaco

as well.

This finding was based on the arguments that

Texaco would have bought additional journal subscriptions
and

that the publishers

were

entitled to licensing fees,

if

make photocopies

The court held

"'

is

that "it

is

undisputable that... a copyright holder

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,

lost

demand

the very question that the fair use trial

is

was not allowed

which were

copying. Texaco contended that "whether the publishers can

to

it

due

copy

Texaco's

a fee for permission

supposed
is

to

to

to answer."^^^

entitled to

demand

a

1 14 F. Supp. 2d 896, 912-913 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd
239 F.3d 1004 (9* Cir. 2001)
"* Id. at 913, citing American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F. 3d 913, 922 (2"'' Cir. 1994)
nd
637
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F. 3d 913, 919 (2 Cir. 1994)

in part,

and rem

'd.

,

1
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royalty for licensing."^'*^ Consequently, the court weighed the fourth factor against

Texaco, mainly "because of lost licensing revenue, and to a minor extent because of
subscription

revenue."^'*'

The decision must be subjected

regarding the fourth factor analysis. First of
actually order

more

subscriptions if

all,

there

is

especially

criticism,

no guarantee

were not permitted

it

to

to copy,

that

lost

Texaco would

and secondly, the

publishers "must... assume that... the scientists will extract what they need and arrange

to

copy

it"

subscription

because institutional subscribers

As

fee.^'*^

to licensing revenues,

cannot be entitled to licensing fees

Texaco

is

correct.

whether the use

like

when

it

the use

Texaco are charged double the usual

must be said
is fair,

Whether a copyright holder has

is fair.

The Texaco decision

is

that the copyright holder

the argument brought forward

"lost" licensing revenue

by

depends on

not convincing. Furthermore, the Napster

court relies on the decision, not only regarding the effect on the market, but also

regarding the commercial nature of the use. The Second Circuit determined that there was
"archival" use but that this

was only

provide convincing reasons as to

The decision does not

indirectly commercial.^'*"'

why

the

use in Napster should be considered

commercial or adversely affecting the market.
Furthermore,

it

could be argued that the individual user

is

making a personal use

of the work rather than an unauthorized commercial use of the copyright.
say the

638

least, that

Id. at

929

Id. at

926, 929

641

Id
Id

93

^^
^^

Id. at

639

Id

at

at

936 (Jacobs,
923

the court relies

C.J., dissenting)

on the sum of all Napster users

It is

curious, to

to find the scale

of such
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use to be the reason for

by

its

commercial

Yet, with regard to direct infringement

nature.^"*^

a third party, the individual users are to be regarded as individuals rather than an

anonymous

mass.^'*^

was warranted by
court's focus

The

District Court

broadened the scope of the analysis beyond what

the fair use defense. There

on the anonymity of the

use.^"*^

is

On

also

a

no foundation

common

in precedent for the

sense level, the anonymity of

the uses speaks against personal use nevertheless, but the court should not have based

its

argumentation on the "vast scale of Napster users" and the anonymity. In the end, the
first

factor

would probably

weigh against a finding of fair use because the individual

still

users indeed exchange copyrighted music without authorization and a use need not be

commercial

in

nature to be unfair.^''

The

large

number of Napster

anonymity argument ultimately do weigh against a finding of
necessarily indicate that the use

is

fair

users and the

use but they do not

commercial.

While some of the court's arguments are

less than convincing, the result is

very

likely correct: Individual Napster users directly infringe the copyright holders distribution

right

by making

right

by downloading works

files

available for

In the end, the court

download

that they

is

to a

mass of people and the reproduction

do not already own in conventional formats.

right to find

Napster liable for contributory infiingement,

since Napster did facilitate infiingements committed

644

See

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,

1

by

its

users and certainly had

14 F.Supp 2d, 896, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev

'd in

and rem 'd. 239 F.3d 1004 (9* Cir. 2001)
^^ See Harper&Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation

part,

Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Sony Corp. of America v.
464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
cases resting their fair use analysis on the actual individual use asserted as the

Universal City Studios,

579 (1994)

(all

three

Inc.,

infrmging use)

^^ The court refers to Sega Enterpnses Ltd. V. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D.Cal. 1994) at a later
pomt. That case involves a situation somewhat similar to the Napster situation where users anonymously
logged onto a bulletin board to exchange copyrighted videogames. However, the Napster court's use of this
case as precedent is limited to the proposition that a use is commercial if an individual gets something for
free that she would usually have had to pay for. The MAPHIA case does not support the finding that a use
is

commercial because of the anonymity of the users involved.
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knowledge of these infringements. The argument
individual infringement

First

of

all,

the

activity is so

had

to

is

Napster did not

intriguing but ultimately unconvincing

amount of infringing

enormous

that

activity

on Napster

infringements, since these were committed

by

to

to several factors:

in relation to the non-infringing

that the individual infringement loses

be aware of this. Secondly, Napster had

due

know of any

some importance; Napster

have had knowledge of some individual

its

executives.

Lastly,

and maybe most

importantly, Napster's internal documents and business plans clearly

showed

consciously avoided any knowledge of individual

and attempted

"remain ignorant of users'
directors realized that

goals

was not only

to

its

real

names and

infringements

[Internet]

"pirated music available, but also push[ing] demand."^'*^

fact that tips the scales in that

infringer attempts to avoid liability

bad

faith

in the

direction.

by consciously making an

is

The

just an

If a contributory

effort 'not to

know',

this

conduct should indeed not weigh in her favor. The Sony defense indeed wears

thin as well,

concerns

to

users were trading in "pirated music" and that one of Napster's

make

amusing

had

it

addresses" because Napster's

hypocrisy of Napster suing "The Offspring" for trademark infringement
additional and

that

mainly because of the vast factual differences between the cases. Sony

itself

Napster

with an analog technology that hardly relates to the technology involved
litigation.

Whereas

VCRs

allowed users to record television broadcasts,

Napster enables them to exchange copyrighted music
not be underestimated, since the users of the (analog)

files.

This factual difference should

VCR

technology did not exchange

copyrighted material on a large scale, they essentially only recorded what they were

^^ 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.05 (2000)
^^
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 1 14 F. Supp. 2d 896, 918 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd
part, and rem 'd, 239 F.3d 1004 (9*^ Cir. 2001)

A&M

""'Id.

in part,

rev'd in
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entitled to

enjoy anyway, only

engage

in a different kind

Where

"time-shifting"

of

was

at

a different time.

activity,

enabling each other to copy without authorization.

essentially limited to

case with Napster.

The only

court's analysis of

Sony

is

real criticism that

its

The Napster users on the other hand

one and the same user,

this is not the

must be brought forward against the

limited view, trying to analogize the scenarios while

ignoring the underlying rationale in Sony, that technology should not be impede because

it

can be used to infiinge.

A

more comprehensive

application of

Sony should not have

yielded a result in favor of Napster entirely for the reasons mentioned above, but

have led

to a

more balanced

Where

the court

is its

While Napster certainly knew of the infringements,
in a position to supervise.

with

its

It

may have had

software, but technically

libraries, let

alone

all

the Napster servers.

it

it

finding of vicarious infringement.

is

questionable whether

The

hardly had the ability to actually supervise

reality is

one simple reason:

If it does

is

it

will not

The law should not

be followed.

However, there remains a question mark

would be overbroad, even

perform actions that

it

is

those

law

after the appeal,

require

that ignores

it

is

for

whether Napster actually

as to

its

system. If it does not,

for requiring Napster to

unable to perform. Napster claims that

*'''

A

equally true for societal reality as

does have the ability to identify and block infringing material on
the injunction

all

court's argument, that the "ability to supervise" does not

simply not a good law. This

technical reality.

was ever

which never actually touched

require actual but only theoretical ability, must be questioned.

the impossible for

it

the right to supervise the user libraries created

transactions between Napster users,

^^*^

could

decision.

mistaken however,

is

it

it

does not have

this

See Damien A. Riehl, Peer-To-Peer Distribution Systems: Will Napster, Gnutella and Freenet Create a
1761 (2001)
Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna?, 27

WMLR
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Independent sources, however, have argued that Napster could indeed identify

ability.

protected material using the so-called 'hash marks' found on any given

marks are

like digital fingerprints that identify

identical conditions

and recording speed.

^^^

an

One

MPS

file that

digital

music

MP3

file.

Hash

has been produced under

retailer,

Emusic, has

now

system that can allegedly scan the Napster network using hash marks

installed a

have been distributed on Emusic's system. ^^^

identify songs that

If

to

Emusic's system can

indeed identify infringing material in this way, this would prove that Napster could do so
as well.^^'*

Whether the hash mark

identification

system works well enough

Napster's claim of inability to identify and block infringing

is

a strong indication that the injunction

The
activities

is

to

be seen, but

it

courts conclusion as to Napster's direct financial interest in the infringing

must be questioned. Napster did not make a

it is

remains

was not overbroad.

profit, neither

fransaction nor from paying users or anything else.^^^

While

files

to discredit

true that the

services

company's value grew proportionally

insufficient to find direct financial interest. First

extended userbase

Its

of

all,

from any individual

were

free

of charge.

to the user base, this alone

the financial interest in an

because the userbase only increases the company's market

is indirect

value but does not generate direct benefits or profits for Napster.

^''

Charles C. Mann and Roger Parloff, Napster Playing Dumb, Experts Say: Programmers Say the
Company Could Easily Block Most of the Infringing Files From Its Directory, TheStandard.com (Oct.

2000)

<http:// www.thestandard.com/article/ display/0,1

151,19487-0,00.html>

(last visited

1

8,

6/5/2001)

"''Id.

^" Brad King, Emusic Tracks Napster Naughties, Wired News (Nov. 21, 2000),
<http://www.wirednews.eom/news/business/0, 1367,4031 6,00. html> (last visited 6/5/2001)
""
Records, Inc. v. Napster, 1 14 F.Supp 2d, 896, 921 (N.D.Cal. 2000), aff'd in part rev'd in part and
rem 'd, 239 F.3d 1004 (9* Cir. 2001), citing Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management,

A&M

Inc.,

443

F.

2d

1

159,

1

162-1 163

clever as the people are

minds

(2"''

who wrote

in silicon valley to

do

it,

Cir.

1971)

-

Judge Patel opined that she was "sure that anyone as

the software in this case are clever enough, as there are plenty of those

can come up with a program that will help to identify infringing items as

well."

*"

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,

and rem

W, 239 F.

3d 1004 (9*

Cir.

1

14 F.Supp 2d, 896, 921 (N.D.Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part

2001)
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In total, the result in the Napster decision

infringement
users with

the decision

b.

knowledge of these

activities.

must be questioned and

criticized.

The Gnutella Problem

relies

on a decentralized system,

community, there are no
addresses.

on user

The

transfer

arises regarding peer-to-peer filesharing

Gnutella,

like

hi

a decentralized filesharing

central servers administering user libraries or providing IP

of data between the users also occurs peer

to the other, but the users

providing this information. With Gnutella,

it

is

from

for the file

having a central system

know one

sufficient to

user's information to establish a connection with the

The search request

to peer, directly

must obtain the information necessary

transfer, like the other user's IP address, themselves, rather than

their

its

Regarding vicarious infringement however,

A similar but distinctly different problem
that

correct, at least as far as contributory

concerned. Napster did indeed facilitate copyright infringements by

is

frill

is

other Gnutella

whole network of Gnutella

users.

for a certain title or artist is forwarded to these individual users

computers check whether the wanted

files are

available

on

and

their hard drive, before

returning an affirmative notice to the host, which sent the search request. This notice

contains the other user's IP address, her port and information regarding the
size of the files. ^^^.

The information contained

in a Gnutella

network

is

number and

limited to the

information that Gnutella users allow others to view on their computers while they are
online, just like in the Napster network. Unlike Napster, however, searches are not

limited to

MPS

or

Windows Media

files.

A

Gnutella user can search other users'
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computers for any type of
basically

means

file.^^^

that there is

is

open source software, which

entity at the center

of the network that could be

Furthermore, Gnutella

no single

held liable for copyright infiingements on the basis of the concepts of contributory or
vicarious infringement. ^^^ Although an

original source

is

a program

to hold

AOL

code has undergone

much

different

extend that

employee

its

initially created Gnutella, the

transformations since

original.

^^^

It

liable for Gnutella's existence, since

many modified

somehow be

many

from the

even removed the original from
are

AOL

website once

it

would be

AOL

its

creation and arguably

difficult, if

not impossible,

did not condone the project and

was aware of it.^^° Furthermore,

versions of the program available. Consequently, even if

held liable for the original version of the software,

liability to these

modified versions. ^^' Since there

it

is

AOL

there

could

would be impossible
no single

to

entity behind

Gnutella copyright holders would have to overcome difficult "jurisdictional hurdles" to

sue and would have difficulties finding out

who

to sue at all.^^^

with every decentralized filesharing network, hi the end

,

The same problem

arises

copyright holders would be

left

*^^

See Frederike Hand, Napster und Gnutella - Probleme bei der Obertragurtg von MP3-Dateien nach
deutschem Urheberrecht, JurPC Web-Dok. 245/2000, Abs. 28 (2000),
<http://www.jurpc.de/aufsatz/20000245.htm>

Damien A.

Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna?, 27
*^*
1,

Id. at

(last visited

6/5/2001)

Riehl, Peer-To-Peer Distribution Systems: Will Napster, Gnutella

WMLR

and Freenet Create a

1761 (2001)

1776-1777 (2001); see also Giancarlo Varanini, Shawn Fanning on Napster, ZDNet Music, (Mar.

2000), <http://music.zdnet.com/download/features/napster/index.htinl> (last visited 6/5/2001);

Tom

Kirchofer, Ruling Unlikely to Stop Free Music Downloads, Boston Herald, July 28, 2000, at 28, available at

2000
*'^

WL 4331 181.

Brown, The Gnutella Paradox: As Soon As An Online Music- Trading Service Gets Big Enough
It's Doomed, Salon.com (Sept. 29, 2000)
<http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/09/29/gnutella_ paradox/index. html> (last visited 6/5/2001)
^° Damien A. Riehl, Peer-To-Peer Distribution Systems: Will Napster, Gnutella and Freenet Create a
Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna?, 11 WMLR 1761, 1778 (2001); citing Anana Eunjung Cha, E-Power to
the People: New Software Bypasses Internet Service Providers, Wash. Post, May 18, 2000, at AOl,

to

Janelle

be Useful,

available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dynyarticles/A21559-2000Mayl7.html> (last visited

6/5/2001)
*^'

Damien A.

Riehl, Peer-To-Peer Distribution Systems: Will Napster, Gnutella

Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna?, 27
""'Id.

WMLR

1761, 1778 (2001)

and Freenet Create a
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with only one possibility, to sue
costs this

would

The

5.

One

home

it

is

the individual users. In light of the

hardly a viable (or likely) solution

immense

legal

663

AHRA
possible solution to the problem of copying of protected works over the

Internet could

a.

incur,

all

have been the Audio

Home Recording Act (AHRA)

The

AHRA solution to digital audio home recording

The

AHRA

was

the result of a

compromise between

of

1992.^^"*

the manufacturers of audio

recording equipment and the music industry brought about by the advent of the

Digital

Audio Tape (DAT).^^^
It

prohibits

copyright

infringement

actions

to

be

brought

based

on

the

manufacture, importation and distribution of digital audio recording devices or the

noncommercial use of digital or analog music recordings,^^^ thereby practically legalizing

home

digital

recording and the devices used.

On

the

other hand

it

requires

the

manufacturers of such devices to pay royalties to the copyright holders through a central

agency and these royalties are levied on the sales of the recording equipment and
media.^^

It

further requires

all digital

Copyright Management System

audio recording devices to have a so-called Serial

(SCMS)

to

be within the scope of the

act.^^^

This system

^"See/J. at 1778-1779
^"^
Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17U.S.C. §§ 1001-1008(1994); 17 U.S.C.A. §§1001-1008 (West
Supp. 2000)
^" See S. Rep. No. 102-294, at 32-33 (1992)
See 17 U.S.C.A. § 1008 (West Supp. 2000)
^'^
17 U.S.C. §§ 1003-1004 and §§ 1006-1007; C/ Benton J. Gaffhey. Copyright Statutes that regulate
Technology: A comparative analysis of the Audio Home Recording Act and the Digital Millenium
Copyright Act, 75 Wash. L. Rev. 611, 621-622 (2000)
^* See 17 U.S.C.
§ 1002 (a); for the exact technical requirements, see S. Rep. No. 102-294, at 17 (1992)

^

159

allows an unlimited amount of copies to be

may be

at the

the original but prevents copies of

achieved by a digital "flag" that

is

beginning of an original recording, "telling" the recording device that

it

copies from being

encoded

made from

made by

The "flag"

copied.

the device. This result

is

not copied however.

is

The device

will not

make

the

^^^

RIAA

b.

copy of a

made with

recording without the "flag" and consequently no copies of copies can be

device.

a

V.

Diamond Multimedia

AHRA

This case addressed the question of whether the

computer context, more accurately, whether

it

can be applied

can be applied to

MP3

in the

recording and

playback devices. The Recording Industry Association of America (hereinafter RIAA)

PMP300

sought an injunction against the manufacture and sale of the Rio
Rio), a device that allowed users to copy

device.^^'

The RIAA argued

under the definition of the

therefore in violation of the

extent that

it

but lacked the

AHRA.^^^ This

found the Rio to be a

definition, but

it

files

from

Rio qualified as a

that the

AHRA,

MP3

digital

their

computers onto a portable

digital

SCMS

district court

(hereinafter

audio recording device

required

by the Act and was

agreed with the

RIAA

"audio recording device" under the

to the

AHRA

denied the injunction nevertheless, because the Rio's lack of a digital

output makes serial copies impossible and an injunction because of the lacking

would be an "exercise

in futility."^

''^

The decision was appealed. The

SCMS

9^^ Circuit,

other

*^^

See S. Rep. No. 102-294, at 36-37 (1992)
*™ Recording Industry Association of America

Diamond Multimedia Systems,

Inc.,

180

1075
*" Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems,
632 (CD. Cal. 1998), affd, 180 F. 3d 1073 (9"^ Cir. 1999)

Inc.,

29

Cir.
*^'

v.

F.

3d 1073 (9*

1999)

Id. at

1074-1075

'*^^/^. at

F.

Supp. 2d 624,

.
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than the district court, found that the Rio

The

the definition of the AHRA.^^'*

device that

that

is

because

is

not a "digital audio recording device" under

AHRA defines

a "digital audio recording device" as a

capable of making a "digital audio copied recording.

this

definition excludes "any material object...

computer programs are
hard drive, which

is

fixed,"^^^

and the Rio

relies

"^^'^

The

court found

which one or more

in

on music copied from a computer

computer programs, the Rio could not be

a material object containing

considered a "digital audio recording device" within the meaning of the AHRA.^^^ The

9^ Circuit

further argues that the legislative history suggests an intentional "loophole" for

Indeed the legislative history suggests that the

computers.

applicable to devices like the Rio, or to normal

the

of

AHRA

'digital

states that "the typical personal

is

presently not

home computers. The Senate Report on

computer would not

fall

within the definition

audio recording device."^^^

Presently, the

AHRA

impact on the question of
to

AHRA

is

OSP

not applicable to computers and consequently has no

or

P2P

liability.

cover computers and the problems discussed

Whether the

AHRA

in this thesis will

should be extended

be addressed

later.

B. Conclusion for the present state of U.S. law:

1

OSP

liability

The

courts in

and the

DMCA

Netcom and Sega had resolved

direct copyright infringement in a reasonable

'^"'

**"

Mat

*^M7U.S.C.

liability for

well before the introduction of the

§ 1001 (3)
§ 1001 (5) (B)

Recording Industry Association of America
1075, 1076 (9"^
^'"/rf. at 1078
S.

OSP

1075, 1081

17U.S.C.

^'''^

way

the problem of

Cir.

1999)

Rep. No. 102-294,

at

122 (1992)

v.

Diamond Multimedia Systems,

Inc.,

180

F.

3d 1073,
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DMCA.^^° However,

this solution

was

neither uniformly applicable nor binding.^^' Frena

was

technically

that

provided no solution to the problem but rather caused more problems by ignoring

reality.^^^

somewhat

DMCA provides

The

infringement

good law, even though

still

indefinite

DMCA's

and arguably insufficient

512

all levels, at least §

had reached a questionable decision

a clear, functional and uniform solution regarding direct

and although the

liability;

the court

to

definition of "service providers"

is

adequately cover the entities involved

at

should be welcomed as the overdue uniform codification of a

(a)

viable solution regarding this type of liability, consistent with the results in the leading

cases on the issue:

Netcom and

Sega. Eliminating monetary liability for the types of

and functioning ensures continuing widespread

activities vital to the hitemet's existence

access to the Internet

at

low cost by reducing the OSPs'

avoiding these risks being handed
subscription policies.

to the user

it,

through higher fees or restrictive

while preserving free speech and thereby contributes to the

of "promotion of science"

Curiously though,

when

(i.e.

learning).

taking a closer look at the safe harbors,

apparent that they cover situations in which

OS?

OSPs should

this material or disables access to

even before the introduction of the

it,

there should not have

DMCA with

its

it

becomes

not face liability anyway: If an

has knowledge or receives notice of allegedly infiinging material on

removes

and thereby

This result promotes further growth of the Internet and the

resources available through

constitutional goal

down

financial risk

safe harbors.

its

network and

been any

This

is

liability

coherent with

^^"^

Supra,

*^'

Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright Infringement. Enterprise

Liability,

TpTp.

107, 118

And the

First

Amendment, 88 Geo.

L.

J.

1833, 1880, 1883 (2000)

**'5Mpra,p. 113
**^

U.S. Const,

**^

Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise

Liability,

art.

1

§ 8 cl. 8

And the First Amendment,

88 Geo. L.

J.

1833, 1880, 1883 (2000)
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the decisions in

Netcom and

Marobie.^^^ Defendants in those cases were not hable

because they had no knowledge (hence were not contributorily hable), no financial
benefit or no actual ability to supervise (hence

standards used in the

DMCA

safe harbors.

were not vicariously

At the same time, the

liable)

DMCA's

- exactly

the

standards are

consistent with the findings in Sega, since the defendant in that case

had knowledge of

the infringements and the right and ability to supervise and control.

must be noted

It

that

the provisions closely mirror the standards for contributory and vicarious infringement

respectively. Subsection (A) refers to "actual knowledge^'' or "awareness

the constructive

requires that the

knowledge required

OSP

",

which equals

contributory liability while subsection (B)

for

have no "direct financial benefit" from an infringement, which

consistent with the standards for vicarious liability.^^^

The only

is

real difference occurs in

subsection (C) that equates the formal notice with knowledge.

Why

create safe harbors, if there

before the introduction of the
the issue

was not

was no

liability

before? Suffice to say that

DMCA there were not enough court decisions to this effect;
The

settled completely^^^.

court in Sega had not set forth standards for

finding contributory liability that could be counted on

,

Frena was theoretically

good law^^° and Netcom and Marobie were hardly enough precedents
basis for standards of service provider liability.

serve a purpose after

^^^

**^

all.

sound

Therefore the safe harbor provisions

uniform codified solution

is to

be welcomed because

Supra, pp. 107, 118, 120
Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise

Liability.

**'M

at

And the

First

Amendment, 88 Geo.

L.

J.

1833, 1880, 1882 (2000)

1880, 1882-1883

**^

Id. at, 1880, 1883; see also
(Md.) 2001 and supra, p. 122
689
Supra, pp. 124 et. seq.
^"^
Supra, p. 159
^^^

A

to establish a

still

Supra, pp. 107, 118, 120

ALS

Scan, Inc.

v.

RemarQ Communities,

Inc.,

239

F.

3d 619, 622 C.A. 4

it
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provides

OSPs with boundaries

contributes

to

the

within which they do not face Uabihty and thereby

functionahty

and

technologies.^^^ This development

is

further

expansion

certainly positive,

of the

Internet

especially since

endorse the findings of the Frena court. In the online environment

it is

it

and new
does not

prudent to create

uniformity and functionality by statute to ensure further growth of the beneficial aspects

of the

Web

rights

and the public's

while limiting the harmful aspects. If a balance between the copyright owners
interest is to

be achieved, limitations of

liability are necessary. If

providers were to face liability caused only by a third party taking advantage of their

prime activity - providing services relating

would ultimately

to the Internet

back on the consumer and

fall

may

-

this

would cause

costs

which

also lead to limitations of free

speech.^^^ Therefore, and for the reasons stated in the above discussions of the cases,

limiting

OSP

An

liability for online

infringements

entirely different question

is

is

generally a good idea.

whether the safe harbors in their present form are

the best solution that could have been found. This

DMCA

difficult to evaluate, since the

has not been applied for a sufficiently long period of time to draw final

conclusions about

its

functionality and effects.

the providers actually

make use of

conditions set forth therein.^^''

A few

These will also largely depend on whether

the safe harbor provisions, e.g.

fair to

comply with

the

educated guesses toward answering these questions

can be made. While meeting some of the requirements

seems

is

may be

inconvenient for OSPs,

say that they will attempt to limit their potential liability to the greatest

*'^

Cf. Brief Amicus Curiae of Copyright Professors In Support of Reversal to Appeal Nos. 00-16401 and
00-16403, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 3-6 (2000)
*'^
Infra, pp. 164 et. seq.
*''*
Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise
Liability,

And the

it

First

Amendment, 88 Geo.

L.

J.

1833, 1880, 1885 (2000)
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extent possible.*'^^

To do

where they face a high
once regarding

DMCA

they will comply with the

so,

risk

this issue.

of

liability.

On

the one

ALS

v.

DMCA's

RemarQ

safe harbor requirements

points in different directions

hand the OSP, RemarQ, argued based on the

and claimed the safe harbor, on the other hand they refuse to block the

concerned as required

to

it

seems too early come

impact of the safe harbors

at

to final conclusions

point.

this

newsgroup was under the impression

RemarQ 's

ALS

that

expected; yet this too

that

OSPs may be more

may change once

about

refusal

to

OSP

RemarQ

part of

behavior or the

block access to the

DMCA

an idea of how to

react.

reluctant to block access to sites than

the standards set forth in the

more thoroughly and standards have been developed by

interpreted

on the

had not complied with the

requirements and there was hardly any case law to give

The case only shows

sites

remain within the safe harbor. This behavior could be

interpreted to signify only partial acceptance of the safe harbor provisions

OSPs. However,

at

DMCA

are

the courts and in

practice.

As demonstrated above

the risk to be held liable for direct infringement

small since Frena has been widely discredited. ^^^ Yet Frena could
other courts and therefore at least

some OSPs

will

still

is fairly

be followed by

comply with the requirements

relating

to direct infringement.^^^

Regarding vicarious
after

Netcom.

liability,

However, the

the liability risk for

risk to

be held

significantly higher, especially since the law

"''VJ. at

1885-1886

^''^/J. at

1840-1842

''''/^. at

1886

^'^^

Supra,

p.

107

OSPs

is

low as

liable for contributory

is

well, especially

infringement seems

not clear about the issue

at the

present

165

time.

is

It

not settled, for example, what degree of knowledge could suffice to find

liability for contributory infringement,

Accordingly,

it

seems

likely that

even though Netcom contained some indications.

OSPs would be

comply with

willing to

^^^
for the safe harbor concerning at least contributory liability.

face liability or not. Furthermore, compliance with the

likely that

What

OSPs

However,
required

it

by

is

meet the requirements

will tend to

effects will this

removed while

have?

Ideally,

it

the Internet's operability

is

be considered

requirements offers
In toto,

it

set forth in the statute.

that infringing material

liability.

questionable whether this will actually happen, whether the procedure

the statute

is

knowledge than the alleged

going to have

this

effect,

or whether

on a large

infringers; they will

scale.^^'

it

will lead to the

This seems to be a

have more resources and

know which

lawsuit and pursue their interests to the

fiillest

extent.

alleged infringer will not have these advantages.^^^

know

It

On

may

legal

designated agent to notify,

phrase their complaint and they will generally have financial resources to

provider will

may

whether they

preserved by limiting undue

substantial risk, since the copyright holders will generally

to

DMCA

would simply mean

unjustified removal of noninfringing material

how

also

whose material was removed.^^^

protection from lawsuits filed by subscribers

is

must

DMCA provides OSPs with a higher degree of certainty as to

that the

seems

It

the requirements

file

a

the other hand, the average

well be argued that the content

exactly which designated agent to respond to once the notice of

removal has been received and

that individual

copyright protection. While

of

all

knowledge and wealth

this is true to

some

extent,

it

are not the issue in

must be considered

that

'" Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise
Liability. And the First Amendment, 88 Geo. L. J. 1833, 1886 (2000)
™M,at 1886-1887
™'5ee/V/. at 1880, 1888(2000)
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copyright in the U.S. serves to protect not only the copyright holder, but also the

public.

^°^

The goal of American copyright law

should be, a balance between these
involved regarding legal measures

Another serious issue
implicates

free

speech,

is

is,

or at least constitutionally prescribed

interests. In light

may well be

of this, fairness between the parties

considered a viable issue.

the protection of free speech.

because copyright by nature

The existence of copyright
speech

limits

copyrighted work for anyone but the copyright holder. This does not

law
is

is

generally a violation of the

necessarily a repetition.

ideas''.^

"*

first

on

Amendment,

removed or made inaccessible because of

made

it

is

First, the

since they add relatively

a complaint, free speech

it

copied,

little

it

to the

restrained. ^^^

is

While

really does not infringe.

not convincing in the context of the

DMCA's

Of

their subscribers for

this

argument

is

safe harbors for three reasons:

imbalance between the parties mentioned above makes

of being sued by

is

that is actually not infringing is

alleged infiinger to react on an even battlefield. Second and

risk

that copyright

of existing speech are no as

providers to have allegedly infringing material removed while

no

the

that the restriction is limited in duration since the

material will be restored eventually if

valid,

repetition

However, where material

course the argument can be

mean

amendment, of course. Where material

Restrictions

problematic with regard to the

"marketplace of

first

regarding

it

makes

more

removing material

it

easy for content

it

difficult for the

importantly,

if

OSPs

run

they comply with the

^"^7^. at

1887
™^ Supra,
pp. 89-93
""^

Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise

And the First Amendment, 88 Geo. L. J. 1833, 1880, 1866-1867 (2000); see also L.Ray Patterson,
Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1987); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free
Speech: Constitutional Limitations an the Protection of Expression, 67 Cal. L. rev. 283 (1979); Melville B.
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantee of Free Speech and Press, 17 UCLA L.
Liability,

Rev. 1180(1970)
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As long

safe harbor requirements.

complaint, there

no

is

as the material

whatsoever for the OSP.

risk

infringing or non-infringing can be

infringer has

After

all,

removed due

is

removed

It

formal statutory

to a

seems odd,

any material,

that

v^ithout risk of a lawsuit.

no remedy; she has no choice but

by

to await being sued

The

alleged

the complainant.

the opportunity to respond to the removal only leads to restoration of the

material if the complainant does not sue. Furthermore, the allegedly infringing material

remains offline during

trial

which again benefits the complainant;

it

amounts

to

a

temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction without going through the
procedure for obtaining such; there are no hearings, no court proceedings, not even
posting of a bond.

The usual procedures

DMCA.

Last,

would

protect a copyright defendant from

of free speech rights are circumvented by the safe harbor design

unjustified restrictions

the

that

and most importantly, generally errors

that limit

in

speech are far more

problematic than errors that expand free speech further than necessary. ^^^ The removal of
material although

it

potentially non-infringing

is

seems

to

be an error of the

first

category.

Taking

all this into

account, the safe harbor provisions of the

less than perfect solution to the

limitation thereof

it

is

While

it

problem of

is difficult to

certainly possible to achieve a

cases with appropriate

bond

for

means

envision a

more balanced

It

liability

more

result

to protect their First

example would be an improvement.

™

OSP

and the certainly necessary

functional set of requirements,

by providing defendants

Amendment

would

DMCA seem to be a

rights.

A

hearing or a

also be reasonable to allocate

See Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright Infringement,
And the First Amendment, 88 Geo. L. J. 1833, 1880, 1885-1889 (2000)
'"^Id.at 1889
™VJ. at 1868-1869

Enterprise Liability,

in these

more
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burdens to the complainant since

it is

she

therefore bear the burden of proof to

procedure
material

is

a sensible solution,

removed or

is

claims copyright infringement and should

fullest.

its

While the notice and take-down

not so sensible, even unreasonable to keep the

inaccessible after a substantial response unless there

believe that irreparable

2.

it

who

harm would be done

is

reason to

to the complainant.

P2P
Regarding P2P services and networks, there

is

no

final

solution yet and the

Napster decisions, though reaching an arguably reasonable result under the current law
the end, have not shone

uniform standard of

enough

liability.

light into the

darkness of the issue to guide the

The decentralized

filesharing networks

way

in

to a

have clouded the

issue further, due to their lack of a central entity that could be held responsible for the

users'

actions.

After Napster's loss in the courts, the likelihood of

filesharing systems being created (for the purpose

least)

have diminished

as illustrated

question

is

by
not

the

to almost nothing.

The

at

trend goes toward decentralized networks

entity's

infringement should be limited, but rather

centralized

of exchanging copyrighted music

emergence of Gnutella, Freenet and the

whether a central

new

liability

how

to

for

like.

Consequently, the

contributory

or

vicarious

maintain a balance between the

copyright holders and the public, as manifested in the individual private users.

It

is

obvious, that the present laws cannot answer this question adequately, since the

it

is

practically impossible for copyright holders to "fight for their rights" in court against

millions of individuals with hardly enough assets to cover even the legal costs this

incur.

On

would

the other hand, allowing anyone with Internet access to share copyrighted

169

material without restriction

artists

behind

it

would pose a

and would eventually lead

quality being produced, thereby

damaging

serious threat to the copyright industry, the

to less original creative

the public interest in a big

domain. Especially in the music business,

somehow abused

their copyrights

work of

it

a kernel of truth,

it

is

true that the artists profit

much

of

could be argued that the industry has

and the monopolistic position they have enjoyed for so

no

ignore that the industry has rights.

is

levels

and varied public

long and should therefore not be pitied or protected. While this argument

more than

all

legal

More

may

contain

argument and should not encourage anyone

to

importantly, the artists have rights; and while

it

less than the industry, this again

should not be used as

an argument against protecting copyrights. These two arguments could be used against
the

"work

for hire" doctrine or as reasons to take a closer look at corporate pricing

schemes and potential violations of
issue of copyright infringement.

AHRA

to

One

possible solution

have nothing to do with the

would be the extension of

the

cover computers and certain computer hardware to legalize the individual

users' actions

:i

antitrust law, but they

by

creating a reimbursement and compulsory licensing scheme.

CHAPTER III: COMPARING THE PRESENT LAWS
A.

Similarities

In both jurisdictions discussed here, the individual users infringe copyright

transferring protected

music over the

filesharing networks.

The problem and

are

numerous

too

to

the

sue,

Internet,

it

with or without using peer-to-peer

The

the controversy are the same:

individual users

enforcement of copyright against them has become

impossible in most cases and the issue of

entities is

be

liability

on the part of OSPs and central P2P

DMCA,

an unresolved problem, the newly implemented laws (the

the

Directive 2000/31 /EC) notwithstanding. While the United States enacted the

address the problem,

it

does not resolve

it

entirely, especially

TDG and

DMCA

the safe harbor provisions have been applied in

RemarQ,

how

is still

not clear

well they will work.

The same

ALS

states

and has not been applied

in practice.

Furthermore, there

regulations on the issue in the "Multimedia Directive" to be enacted.

impossible to say whether the

problems

in the

the problems, if they

It is

additional

difficult if not

or Directive 2000/31 /EC adequately deal with the

however, there are laws that would resolve

were applicable: The

Germany^^^, curiously enough

2000/31 /EC, which in turn shows

in a

TDG

many

at least

would resolve the issue of OSP

way much

similar to the

similarities to the
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i

may be

all

long run.

In both jurisdictions

in

DMCA

v.

true for Directive

is

2000/31 /EC, which has not even been incorporated or translated into national laws by

member

to

with regard to centralized

P2P networks. Even though
it

by

DMCA

DMCA

some of
liability

and Directive

in its structure

and

I
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On

requirements.

the other side of the Atlantic, the

controversy about infringement by the individual users

AHRA

would put an end

to the

710

Differences

B.

The most obvious
scope of the

new

indeed limited

in

difference between the jurisdictions on the other hand,

legislation.

While the

DMCA

is

the

purports to be a copyright law and

is

scope to copyright-related issues, Directive 2000/31 /EC addresses

criminal law, intellectual property law in general and even contract law, to

name

but a

few. This illustrates the general difference between U.S. law, which tends to regulate

"from the particular

to the general"

and continental European law, which usually contains

very general rules that are then interpreted to

fit

many

individual situations. Neither

system seems to have the perfect solution for the issue, but from a logical standpoint

seems

that the

more general approach

answer a question

that is not entirely

thereby remain more flexible in

is

better suited to address a developing problem; to

known because

its

application.

it

can be written more abstractly and

On

the other hand,

addressing the

problem on a case-by-case basis has the advantage of not being limited by a
There are several more differences prior
the

general

philosophical

it

to the introduction

statute.

of the new laws,

like

approach or the scope of the defenses/justifications an

individual or corporate entity could assert. These are largely apparent from the above

discussions and will not be repeated here. Suffice to say that the approaches are different

°*
See supra, p. 75
™^ Compare 17 U.S.C.A.

§

512 (West Supp. 2000) a« J Council Directive 2000/31 /EC, Art. 12-15, see

5Mpra, pp. 82, 83, 114, 128
''"
Compare supra, p. 155 and infra, p. 171
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enough

to

be distinguished but similar enough

solutions, as will

be suggested

in the following.

to

possibly reach almost identical

CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
OSP

A.

liability

The approach taken regarding

the

liability

of OSPs

legislation so far is a step in the right direction, if a nervous

DMCA

it

and incomplete one.

If the

should resolve the issue in a sensible manner. The same goes for the

European solution, although
details left

it

remains to be seen

how

and refinement, they are

with reality as far as they go. The gaps can be

An

member

states will

alternative solution

would be

fairly functional, practical

filled

fill

in the

would have

to eliminate

any

liability

the

same

due

to the lack

Legislation to this effect

part. In turn

any form of

of infiingement by a third

be achieved by legislation going further than

Directive 2000/3 1/EC's requirements and eliminating

be discussed further

AHRA.

on the individual users'

result could

compulsory

the general implementation of a

indirect liability in the U.S. could not arise

Germany

and compatible

and the flaws eliminated.

licensing and royalty scheme, possibly akin to the

party. In

the

open by the Directive. While the present solutions should certainly be subject

to further criticism

B.

European and U.S.

can be amended to adequately preserve free speech and fairly distribute the

burden of proof,

will

in

in the following, regarding

all liability

P2P

for

OSPs. This solution

filesharing networks.

P2P
Neither of the legal systems examined here has found a sound solution to the

problem of P2P filesharing networks, especially not decentralized systems
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like Gnutella
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or Freenet. There are several possible

ways

to

handle the problem, some of which will be

analyzed in the following.

Centralized filesharing networks

I.

In centralized filesharing networks, the individual users infringe copyright

making unauthorized copies of protected works,
entity maintaining the centralized

as seen in the Napster case.

much
too

to

be wished

for.

many to be sued
by

in its progress

The

The

is

individual users,

who commit

new

service or technology.

necessary. There

There

is

no benefit

way of enforcing

users liability,

it

is

The driving

is

forces behind the

of Internet usability and versatility should not be hindered by

may be

in

several solutions to the problem.

would have

to start

it.

by eliminating

the individual

maintaining a law that holds millions of otherwise

innocent persons liable for an everyday activity while

practical

the actual infringements are

and furthermore technology could be seriously impeded

sensible solution to the issue

users' liability.

for contributory infringement,

the contributory liability of the central entity because this entity

in the field

law beyond what

is at least liable

Currently, the

This seems simple enough. However, this result leaves

for their acts

usually the one creating a

developments

network

as discussed above.

when

at the

The copyright holders have no

same time lacking any

benefit fi-om the individual

not an effective element to the protection of their rights and therefore

unnecessary. Consequently, the individual users sharing copyrighted works should have
the benefit of an exception like the fair use doctrine or a justification like § 53

similar

compulsory licensing scheme. This would not only simplify and

"'SMpra,pp. 53, 135
712

Supra,

p.

136

UrhG

obliterate

or a

many

175

of the problems discussed above,
users "back into legality."

on the part of the

As

would

it

also

mean

bringing a vast

number of Internet

a side effect, there could not be any contributory liability

central entities

anymore

(or

OSPs

because there would

for that matter),

not be any infringements committed by the individual users and consequently, there

would be nothing

to "contribute" to.

Since vicarious infringement

for contributory infringement, requires an infringement

issue

would be resolved

71 %

third party

(the users), this

Even though individual infringement

as well.

prerequisite to third party liability in

of third party

by a

liability, like liability

not a

is

strict

Germany, the concept would eliminate the problem

infringements as well, due to the licensing scheme

liability for online

proposed here.

Of course,

the individual users' liability cannot be abolished without

of generalized benefit or reimbursement

to the artists

and other copyright holders. There

may be many ways

to

would be a

Internet access that could then be used to

tax

on

holders. This solution

do

this,

but

would be

it

seems there are only two practical paths

the easiest conceptually.

popular and least politically opportune and

is

pay

However,

artists

it is

would be

a

the exchange of copyrighted material over the Internet.

computer system? While
problem would be

that

this

should apply.

may

not

One

and copyright

certainly the least

mandatory automatically

added fee on the purchase of hardware (and possibly some software)

this

to take.

not likely to be implemented. Another,

likely unpopular but practically viable, solution

determine to which equipment

some form

that is necessary for

One problem would be

to

A modem? A CD-Writer? Even a whole

make much of

a difference, another serious

such fees would be highly arbitrary since not everyone using any

of the hardware required to share copyrighted material over the Internet actually does so

^'^

Supra, 117
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or even wishes to do so. This, however, should be regarded as the drawback that

copyrighted material

is

more users

"legalized",

P2P

Furthermore, once

acceptable in resolving the whole problem.

will

likely

is

of

filesharing

advantage of the

take

technology, more technology will be available and the fees would grow to be less
arbitrary over time. Therefore, this concept should be recognized as presenting a simple,

functional and acceptable solution.

As

the copyright industry in general,

it

should be noted that the solution

them

should also be recognized that their rights would be

for a certain time, but

it

to possible opposition

from the record industry or

may

cause losses for

preserved and royalties would be paid. Furthermore, the added publicity and exposure of
their products to a vast

may

worldwide audience

The value of word-of-mouth public

their products.

eventually lead to increased sales of

relations should not

be underestimated

in this context.

For the United
scope of the
software,

AHRA

States, this result could basically

to

CD-writers

cover

and

all

be achieved by extending the

digital recording devices, including

possibly

even

home

computers.

In

MP3

recording

Germany,

implementation of Directive 2000/31 /EC could be the opportunity to reform the

some

extent and implement a compulsory licensing

TDG

or a

"mere conduit", "caching", "hosting" and the

new

like.

UrhG

to

scheme of this nature by extending or

reworking §53 UrhG. Such an amendment or "renovatin" of
to include a provision similar to § 5

the

§

53

UrhG would

then have

provision, eliminating liability for

177

Decentralized filesharing networks

n.

Since only the individual users of decentralized filesharing networks infringe
copyrights under current laws, only the individual users could be held liable and therefore

only they can be

center of the question of

at the

how

to protect the copyright holders

without limiting free speech and the public interest relating to copyright and without
inhibiting the growth of new technologies.

Following the AHRA-like approach would resolve
individual users' activities

would be

that

industry, increasing their profits apart

from the

must be noted

that the

unresolved.

all

The

it

solutions found and suggested

be regarded as

usefril

problem as

legalized and the industry and artists

from a royalty scheme and a larger audience

In the end,

this

may

or

may

well.

would

The

benefit

not purchase items from the

royalties.

problems are

by

still

immense and

legislators, courts

largely

and scholars should

pieces to be brought together to solve the great puzzle of liability

for online infringements.

The suggestions made above

are believed

by

the author to pose

an alternative to the present "bits and pieces" legislation and attempt to incorporate and
restate the

most useful ideas already proposed while hopeftilly adding a new element of

uniformity and simplicity.
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http://wv\Av.heise.de

Legal Information Site

-

http://www.weinknecht.de
http://www.hgb.leipzig.de

BT-Drucksache 4/270

Legal Information Site

-

University of Leipzig Site

-

Statement of the Bundestag regarding §53

-

http://normative.zusammenhaenge.at/faelle/urhg aol.html

http://www.sub.unigoettingen.de

http://Intemet.SDiegel.de

-

http://www.newsbvtes.com

http://www.wired.com

-

-

-

at

72 (1998)

News

News

-

-

Site

House Report regarding

the

DMCA

Site

Site

Magazine "Wired"

http://www^thestandard.com

Court Report

University of Goettingen Site

Magazine "Der Spiegel"

H.R. Conf Rep. No. 105-796,

http://www.inside.com

-

-

UrhG

Site

"The Standard"

Site

http://www.wirednews.com
http://music.zdnet.com

http://www.salon.com

http://www.washingtonpost.com
S.

Rep. No. 102-294,

IITF:

at

-

"Washington Post"

32-33 (1992)

-

Site

Senate Report regarding the

The Report of the Working Group on

AHRA

hitellectual Property Rights,

137-138 (1995)

Abbreviations and foreign terms:

1

Courts

AG - Amtsgericht (lowest level civil

and criminal

[trial]

LG - Landgericht (second

and criminal

[trial

level civil

court in

Germany)

and appeals] court

in

Germany)
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OLG - Oberlandesgericht (civil and criminal court of appeals in Germany)

KG - Kammergericht (=OLG in Berlin)
OGH - Oberster Gerichtshof (highest civil and criminal court in Austria)
BGH - Bundesgerichtshof (highest civil and criminal court [of appeals]

in

Germany)

BGHZ - Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen (private law decisions of the BGH)
BverfG - Bundesverfassungsgericht (Constitutional Court of Germany)

RG - Reichsgericht (highest civil

and criminal court [of appeals] before 1945

RGZ - Reichsgericht in Zivilsachen (private law decisions of the RG)

Statutes

2.

BGB - Buergerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil
UrhG -

Code)

Urheberrechtsgesetz (German Copyright Statute)

luKDG -

Informations- und Kommunikationsdienstegesetz (Information- and

Communications- services

statute)

TDG - Teledienstgesetz (Art. X of the luKDG)
LUG - Gesetz betreffend das Urheberrecht an Werken der Literatur und der Tonkunst
(Copyright Statute for Literature and Music of 1901)

KUG

-

Gesetz betreffend das Urheberrecht an Werken der bildenden Kuenste und der

Fotografie (Copyright Statute for Arts and Photography of 1907)

GG - Grundgesetz (German Constitution)

3.

German

Publications:

NJW - Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
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JuS - Juristische Schulung

MDR - Monatsschrift fuer Deutsches Recht
GRUR - Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht
GRUR Int. - Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht International

ZUM - Zeitschrift fuer Urheber- und Medienrecht
CR - Computer und

Recht

MMR - Multimediarecht
BT-Drucksache - Bundestagsdrucksache

4.

Translations of frequently used

(official publication

of the Bundestag)

German terms

Abs. - Absatz (paragraph)

Urheber - author
Urheberrecht - copyright/right of the author
Urheberpersoenlichkeitsrecht

- personal

rights

of the author/moral rights

Urheberrechtsgesetz - copyright statute
Urteil

-

court decision/verdict

Verfasser/Autor - author

Eigentum

-

property

Verwertungsrecht - right

to

economic exploitation

Gesetz(buch) - statute
Rechtsverletzung - violation of a right/infringement
Dienste der Informationsgesellschaft - information society services
Inverkehrbringen - to be entered into circulation
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Anbieten -

to offer

Geistige Auseinandersetzung

-

intellectual dispute

Anspruchsgrundlage - (statutory) basis for a claim
Rechtswidrig - illegal/against the law

Amtliche Begruendung Kenntnis - knowledge
Inhalt

-

content

official statement

of the legislature

